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Abstract 
The dissertation analyzes digitization through a phenomenological lens, 
understanding the digitization as an “outgrowth” of a potential that was always 
already latent within our being as the human-being. The analysis primarily utilizes 
the philosophic work of the 20th century philosophers, Martin Heidegger and 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty.  
Through their philosophies, I seek to synthesize Heidegger’s concept of 
de-severance with Merleau-Ponty’s concepts of embodiment and the world as 
possessing depth. In doing so, I bring these theoretical concepts together to build 
a phenomenological “picture” of how it is that the digitization of the world came 
into being. All the while, my ultimate project is seeking and displaying the 
underlying drive, or will, that occurs when human de-severance, our particular 
embodiment, and our unique access to the world as depth discover within the 
world the potential to digitize.  
This will, and the result of the interplay between human de-severance, 
embodiment, and the world’s depth is the-will-to-flatten. In putting forth this 
theory, I analyze how the will-to-flatten via digitization has influenced our 
understandings and engagement with embodiment, space, and intersubjectivity. 
While I argue that the will-to-flatten is the driving force of digitization, I ultimately 
seek to display that the telos of this will is a paradox that cannot be resolved.  
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Introduction 
 
“Generalization of the problem: there was a passage to the infinite as objective infinity--
This passage was a thematization (and forgetting) of the Offenheit, of the Life-World 
(Lebenswelt)--We have to start anew from behind that point.” 
 – Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible, (166)  
 
 
The world has become increasingly digitized and will only continue to be 
impacted by this digitization. Digitization, clearly denoting the material transition 
from analog to digital, but given the context of this dissertation, will primarily be 
analyzed phenomenologically as an ontological phenomenon in the attempt to 
better understand the driving force “behind” digitization. One straightforward 
reason for the significance of this endeavor is that digitization has become an 
indispensable facet of modernity’s reality. So ubiquitous is digitization to the late 
twentieth and early twenty-first centuries that, much like air, there is a tendency 
to presuppose its presence. Digitization’s existence has so fully saturated our 
lives that it’s easy to overlook just how vital it is to the contemporary moment, but 
one need not worry. We won’t be able to forget for too long, as we are being 
reminded by a significant flow of scholarship - scholarship that informs us just 
how digital technologies and media not only exist with us, but how they are 
literally changing the world itself, for better or worse. And this work has 
established essential arguments and conversation points in regards to how we 
should treat digitization as we move towards the future, where human and the 
digital continue to merge.   
For example, Marshall McLuhan, a visionary of digital media and its 
implications, published an eye-opening text in 1964, Understanding Media: The 
Extensions of Man. This text established a vital recognition that the medium, and 
by that McLuhan means the tangible technology itself, whether ancient or new, 
fundamentally alters the way we live our lives, influencing even our actions and 
thoughts (8). A television does not simply present us with discrete images. The 
television itself alters the structure of the home; where we sit and converse with 
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friends and loved ones is changed by the presence of the television. Anne 
Friedberg’s The Virtual Window brings us back to the screen, not simply as a 
tangible apparatus, but as the metaphoric window through which so many of us 
encounter each and every day. She writes, “The frame of the screen is a closed 
system, a primary container for inset secondary and tertiary frames that may 
recede in mise en abyme, but also converge to reunite within a grander but still 
bounded frame” (241). The realities of our screens are paramount to our 
fundamental understanding of the world and others, Friedberg tells us. Screens 
both frame and filter, and hence, framing always produces a double 
phenomenon. The frame simultaneously includes while it excludes. 
 But do we consider this exclusion, or unquestioningly take what is 
included as our existence? What is being framed? What is not? We must 
continue to ask ourselves these questions in the age of the screen or our realties 
will be shaped by it. Douglas Rushkoff, in Program or Be Programmed, urges us 
in a similar vein to confront our digital technology and media devices as active 
users, and not to be unknowingly swayed by their potential power. He states, 
“Understanding programing - either as a real programmer or even, as I’m 
suggesting, as more of a critical thinker - is the only way to truly know what’s 
going on in a digital environment, and to make willful choices about the roles we 
play” (8). Our technologies, and those who control them, are programming us, 
Rushkoff insists. We must know the program, the digital code, or at least be 
cognizant of it if we wish to reprogram ourselves. Meanwhile, Nicholas Carr 
investigates digital technologies and their capacity to change the human brain in 
What the Internet is Doing to Our Brains: The Shallows. Much like Socrates’ 
warning in The Phaedrus, Carr addresses digital technology’s increasing 
capacity to act as an extension of the mind, potentially diminishing our own 
memory (Plato, 551-552). Our smart phones hold the numbers of our contacts, 
scheduled appointments, and link us to Wikipedia, where so much of our human 
knowledge resides - so why actually remember any of this as one’s own? Carr’s 
The Shallows displays to us that our brains are literally being altered, our 
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synapses rewired. We are becoming as mechanistic as our machines, as timely 
as our clocks. We’re losing our attention just as we become models of capitalistic 
efficacy, paradoxically leaving only our technology with the more “human” 
qualities, such as our emotions. Carr witnesses this transfer of qualities in 
Stanley Kubrick’s 2001 Space Odyssey, where in the end, the artificial 
intelligence HAL is the only figure that resonates qualities we consider most 
“human.” HAL feels for its life, pleads for it. Human intelligence, in comparison, 
so mediated, so altered by the computers we constantly use, appears “flattened,” 
– mechanistic (224). 
And yet, insisting upon a more positive position, Henry Jenkins, Sam Ford, 
and Joshua Green confront digitization and its ability to transmit Spreadable 
Media. Together, the three display the ease with which the digital technologies 
we engage with link the world as one, spreading information in a vast, almost 
instantaneous manner. We are all connected via digitization. A YouTube video 
uploaded in Iraq can fundamentally, and quickly, impact human values and 
meaning on a global scale, a thesis that was arguably prophesized by Walter 
Benjamin in his seminal essay, The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical 
Reproduction. Reproducible technology, which increasingly turns works of art 
into discrete images, strips from them their particular space and time, their aura, 
allowing us to recreate and then transmit art all over the globe, politicizing it. Who 
controls the dissemination of this art, as well as the message attached to it? Now 
governments and corporations can use art as a means to an end, for profit, 
democracy, or even fascistic purposes. But what if the citizens take charge? 
What if citizens not only consume, but through a global public sphere of 
technological interconnection, reclaim art, creating its message apart from any 
higher institutional power? But this means we must still use digitization in order to 
save the world, does it not? Carr’s fear, envisioned through HAL, might still be 
realized even as we work to save everything. Engagement with digital technology 
is impossible to abandon in our contemporary moment.   
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Considering such a dystopia, Jaron Lanier takes a reflective step back 
with You Are Not Your Gadget. Here Lanier insists that one can engage digital 
technology yet learn when to “disconnect” in order to find and center oneself to 
be more authentic in the face of the bombardment that Benjamin, Carr, and so 
many others have warned us of. He notes that, “The antihuman approach to 
computation is one of the most baseless ideas in history. A computer isn’t even 
there unless a person experiences it” (26). Citizens, all of us, must be active 
users, but in order to avoid acquiring the qualities of our gadgets, we must also 
require time for disconnecting. What a conundrum we are in.  
And yet, at the same time, we have David Trend’s Worlding, as well as 
Jane McGonigal’s Reality Is Broken, encouraging us to invest ourselves; no, 
immerse ourselves in virtual reality and digital games. Reality, the world, is 
broken, they insist, and perhaps it has always been. Could reality be fixed? Yes, 
but in order to fix reality, we must turn to our games and virtual worlds in order to 
discover a more utopic state within our technology, which may just resonate 
positive qualities within ourselves. Could learning from games and virtual worlds 
resolve our own problems in “the real world” when we “disconnect?” These two, 
and many others, convincingly inform us that a proper engagement with 
digitization might just save our rather “broken” existence. We might just bring our 
digitally reprogrammed selves back into the world, which so desperately 
demands fixing.  
All of the positions presented above certainly have differences in opinion, 
scope, and especially how we should engage the digitized world, but there is 
consensus, an identical vein that courses through all of these texts: the world is 
becoming digital, and as it does, everything is changing, even the human being. 
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Is Digitization Fundamentally Altering the World and Human 
Experience? 
 
The list of contributors to the theoretic and practical recognition that digital 
technologies, encompassed by digitization as it broadly refers to this 
phenomenon, goes far beyond the scope of the list mentioned above. However, 
the message, though contradictory at times, is again transparently clear. Digital 
technologies are everywhere, and all facets of the world face inevitable change, 
or perhaps the change has already taken place from the devices that impact 
such areas as gaming, augmented reality, virtual reality, artificial intelligence, 
media, communications, economics, sociopolitical relations, and even everyday 
appliances such as one’s car and clock. These digitized technologies, this 
digitization, has had (and will continue to have) a profound change on the world, 
human existence, and our own condition. This much is evident by an abundance 
of digital theorists. Our human experience, as well as the world itself, where all of 
us collectively reside, has been fundamentally altered, these scholars inform us. 
We now have virtual worlds “apart” from real-world embodied and special 
existence. Perhaps these other worlds, better worlds, will save this one we 
currently consider home? What we need to do now is understand this 
fundamental transition called digitization, if only we wish to understand, cope 
with, and control, these changes. Digitization, this new world, or even worlds, is 
literally present all around us. We must inform ourselves, then act, these scholars 
all demand of us. 
We can no longer ignore the digitization of the world. We can no longer 
allow digitization’s ubiquity to numb us to its presence, as well as its 
consequences. A seemingly endless degree of technology – old and new, as well 
as that which is destined to come - has and is increasingly digitizing the world. 
We know this to be a fact, if only we take a moment to observe the world around 
us. Then we too may ask ourselves, is reality, the world itself, “broken” due to 
digitization? Or was reality broken before, and digitization our savior in disguise? 
Is the world fundamentally changing due to digitization? Strained attention spans, 
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a sense of isolation, global terror, drone attacks, cyber hacking, online bullying, 
child pornography, digital propaganda, the potential weakening of international 
sovereignty laws that facilitate the illegal sharing and downloading of content, or 
the leaking of government information, and the increased effect of national 
isolationism. To be sure, all of these issues, which are just to name a few, do 
plague us today. And all these issues, as is so reiterated within the public sphere, 
academic or exterior, if not directly due to the world’s digitization, are further 
exacerbated by it. But on the other side, the brighter side, the claim is that 
digitization is in fact the very means by which we might fix a reality that perhaps 
was broken to begin with, change it, as it were. For example, gaming to prepare 
oneself for real life events, teamwork in online space, improved concentration, 
more engaging classrooms, a new wave of international communication, 
communicating with a loved one far away as time and space compress, greater 
recognition and acceptance of human difference, and the building of alternate 
worlds (better worlds) in virtual space. All these examples, and many more, 
appear to be positive aspects of the digitization of our world.  
 The narrative here, fueled by the conversation that has emerged around 
the topic, is resoundingly clear. Technologies that enable a digital-experience 
have, and are, continuing to change reality on a grand scale. And as the world 
becomes digitized, in all of its variant forms, it is our moral duty to contemplate 
the degree to which our world is becoming better or worse. We must 
acknowledge this, because we cannot escape it. Think about it: the odds are 
quite high that this text is coming to you from some type of digital screen, 
impacting both your physical and cognitive experience. The digital camera on 
your laptop, smart phone, or tablet sits waiting for you, ready to digitize an image 
of you or anything possessed within your line of sight. The world itself waits in 
preparation, ready to be turned into discrete digital code, then uploaded in 
another world – the world of digital space. A numeric sequence of ones and 
zeros now endlessly reside within countless hard drives, which interconnect, so 
as to be transmitted to a new location through the ease of touching only a few 
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digital buttons. A reality within the world of technological reproduction that even 
Walter Benjamin might be shocked by, were he still alive today.  
 A screen inside of the primary screen, which currently captivates your 
sight, may even present a distant location to you while you read this work, 
distance overcome. Two worlds become one, mediated through the Interconnect. 
It is of course possible to engage this text while a YouTube video maintains its 
telos in the corner as the location where the world becomes condensed, 
streaming your favorite music video, maybe even suggesting videos, as it 
algorithmically learns from your patterns of digital engagement. Or perhaps you’ll 
minimize our conversation to view a live stream of a loved one over Skype. The 
global distance that separates you from your loved ones can now be joined, their 
presence brought near. You might even be wearing a digital retinal display, 
projecting the textual image directly onto the contour of your eyes. Your eyes, 
voice, hands, and basic body movements attuned to the reality that is displayed 
via this fascinating, new technology. The previous limits of space, and the time 
required to traverse it, feel more at ease with your passions for connection. In 
The Language of New Media, Lev Manovich argues that time and space 
experience a compression as technology advances and achieves “telepresence” 
(165). The world itself has imploded into your smart phone, only to then explode 
as the opening to a world of endless possibility for you, allowing you the gift of 
presence where your material body currently isn’t. You can now connect with this 
writing, as well as with the writing of others, without even the need to move from 
the couch. A quick visit to Amazon allows you to download any text. Our digitized 
world would surely seem to be a state of opulent magic in comparison to the 
distance that was not to be overcome by those before us.  
But, what if I have made too great of an assumption? What if you still find 
joy in the tactile sense and smell of a paper book? Though a technological relic, 
the paper book, magazine, or newspaper clearly haven’t entirely lost our 
attention. Flipping through the pages of a new or used book has a tendency to 
produce a nostalgic, calming sensation. Much like the taste of the madeleine 
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transcends Proust’s main protagonist in The Search of Lost Time to another 
location, so too can the aroma of a paper book. Analog paper books and vinyl 
records may well be making a return, as some long for a world less saturated in 
digitization. But saturated in digitization we are, whether one enjoys it or not. The 
ubiquity of the digital world is most certainly near your objective location. You are 
not “alone,” at least not digitally alone. Other digital worlds continually enact 
themselves all around us each and every second. However invisible they may be 
as one walks the halls of one’s home, these digital worlds wait for us to tap into 
them. The worlds in digital virtual space will immerse us, if only we let them. 
These worlds will surely consume our sense of space, time, and even self, as 
Jane McGonigal so beautifully displays in her text, SuperBetter: The Power of 
Living Gamefully.  
But again, how often do we reflect to consider the changes that digitization 
has had on our lives, as well as changes on a grander scale, a world scale? In 
the Philosophical Investigations, philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein writes, “The 
aspect of things that are most important for us are hidden because of their 
simplicity and familiarity” (50). What does Wittgenstein mean by this? Digitization, 
the technological devices that now proliferate the world, which connect so many 
of us to a constant stream of information, other people, games, and virtual worlds 
may not warrant the label simple, but they do permeate existence. Are we too 
familiar with digitization to notice its effects, to question digitization itself? The 
children of today have literally been born into the digital age, they are digital 
natives at birth, whether they know it or not. In fact, one day soon we may no 
longer know of a world where digital immigrants reside. To have an iPhone or 
Android phone placed into one’s hands in the first few years of life certainly 
naturalizes the reality of digitization, but were those before these tangible devices 
knowledgeable of digitization? The iPhone, which struck so many with a sense of 
fascination in 2007, the year of its release, is now but a commonality of the world. 
How odd it might strike us, only eleven years later, to witness someone picking 
up the same phone and displaying a sense of amazement. The wonder inherent 
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in digitization’s impact on our lives has become sterilized due to its 
everydayness, its commonality. As digital devices become such an integral 
aspect of our lives, their presence becomes more difficult for us to acknowledge. 
Given our contemporary moment, what is more ready-to-hand, to use Martin 
Heidegger’s term, than our digital technologies? When a technology is ready-to-
hand, it simply works and fulfills its given task; it is “in its place,” so to speak. 
What’s ready-to-hand we almost never question; instead, we engage it as a 
practical actuality, a means to something else, and in doing so it falls into the 
backdrop of our perception.  
Considering another Heideggerian term, it is also true that we’ve become 
digitized if we turn to the occasions when our digital technologies fail us. In these 
moments, our technology presents itself to us in a different manner, it is present-
to-hand, and we stumble in confusion, awakening to the sense of loss and 
disorder before us. From the Internet to digital banking, digital clocks, digitized 
global economies, digital classrooms, to even the increasing digitization of our 
cars and general transportation, one thing should become clear to us: digitization 
is all around. And when digitization escapes us, when it fails, we feel lost – 
exposed to the world, and the distance it places upon our embodiment. We lose 
our world, so to speak, we lose our mastery, our telos recognized via digitization.  
Or, have we simply gone too far? There is now no doubt that digitization 
has become a vital facet of daily life, but is it a fundamental change of our world, 
of the human condition, our ontology (our fundamental being), which we are so 
often reminded of? When we turn our attention to the narrative that is presented 
to us, it doesn’t seem that the claim, “we lose our world” when digitization fails, is 
in any way incorrect. And in some ways, given Heidegger’s notion of present-to-
hand, and Wittgenstein’s claims to familiarity, they are correct. We have shown 
this. The issues encompassing digitization, as well as the disclosure of these 
issues to a wider audience, resonate with all of us. Discussing digitization, 
whether it is a specific technology, or more esoteric inquiry tends to captivate us - 
and it should. We can all sense that digitization is having an impact on our lives. 
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The narratives surrounding digitization is as ubiquitous as digitization is itself. But 
what is it that is changing? Has the human being fundamentally changed 
ontologically in the face of digitization’s creation? And if so, how? These are the 
questions I wish to dwell upon and come at anew through a phenomenological 
lens.  
Has this assertion that “digitization is changing everything,” the human 
experience and its condition itself, been positioned upon certain presuppositions 
as well? That is to say, does the conversation surrounding digitization, academic 
or otherwise, tend to unknowingly engage in major presupposes regarding the 
essential being of the digital? While the scholarship on digitization does realize 
and engage with the need to reflect and analyze digital phenomenon, it so often 
takes the materiality of the analog and digital technologies, what is directly before 
us, as its point of initial departure.  
The issue with this is that theorizations of digitization, centered around a 
materialistic (or even an intellectualist) point of view, presuppose their own 
philosophic metaphysical framework, which in turn directly influence the 
conclusions that are made. A position whereby subject and object remain 
distinct, easily allows for a misconception that the world is experiencing 
fundamental changes via the emergence of digital technologies. Because of this, 
it is not my intention to dismiss the claims that have been made about digitization 
outright, rather it is to take a phenomenological approach to ascertaining the 
phenomenon of digitization prior to making any direct claims on its potential for 
fundamental “worldly,” or human, change. Digitization, being a term that will 
become increasingly defined throughout the course of this analysis, is here to be 
understood as an ontological phenomenon, one where the subject/object 
dichotomy is called into philosophic question. A phenomenological analysis will 
serve to unmask preconceived metaphysical standpoints, allowing for an 
ontology that discovers the digital as a natural “outgrowth” of the human 
condition, and more importantly as an outgrowth of a will that underlies the 
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nature of this condition. And the will I speak of, which will come to be defined as 
the-will-to-flatten, cannot be reduced to materialism.      
That having been said, a materialist understanding of digitization, one 
based upon a subject verse object dichotomy, does produce worthwhile 
knowledge and contemplation on the experiences of a digital world. It’s true that 
digitization is often times too close, too familiar, too ready-to-hand, to be seen by 
us. The scholarship listed sees the digital as a significant issue to contemporary 
psychology, sociology, communication, epistemology, politics, etc., this much is 
certain, but it fails to consider the undercurrent that drives digitization’s very 
being into existence. It is true that were digitization to evaporate from the world, 
within an instant, unfathomable problems would quickly present themselves. 
Billions of human beings currently have an interconnected dependence upon the 
materiality of the digital, the global economy certainly does. But is “dependence” 
a sign of the world and the human undergoing fundamental changes, or have we 
made ourselves merely more vulnerable through our will towards digitization, with 
all of the potential powers it bestows upon us when it works? The question rarely 
asked is, what is digitization? What underlies digitization, what is driving it into 
existence at all? How is it possible that the human being, and our unique 
interplay with the world allowed for digitization to emerge at all?    
Given these questions, I ask is digitization changing the human condition 
on a fundamental level? Has digitization, as a seemingly profound technological 
advance in our ability to manipulate reality, often by converting it into discrete 
data, which can then be transmitted and shared with others, changed our human 
condition? One might say it is now possible to build new worlds through 
computational data alone, worlds that can evolve and change. We can produce 
artificial intelligence that actually engages with us on an interactive level, which 
we learn from, and have a meaningful connection to. Our drive towards 
digitization has allowed us to open the sky, land on distant planets and even 
comets. Who knows what else is on the horizon, how close we may get to what is 
most empirically distant. But the question once again is, has this changed the 
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human condition and the world as it presents or “opens” itself to us? Has our 
condition been “expanded” with digitization, or has it been impacted? Here we 
must begin to be careful with our words, as fundamental, impact, and change 
possess different meaning. 
Considering these questions, Wittgenstein’s quotation shines light upon 
the reason that the narrative of digitization, as fundamentally world changing, 
even human changing, appeals so greatly to us. When reading such texts, we 
once again discover a sense of amazement in our digital devices. As digitization 
on a narrow or broad scale is held up in isolation against our reflection, its impact 
on our lives becomes visible. But impact is different than announcing a 
fundamental change, whether it be to the world or our own human experience. 
Can the two be disentangled? Again and again, these narratives, which are so 
familiar, not only awaken a sense of wonderment in the face of digitization, but 
they also insist that change is taking place even to our own human condition. 
Does the story we are so often told about digital technology rest on any 
presuppositions? Have they gone too far with the claims of digitization as a grand 
change to the world and the human being?  
I wish to propose this thesis: digitization has (and is continuing to have) a 
vast impact on the world and human life, especially our intersubjectivity; 
however, examined phenomenologically, it is not the fundamental change to the 
world or human condition, which is so often presented to us in contemporary 
scholarship. Why, one might ask? Put simply, to fundamentally change the world 
and our own condition, as human beings, would require that the world, our 
embodiment, space, and intersubjectivity as a particular openness to the world, 
change their condition. And while the world and our being have been impacted, 
we will continue to show that it has not changed.  
But what is meant by all of this? The world, human condition, openness, 
and fundamental change versus impact – all of these concepts may feel too 
ambiguous at the moment. In order to clarify this, we will engage the philosophy 
of phenomenology, developed in the early twentieth century by the late Edmond 
13 
Husserl, a project, that is vast and has evolved since its inception into the cannon 
of human knowledge. Guided by phenomenology we will discover a greater 
sense/meaning in the terms and the presupposition that is so grounded in 
contemporary digital media and technology scholarship on the subject of the 
digital. In doing so, I will present the case for why digitization appears to be a 
fundamental change to the world and the human condition, when it is in fact an 
impact that has “arisen” from a fundamental condition, a condition that in truth, 
has seen not fundamentally changed to itself since the advent of digitization, but 
rather drives it into being as an existential aspect of the human condition on a 
transcendent level – that is, beyond the scope of any one individual human life.  
 
 
Layout of Chapters 
 
Chapter One – Phenomenology of Digitization: this chapter will function as a 
chapter of clarification. Here I will specify how a phenomenological investigation 
of digitization critiques a deeply rooted ideology held within digital media and 
technologies studies, an ideology of the subject versus the object, empiricist or 
intellectualist, which interpret the world in a particular manner. 
Phenomenologically, I will turn to Martin Heidegger’s being-in-the-world as an 
alternative starting point to the metaphysics of subject versus object. In doing so, 
the terminology of world, de-severance, embodiment, depth, digitization, and 
ultimately the-will-to-flatten will come into greater necessary light. This 
clarification of terminology will be useful for the reader throughout the 
dissertation, situating a more comprehensive understanding of the dissertation as 
a whole, also allowing for the analysis of individual technologies in order to 
display that while digitization has impacted the world and human condition, it has 
not fundamentally changed the human ontology as the-will-to-flatten.   
Again, we shall come to see that contemporary digital technologies are 
often interpreted under an historically situated metaphysics of internal versus 
external, which places the subject over and against the objects; the objects in 
14 
this case are our digital devices, which we encounter in the world. We will display 
that the “disconnect” between subject and object is one situated under an 
historically upheld metaphysics that places the relationship between the world 
and the human condition, even one’s own self and embodiment, as distinct and 
empirically discoverable within their own right. This ideological manner of 
comprehending the world sets in motion presuppositions regarding our sense of 
distance and space, a distance that allows us to state that there are “digital 
worlds” apart from the world we all know, a claim we will dispute as incorrect.   
The subject object dichotomy presupposes a sense of a distance between 
the world, the human, and technology, viewed as “things,” or objects, in the 
world. Under this classic dichotomy, the spatial and temporal “distance” that is 
always between myself, as a subject, and the other objects in the world, which 
are not currently visible to me, become objectively problematic. Digital 
technologies appear as an “overcoming” of the problem of distance, which if we 
understand the human condition and the world under the terms of 
phenomenology, was never a problem, phenomenologically speaking, to begin 
with. 
The issue is that under these historic metaphysical terms, even one’s own 
body, as the medium of perception and the world’s unconcealment, or the very 
manner in which the world “opens,” constantly presents itself as meaningful to 
us, also becomes an object. What is presupposed through the subject object 
dichotomy is human embodiment as a consistent correlative to the world, a 
non-reducible medium, or existential, by which the world possesses certain 
meaningful experiences to said embodiment. What’s more, the metaphysical 
standpoint of the subject object dichotomy, often a presupposition of both 
empiricism and idealism, inherently objectifies notions of the body, space, the 
other, and even “self.” Objectification ultimately quantifies, measures, calculates, 
and creates a taxonomy of differences, subsequently embedding an ideology that 
places too great a space (or objective distance) between the subject and object. 
Unsurprisingly, this ideology just mentioned is deeply rooted in our academic and 
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social thinking such that it inherently invades the scholarly field of digital media 
and technology studies.  
Our intent, however, is not to state that this objectification, resting on the 
subject object divide, is somehow inherently “wrong.” In fact, it is the functional 
means by which humans, as a particular embodied relation to the world, have 
apprehended the world in order for us to bring digital technologies into existence. 
Digital technology depends on objectification. But is objectification all that there is 
or all that is happening to us on an experiential level?  
My argument is that objectification is the result of a certain type of human, 
embodied existence. Our interest rests in the interplay of embodiment as a 
particular situation that constantly works “itself” out reflectively, both individually 
and more vitally intersubjectively, as a correlation to the world, which it is in and 
always already a part of. As embodied “subject,” the world simultaneously 
“conceals” and “reveals” itself due to its depth. And this is an experiential process 
that happens prior to any objectification, whereby by we learn to idealize the 
world and ourselves as subjects over and against objects that we perceive and 
bring meaning to, ourselves. 
 What we often fail to comprehend is our relation to the world as a 
particular type of embodied situation, whereby we always engage with anything 
at all, whether it be our own “selves, or “external objects.” And this is a 
simultaneous interplay of mutual engagement, resulting in a disclosure of 
meaning and new experiences, as well as technological possibilities, that is 
never fully finished or complete, and is constantly open to change – because we 
are situated in-the-world as an embodiment perspective.  We attempt to 
understand our engagement with, as well as the implications of digital 
technology, by exploring specific technologies via these phenomenological 
terms. The hope is that we can gain a new understanding of our relationship to 
digitization, not limited to the ideologies inherently entrenched in the 
subject/object dichotomy, which often understand the digital as a new frontier.  
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We will also sense that while digital technologies have had an impact on 
the world and human condition, they have not changed it in any fundamental 
way. In what way should we deal with the impacts of digitization after realizing 
that the world and our own condition is fundamentally unaltered? 
 
Chapter Two - Embodiment and Digitization: this chapter will explore human 
embodiment as the manner that the human being is always already existentially 
situated within the world and can never fully “extend” or separate into ulterior 
worlds or realties beyond our de-servant being. I will explore digital virtual 
technologies under the continued explication of the phenomenological concepts 
that were developed in chapter one.  
In doing so, throughout this chapter we will explore the phenomenological 
experience of individual human embodiment as the inescapable and constant 
involvement with a particular placement or situation, as well as the ground of de-
severance. In order to do so, the chapter will explore such technologies as the 
Oculus Rift– continually displaying embodiment’s fundamental interrelation to this 
digital, virtual technology. Through the investigating of this technology, the reader 
will come to better comprehend how human embodiment, engaged as one such 
digital device as the Oculus Rift, not only brings the technology into existence, 
but is always already grounded as an existential constant interrelation between 
our particular body and a particular being-in-the-world (digital or not – as no 
distention truly exists), which constantly forms and opens new meaningful 
experiences. The Oculus opens aesthetic possibilities, which, while providing an 
experience that can be learned from, like all experience, is not an escape from 
the world into another, but is rather situationally bound to the potentials and 
confines of embodiment.   
Lastly, I will come to acknowledge that embodiment in the “real world” not 
only impacts “digital worlds” and cultures, provided by the Oculus Rift, but is in 
fact inseparable from one constant world of experience, which is the world that is 
always mediated, and never escaped due to embodiment - even in the realm of 
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the digital. We shall see that lived experience takes new aesthetic shape with our 
digital technologies, but this does not mean that “new worlds” are possible, as 
though these worlds could somehow be utterly distinct from embodiment and the 
world of meaningful experience that situated de-severant being.   
 
Chapter Three – Space and Digitization: Lev Manovich questioned the issue of 
presence as it relates to distance and time in our digital era; in doing so, he 
introduces his theory of telepresence. The concept Manovich opens is 
undeniably of great importance, though we will stress that the underlying 
foundation of any theory of telepresence is in fact situated on certain 
presuppositions that I will unravel via this phenomenology of digitization.  
  In this chapter, I will analyze the issues of digitized presence within space, 
digitization as the overcoming of empirical distance. This analysis will be guided 
by the phenomenological concepts of de-severance, embodiment and space as 
depth, which will add to the discussion of our “altered” perception of space in the 
digital age. Examples of space in the digital age, one’s digital tele-presence will 
focus on “real time” smart phone connection, reaching into locations far divorced 
from one’s own empirical embodied location. Building off of the previous chapter, 
I will make this leap by investing the issue of what it means to be present as de-
severant within space phenomenologically understood through Merleau-Ponty’s 
theory of depth, and the thickness of objects, concepts that inherently relate to 
the perception of space as fundamentally changing via digitization. 
What does it mean to be present is a significant philosophic question, and 
how one addresses this issue influences the perception of technology and its 
accomplishments. Within this chapter, the answers to perception, and the 
overcoming of space, will unravel through the concept of de-severance, depth, 
and the-will-to-flatten. At first glance, it may appear that the digital era has forced 
us to question this concept anew. A question too often presupposed as obvious 
has been reawakened in the digital age due to technologies such as 
photography, film, and the surveillance camera – especially linked to one’s digital 
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phone. However, we will begin from the perspective that presence – prior to the 
digital era - is anything but obvious and is far too often misunderstood under the 
ideologies of the subject/object dichotomy, missing de-severance.   
By observing these technologies through a phenomenological lens, it will 
become clear why theories such as Manovich’s ultimately “fall short.” What we 
mean by this is that our theoretic lens will shed light on how and why Manovich 
theorizes perception from a stance that is far too limiting. Though arguably 
presupposed, Manovich consistently places the subject (or perceptual perceiver) 
inside an objective body, which situates itself against a world of “material 
objects,” which digital devices “extend” our presence into, or toward.  
Our theoretic stance will argue that if space is limited, claims of objective 
mathematics, little of the actual experience of presence (both its historic 
ramifications, as well as its limitations) will be genuinely grasped under these 
terms. The very reason that digital technology’s “compression” of space strikes 
us as shocking and new is in fact a misunderstanding of human embodied 
presence itself as de-severant. Furthermore, what is missed entirely is the 
underlying will-to-flatten.  
What will become clear is that our embodiment is always already situated 
to worldly circumstances that anticipate what is not objectively ‘present,’ even 
prior to digital emergence. The human de-severance is always situational, and 
called on by the depth of space, which is more than what is objectively “against” 
a subject. Digitization does not change this, digitization merely opens and 
exacerbates ethical and moral considerations as one moves toward an 
exploration of intersubjectivity and digitization, within a world where empirically 
speaking, otherness is brought increasingly near by the-will-to-flatten.    
 
Chapter Four - Intersubjective and Digitization: Within the previous chapters, the 
embodied perspective of the “individual,” and this embodiment’s access to the 
depth of space via de-severance, remain important, yet too confined. Because of 
this, the fourth and final chapter will analyze digitization’s impact on 
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intersubjectivity, ultimately looking toward the impact digitization is having, as the 
will-to-flatten, on ethics. In this chapter, I will focus on Artificial Intelligence, 
YouTube, and Facebook as experiences whereby digital technologies impact 
intersubjective experience. In doing so, I will build upon the argument that 
digitization resides within the-will-to-flatten, a will to make the farness vanish, and 
ultimately to erode the depth of the world, even if this means the depth of the 
other. My claim will be that the most profound impact of digital technologies is not 
on our particular type of embodiment or escaping said embodiment for other 
“worlds.” It is not the erosion of empirical space as distance. But, that digital 
technologies have impacted our intersubjective experience, exacerbating the 
scope of one’s situation, as well as allowing for an individual embodied 
perspective to “take in” a larger scope of other experience than ever before, 
though paradoxically allowing for a narrowing of this nearness – a closing off of 
one’s phenomenological, intersubjective world. Our most profound contemporary 
challenge is not in escaping the world for other worlds, which we will have shown 
is not possible, but facing being-in-the-world with new ethical, moral, and political 
questions in the wake of digitization’s impacts on the intersubjective experience.   
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Chapter One: Phenomenology and Digitization   
 
“…there was a passage to the infinite as objective infinity--This passage was a 
thematization (and forgetting) of the Offenheit, of the Lebenswelt (*life-world) --We have 
to start anew from behind that point”  
 – Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible, (166)  
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The intent of this chapter is clarification, especially for any reader unfamiliar with 
the terminology, concepts, and theory of the philosophy of phenomenology. 
Clarification will simultaneously link into the analysis of digitization and the-will-to-
flatten, hopefully enlightening what is meant by these concepts, which must to be 
understood as the backbone of this phenomenological argument that runs 
throughout the dissertation as a whole. If it is true that digitization has not altered 
the fundamental ontology of the human being, but is rather the result of being-in-
the-world, de-severant under a particular human embodiment, which “takes up” 
space conceived of as depth, as I argue that it is, then some degree of context is 
required. These italicized terms are rich with content and lead us toward the 
realization that while digitization does not change our ontological condition, it 
surely exacerbates certain innate human conditions and tendencies as the world 
is brought continually nearer to us via digitization. This exacerbation, while not a 
change of ontology, of our phenomenological condition, does impact the moral 
and ethical implications of engaging with an increasingly digital world, where 
what was once separated from an individual by an empirical distance (otherness, 
for example) is increasingly brought into our world as we digitize, whether real or 
virtual.  
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Phenomenology of the World: The phenomenology of being-in-
the-world, and what led to it 
 
Here the intention is to conceptualize the groundwork for a theory of the world 
and its “digitization” as an all-encompassing framework to the lived experience of 
our contemporary digital moment. A phenomenological theory of world is a 
relatively underdeveloped concept in the analysis of digital media technology, in 
the sense that this concept influences one’s perception of metaphysics and 
ontology. For example, Don Idhe, in his text, Bodies in Technology, addresses 
the phenomenological body as the site of knowing the world, digital or not, but 
doesn’t delve into digitization or the will that underlies it. Digitization, understood 
here is not simply an analysis of our tangible devices – from the computer and 
the tablet, to smart phones, gaming systems, virtual realities, A.I. systems, etc. - 
but the lived experience that all who confront digital technology are intended 
“towards” as de-severant. In other words, we wish to better comprehend how 
digital technology (broadly speaking), through the human condition, arose as a 
tangible possible, and the subsequent effect of the technology on our individual 
and collective intersubjective experience. This will ultimately lead toward futures 
works that increasingly deal with the moral and ethical issues this theory of 
digitization unfolds. 
 Lived experience means the primary opening of experience and 
engagement with digitization’s impact on our lives, or how the world initially 
presents itself as some-thing to be engaged – how we are first and foremost 
caught up in the world as a matter of depth that we concern ourselves with 
through various projects, both large and small, collective and individual. To avoid 
slipping into confusion over the theory I wish to employ, we will begin by 
addressing Edmond Husserl’s theory of the life-world as the all too often 
presupposed “ground” by which the world always already opens, in various 
manners, for the human being, which will lead into Heidegger’s analysis of being-
in-the-world. Though it will be acknowledged that the human is not the self-
contained eternal “center” of experience, in the sense of the Cartesian cogito. 
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Still, it is imperative to recognize that we as human beings are always 
experiencing “phenomena” or “things” via a particular manner, an embodied 
schema to cite Merleau-Ponty in Phenomenology of Perception, which cannot be 
overcome, whether tangible, imaginative, or digital (49). Our perceptual 
perspective, which is to say we as the human being, is one whereby we are 
opened to phenomenon through our modes of being-in-the-world as a human 
being. The schema/mode I speak of, and wish to further investigate, always 
pertains to digital technologies because this schema always includes one’s 
embodiment, our being situated within the world, allowing for our intersubjective 
experience with otherness, and the foundations of meaningful relations to 
anything at all.  
By turning to Edmond Husserl, the aim is not only to find the roots of the 
phenomenological concept of world, but to explore its conceptual development. 
We shall come to see that theory was developed in the early twentieth century, 
stating that our primary experience exists as that which is prior to the act of 
rational reflection upon existence, which has arguably lead to two relatively polar 
outcomes – empiricism and intellectualism. Empiricism is seen as the 
externalization of the world as material cause and effect, and intellectualism the 
internalization of the world as a subject constituting said world through internal 
acts of meaning. I will argue that one consequence of our capacity for reflection 
(our sense of distance form “self,” and hence, distance form the world) has 
resulted in the outcome of the world and our own human being has become 
comprehended as objects of study, via the objectification of classical empiricism 
beginning in the seventeenth century. And yet, this has always been the result of 
what I consider to be the underlying condition of the human being, our underlying 
will to nearness, the eradication of distance, the-will-to-flatten. 
 On the antithetical end of the spectrum, our being, and the world of things 
has been understood as subjectification via the intellectualist tradition, which 
refutes certain empiricist claims that posit the body and mind as casual objects. 
The outcome of the subjectivist’s spectrum has been to turn our subjectivity, or 
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the sense of “inner presence,” into a constituting force that constructs a 
meaningful world around itself. At present, the primary objective is to overcome, 
as well as modify these two extremes by turning toward a theory of the being-in-
the-world, and sensing how what comes of this leads us to an understanding of 
digitization not as an ontological shift in being, but a result of the-will-to-flatten.  
If we succeed in ascertaining what is meant by the world as the 
presupposed ground by which experience presents itself as an always already 
opened space of our lived experience, our de-severance, it is the hope that a 
more concrete understanding of digitization’s development and its impact on our 
lives will present itself, eventually leading to further analysis into the moral and 
ethical ramifications of digitization. Although we must initially engage with 
Husserl, we shall come to see that his concept of world, while always remaining 
a fundamental “backbone,” has in fact been modified by a number of scholars, 
including the twentieth century philosophers Martin Heidegger and Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty, whose work this dissertation is theoretically constructed upon.  
While Husserl ultimately grounds the life-world’s most constituting element 
in the transcendental ego, which we shall understand as being too close to both 
the rationalist and intellectualist traditions, we will ultimately develop our 
understanding of the world as a constant play between our mode of de-severant 
embodiment, space as depth, and intersubjectivity as they collectively relate to 
the surrounding world of “things” to be brought near through the-will-to-flatten. 
Through this initial clarification, the hope is to apprehend how human reflection 
has historically fallen, and is now situated, into various types of metaphysical 
analysis that dominant contemporary digital media scholarship. Both objective 
and subjective analysis of the world, our body, and the cogito, find their 
development through our human capacity for metaphysical reflection – a 
phenomenon relating to the humans self-reflective capacitive as de-severant 
openness towards the world. We shall see that it is only via the inherent 
properties imbued upon our reflective state that various types of “worldly” and 
“personal” analysis have emerged, resting “on” the presupposed ground of being-
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in-the-world, the always already opened space of experience and ultimately 
depth.  
Next, I will come to comprehend how in one sense the objectification of 
the world through our reflective capacity, firmly established during the tide of 
enlightenment empiricism, has allowed for modern digital technology to emerge, 
especially in chapter three, Space and Digitization, while subsequently leaving a 
vast degree of blindness in regards to our comprehension of how the world 
always already opens (or perceptually presents) itself via de-severant being. This 
blindness was in fact acknowledged, however flawed, through the Kantian 
idealist tradition that was established during the eighteenth century. If all of life is 
merely a sequence of objective causal relations, as empiricism implies, how can 
an account of one’s subjectivity, one’s “internal” life and free will as a meaningful 
relation to the world of things, fit into such an objectivist account of existence? 
Kantian idealism addressed this issue by turning toward the transcendental ego, 
as the a-prior condition by which the world is meaningfully constituted by the 
human subject. However, it must be understood that the idealist tradition took 
this conception of an inner immanence too far, placing an overemphasis on the 
world’s “meaningful construction” within the ego, or rational cogito, which was 
perhaps Husserl’s greatest historic conceptual barrier, even as he developed a 
theory of the world/life-world. In the end, we shall see that Husserl ultimately 
resides too immersed in the wake of Kantian idealism, even as he develops a 
radical new “ground” for philosophy.    
That having been stated, regardless of objectifications inherent in 
presuppositions, it will be shown that it is none other than the potential of our 
being-the-world that has opened our objectification of the world, and even our 
own bodies, to the possibilities revealed to us within the revolutions in 
technological development and science. One might state that if a conception of 
the world is of importance, why has it not been comprehended sooner, for it is 
true that missing the world as the formative ground of experience does by no 
means stop digitization from being developed. And this is because the-will-to-
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flatten does not require this as a means to acquiring its telos towards nearness, 
the "development of tangible technological digitization.  
As Merleau-Ponty writes in his final major essay, “Eye and Mind,” 
“Science manipulates things and gives up dwelling in them. It gives itself internal 
models of things, and operating on the basis of these indices or variables, the 
transformations that are permitted by their definition, science confronts the world 
only from greater and greater distances” (351). The sense produced by this 
metaphysical means of apprehending the world is one whereby the world 
presents itself as calculative distance, establishing the sense of objectivity that 
Merleau-Ponty refers to, which is the result of our human capacity for reflection 
as a de-severant being. However, it shall be understood that to exacerbate this 
sense of distance between ourselves and the world, so as to “see” the world, 
embodiment, space, consciousness, and otherness as things in the world, or as 
mere objects to be mathematized within objective space, is the very means by 
which being-in-the-world conceals itself from our acknowledgement, even as it 
brings forth technological development.  
And it could be argued through an objectivist account that a 
phenomenological analysis of being-in-the-world, the-will-to-flatten, and 
digitization is of no use, or simply baseless; that having been stated, however, as 
we situate the proceeding chapters, it is of importance through this chapter that 
we apprehend how missing a theory of the being-in-the-world, of the 
phenomenological world, does in fact diminish our power to philosophically 
apprehend what happens to us over and above our own sense of intellectualist 
“self-willing,” as we peruse various technological ends, as well as the 
diminishment this has on how to assess the potential consequences of our 
technologies.  
In the case of this study, the ends are the increased development of digital 
technologies within our lives. A theory of being-in-the-world will enrich the view of 
how these tangible technologies came to be, and perhaps more importantly, 
develop a sounder knowledge regarding their impact on our de-severant 
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experience as it derives itself from the depth of world’s space as potential. To 
understand the world as the ground upon which experience and meaning are 
constituted, points us toward an acknowledgement that an impact upon the world 
through our opened powers of embodiment, de-severance, and intersubjectivity 
have led to digitization, and in doing so, have impacted our sense of nearness, 
which is the grounds upon which experience itself is constituted.  
 
 
Clarification of Husserl’s Theory of World 
 
Delving too deeply into the nuances of Edmond Husserl’s theoretical life work 
would demand the attention of an entire dissertation unto itself, which is the not 
the intention here. That stated, the goal at present is not to simplify or diminish 
Husserl, but to point toward a number of key concepts that he developed in his 
critique of previous philosophers, primarily, though not limited to Rene Descartes, 
David Hume, and Immanuel Kant. As witnessed in The Crisis of European 
Sciences & Transcendental Phenomenology, Husserl’s philosophic project is in 
large part an attempt through various means, to correct the work of Kantian 
philosophy, which Husserl believes to have been guided by Kant’s historicity, or 
his temporal moment in relation to the ideas encompassing him, which impeded 
him from noticing his own philosophic presuppositions (103). Ultimately, 
Husserl’s addition to the field of phenomenology, in relation to the current 
concern, begins with his development of phenomenological bracketing, which 
can be found in his earlier texts, such as his Ideas Pertaining to a Pure 
Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy: first book, eventually 
leading to his own self-critique and theoretical development of the life-world in his 
final major text, The Crisis. But why did Husserl turn towards the world/life-world 
as he neared the end of his life? 
 Two of Husserl’s primary concerns, concerns that enrich our own 
enterprise, are as follows: first, a more complete comprehension of the 
meaningful world of things; and second, the relation of worldly (objective) things 
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to the subjective transcendental ego, or how and why we are intended toward 
things, how and why the human being is able to bring things into its conscious 
concern. The world for Husserl, is the beginning of all “cognitive” experience, as 
well as the subject for the investigative plane of the natural attitude, which will be 
further explored in Chapter Three. As Husserl states in Ideas, “The world is the 
sum-total of objects of possible experience and experiential cognition, of objects 
that, on the basis of actual experiences, are cognizable in correct theoretical 
thinking” (6). The subjective transcendental ego (although considering it 
secondary to the world is certainly problematic) is ultimately the constituting 
source of meaning, as well as the constituting source of the objects experienced 
in the world. Without an interpreter of things by a being capable of certain forms 
of openness toward the world, which posits an interpretation, can we possibly 
express that there is anything meaningful at all? Strip an interpreting “ego,” a 
subject, from the world of “things” and what is actually left?  
In fact, the question above establishes a great deal of the Kantian dilemma, 
as well as Husserl’s response to it. That is to say, both the world and the 
subjective transcendental ego consume Husserl’s scholarly work throughout the 
turns of his career, as can be explicitly noticed from his Ideas to his final work, 
The Crisis. What changes, however, is the means by which Husserl attempts to 
philosophize the relation and interaction between the world of objects and the 
subjective transcendental ego. First, Husserl begins with bracketing, and then 
seemingly discards it as he moves toward a conceptualization of the world/life-
world. 
Expanding on this change, what we find in Ideas is the epoch, or the 
phenomenological reduction, which brackets intentional contents of “the mind.” 
Essentially, there’s a recognition by Husserl, arguably in large part via standing 
on the shoulders of Kant’s investigations of worldly things against the 
transcendental ego, which attributes meaning to any-thing that we are 
intentionally “drawn” toward. For Husserl, even the intentional object of a dream, 
however “illusorily” it may be, is meaningfully intended by the cogito, or ego, 
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regardless of its wordly - “thingness.” Not all that we are intended towards needs 
to be tangible matter in the strict sense of the term, and this realization begins to 
lead toward a theory of digitization, especially as it is built upon by Heidegger 
and Merleau-Ponty.  
What is most important, at present, is to acknowledge that through Kantian 
philosophy, Husserl develops a young phenomenology. Like Kant, Husserl is not 
“stuck” in a methodological objectification of things, but a turn towards an 
apprehension of how objectification occurs as meaningful to us human beings at 
all, via a transcendental intersubjective ego – Husserl exists on the side of the 
intellectualist, paving the way for a more contemporary phenomenology to 
develop. For Husserl, to bracket an object of meaningful intentionality, or our 
directional (or even in-directional) thought toward things, is to put in limbo all of 
the presuppositions that existed during his historic moment - or our own at this 
moment. By doing so, he set his task toward apprehending the subjective 
transcendental ego in order to discover the very grounds by which anything (any 
object of thought) is posited as meaningful. As Husserl notes in Ideas, 
“…consciousness has, in itself, a being of its own which in its own absolute 
essence, is not touched by the phenomenological exclusion” (65). The primary 
issue at hand, for Husserl, is to discover the constituting pole, or “place,” of all 
meaning. For without meaning, can we say that anything exists at all, or at 
minimum, how can it be upheld as meaningful? 
To introspectively locate the pole by which any meaningful relation to the 
world is constituted is Husserl’s ultimate end, and as such, he turns internal, so 
as to rather paradoxically miss the external he is cautious of. The intent to 
discover the subject transcendental ego does not falter throughout Husserl’s 
work, but he senses the issues of intense internalization via bracketing. And so, 
as his work develops, he turns toward the world, or life-world (lebenswelt), as a 
philosophic alternative to bracketing.  
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Husserl’s life-world, and Heidegger’s move to  
Being-in-the-World: Situating Being and De-servance – the path 
to apprehending the-will-to-flatten 
 
Husserl’s persistence towards apprehending the “ground” of the transcendental 
ego is far from unimportant here, it is perhaps through his enduring examination 
of the transcendental ego, or pure subjectivity – intellectualism - that such a 
phenomenon was later challenged by phenomenologists, such as Martin 
Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty. As we will soon discover, through the critiques of 
the phenomenologists who took up Husserl’s philosophic task, Husserl’s desire 
to overcome the natural attitudes’ presuppositions in order to discover the 
subjective transcendental ego’s ground presents a certain irony. For Husserl, 
much like Kant during his own time, rather unknowingly finds himself deeply 
embedded within a certain Cartesian metaphysical presupposition of his own. 
The presuppositions, which Husserl’s philosophy face, are that of the ego, I, or 
cogito, as that which is “nearest” to the world of thingly objects as over and 
against an ego, constituting objects as meaningful via our sense(s) of 
intentionality. The irony is this: while Husserl falls into his own metaphysical 
presupposition, which paves the way to a theory of world that I feel is essential to 
understanding digitization, it is perhaps only as a result of his own 
presuppositions regarding the existence of the transcendental ego that such a 
form of self-constituting subjectivity becomes an apparent flaw to those who 
engage with his phenomenological task. To overcome the metaphysical attitudes, 
so as to apprehend Heidegger’s being-in-the-world, requires a sense of 
interconnection toward the world, which relies neither upon subject nor object, 
strictly speaking, as a formation of this dichotomous opposition that always 
inherently creates the sense that there is distance between world and self. And 
due to this, under tradition philosophic metaphysics, the world’s impact on our 
experience either appears to be an act of causality upon the objective body on 
one end, or one of self-constitution via the subject on the other, when in fact 
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neither of these are entirely correct according to Martin Heidegger’s critique, nor 
are they correct if we wish to better comprehend digitization.  
 But perhaps we have jumped too far? Allow me to return to Husserl. For if 
we stated that being-in-the-world overcomes this opposition of subject and 
object, how is it that Husserl never overcomes this issue? In The Crisis, Husserl 
reorients his thinking, turning from the phenomenological reduction (bracketing) 
to the life-world. Bracketing is negated in this final text, conceptually revamped 
by a turn toward the theory of the world/life-world. However, The Crisis is still 
largely as a continued critique of Kant, and a desire to “steer Kant’s path” into the 
proper direction so as to articulate the place of subjectivity and its role in the 
meaningful constitution of objectivity as we know it. As Husserl notes, in his 
critique of Kant’s analysis within The Crisis,  
 
“…it (*Kant’s analysis) had never penetrated to the subjective structure of our world-
consciousness prior to and within scientific knowledge and thus had never asked 
how the world, which appears straightforwardly to us men, and to us as scientists, 
comes to be knowable a priori—how, that is, the exact science of nature is possible, 
the science for which, after all, pure mathematics, together with a further pure a-
priori, is the instrument of all knowledge which is objective, [i.e.,] unconditionally valid 
for everyone who is rational (who thinks logically)” (103). 
 
For Husserl, philosophy’s crisis is the presupposition taken, even by Kant as he 
turns back to the subject, in order to apprehend the world as objective, the 
thinglyness of the world. A tendency, when it becomes historically situated as 
truth, totalizes worldly objectification while falling blind to the means by which this 
objectification is possible, which Kant comprehended as problematic, yet failed to 
see his way out of. Expanding upon this phenomenon, Husserl’s feels that the 
drive toward objectification, when taken to its logical extreme, begins to objectify 
the phenomenological openness toward the world, or “subjectivity,” which, in the 
Husserlian sense, defines lived experience. As can be seen in fields such as 
contemporary psychology, the turn toward empiricist objectification now mostly 
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dominates the analysis of all experienced phenomena, from our history, to out 
bodily senses, to worldly objectivity, to language, even our relation to others. As 
an example, vision, broadly speaking, is often entirely objectified – and when 
vision becomes objectified the phenomenal openness toward the world that is 
vision (as de-servant experience) is lost upon us. This realization is vital to a 
theory of digitization, because while we can analyze digitization strictly under the 
terms of tangible objective digital technologies, digitization understood as a 
human phenomenon, and all that resides “beneath” it as will, is missed in so 
many contemporary analyses of the digital age.    
 Husserl’s insight, expanding upon the Kantian tradition, is the 
acknowledgment that a phenomenon such as vision (merely providing one 
example) is not simply an object among objects. As Husserl’s states in The 
Crisis,  
 
“Naturally, from the very start in the Kantian manner of posing questions, the everyday 
surrounding world of life is presupposed as existing—the surrounding world in which 
all of us (even I who am now philosophizing) consciously have our existence; here are 
also the sciences, as cultural facts in this world, with their scientists and theories. In 
this world we are objects among objects in the sense of the life-world (* italics added), 
namely, as being here and there, in the plain certainty of experience, before anything 
that is established scientifically, whether in physiology, psychology, or sociology. On 
the other hand, we are subjects for this world, namely, as the ego-subjects 
experiencing it, contemplating it, valuing it, related to it purposefully; for us this 
surrounding world has only the ontic meaning given to it by our experiencing, our 
thoughts, our valuations, etc.” (104). 
 
The conceptual development of the world/life-world, which we begin to discover 
here, is without question a substantive critique of Kant, but it too ultimately falls 
victim to its own criticism. Regardless of the variances in thought, Husserl 
ultimately places the world’s meaningful constitution upon the subject as the 
transcendental ego, though on a more radical spectrum than Kant conceived 
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during his time, even as Kant opened the pathway to an analysis of the 
phenomenological world.  
 Our next leap in the philosophy of the phenomenological world, requires a 
turn toward Martin Heidegger, a student of Husserl’s at the University of Freiburg. 
It is well known that Husserl existed as a primary influence within Heidegger’s 
scholarship, regardless of the degree to which Heidegger developed his own 
phenomenological, existential, and hermeneutic path, subsequently abandoning 
the transcendental ego as a philosophic starting point. Heidegger’s work, much 
like Husserl’s, takes a variety of twists and turns as it ages. However, I would 
argue that Heidegger’s concepts Being, being-in-the-world, as well as 
unconcealment/concealment (or aletheia), can be seen throughout his body of 
work as a whole. It is through Heidegger’s philosophic development that the 
theory of digitization I will present here, as well as the theories of the other 
philosophers I engage with, will radiate. This is because Heidegger marks a 
historic philosophic divergence, which is still finding its cultivation to this day, in 
works such as this one, however reinterpreted Heidegger may be. But what is 
this divergence, and how does it pertain to the phenomenological concept of the 
world?  
 What has been discovered thus far is that the life-world is the constitutive 
ground by which the world opens, and hence, expresses itself as meaningful a-
prior and beyond. We have also determined that isolating the world as a 
meaningful constitution via the subjective transcendental ego is problematic at 
best. But what is left then to constitute meaning as the primary openness by 
which the world is meaningful to us as human beings, prior to any idealizations of 
the world by human rationality? Heidegger’s answer to this dilemma is to turn 
toward Being. Being for Dasein, translated as being-there, or the state by which 
Heidegger identifies the human, is not necessarily the same thing. That is to say 
Being, as such, is not the philosophic confrontation of a subject against an 
object, or visa versa. What Heidegger expresses is not only the desire to see 
“past” subject versus object, but a realization that the idealized, or our reflective 
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tendency, is always a result of always already being-in-the-world and being-in-
the-world, for Heidegger, is never first and foremost an experience of a subject 
here and object over there against the subject, this too I believe is true of 
digitization. But let’s first clarify being-in-the-world. 
 As Heidegger notes in his magnum opus, Being and Time, “Dasein's Being 
takes on a definite character, and they must be seen and understood a priori as 
grounded upon that state of Being which we have called "Being-in-the-world” 
(78). An understanding of Heidegger’s Being-in is fundamental to apprehending 
what alterations have been made to Husserl’s concept of the life-world. For 
Heidegger, while the human being certainly possesses the power to “abandon” 
its lived experience via moments of contemplative reflection, a turn to the 
objective or subjective, or the stance by which subject and object may appear, 
this is not our primary mode of existing – or how the world is first and foremost 
lived, experienced, and ultimately willed as meaningfully given, it does the reach 
the will the underlies the human being. For Heidegger, we are ‘alongside’ the 
world in a sense, but even more accurately, we are a Being-in-it, we are utterly 
absorbed in the world (Being and Time, 80). As he states, “Dasein is never 
'proximally' an entity which is, so to speak, free from Being-in, but which 
sometimes has the inclination to take up a 'relationship' towards the world. 
Taking up relationships towards the world is possible only because Dasein, as 
Being-in-the-world, is as it is” (Being and Time, 84). By “free from Being-in” 
Heidegger is already providing a critique of the philosophies of rationalism, 
empiricism, and Kantian (even Husserlian) intellectualism, all of which (however 
unbeknownst to them) come at the world as though the “mind,” or subject, exists 
apart, or over and against the world as objects, and so even turns the mind into 
an object of study. For example, the very idea of mathematic proximity, of 
distance, has at its very foundation, a presupposed assumption that subjectivity, 
or the being that observes the world, presents itself against the objects it 
encounters. And while Heidegger is not contesting our sense of mathematic 
spatiality as necessarily flawed, we are in-space(s) he claims, he want us to 
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acknowledge that this is only a result of the unitary phenomenon by which we 
first and foremost find ourselves as being-in-the-world, not separated from it as 
the dichotomy of subject and object inherently presuppose at its very “core.” 
Expounding upon this, Heidegger notes,  
 
 It would be unintelligible for Being-in-the-world to remain totally veiled from view, 
especially since Dasein has at its disposal an understanding of its own Being, no 
matter how indefinitely this understanding may function. But no sooner was the 
'phenomenon of knowing the world' grasped than it got interpreted in a 'superficial', 
formal manner. The evidence for this is the procedure (still customary today) of 
setting up knowing as a 'relation between subject and Object' -a procedure in which 
there lurks as much 'truth' as vacuity” (Being and Time, 86-87). 
 
What is meant by this claim? “Dasein has at its disposal an understanding of its 
own Being,” Heidegger claims, an issue we will continue to address. What we 
have here is the realization that the human has itself as an aspect of its worldly 
concerns, which we inherently become “caught-up in.” One mode of openness, 
by which the human is open to a meaningful relationship with the world is 
precisely that the human “returns to itself” as an issue of concern, so to speak. 
And concern, or care, for the world is a fundamental aspect of the life-world for 
Heidegger. “To be concerned with,” implies to “take up,” to be absorbed with. 
Dasein, or a human’s “own” existence is concerning to itself via being de-
severant, that is, bringing the world near. We, as humans, have a tendency to 
absorb ourselves in our own sense of existence as an experience of 
something(s). Much as Husserl notes, “consciousness” is intending toward 
things, whether “real” or “imaginative,” this never ceases to exist, real, dream-
like, or virtual, in fact this very being eventually constitutes the virtual. The sense 
of self-knowing, as a concern, is an open “fixation,” whereby we are always 
already meaningful to ourselves.  
 The issue here is that being open to a sense of concern with self, also 
presents a sense of innerness – nearness to self, which digitization ultimately 
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further fulfills through the realization of various tangible technologies. As 
Heidegger notes, “In Dasein there lies an essential tendency toward closeness” 
(Being and Time, 140). We can even see in Descartes’ Meditations on First 
Philosophy that what appears “closest to me,” and least dissolvable is the “I 
think” that accompanies me, an issue that will become of increasing importance 
to us as we present our own theory of digitization.  
 The “natural” tendency, as it has emerged, is to posit our concern for self as 
a subject over and against some-thing else: the world as thing(s). The result is 
that the world can appear as separate, separate to an “ego,” which “gazes” upon 
it, measures it, calculates it and assigns meaning to its “distinct objective parts.” 
Heidegger’s point is not that this is somehow “false” of us -- how could it be if it is 
happening, but that what comes first and foremost is the sense of open de-
severance (as a fundamental aspect of being-in-the-world), and de-servance by 
no means is limited to self-concern, strictly speaking. If we were a mere 
movement toward self-concern via de-servance, this would be likened to an 
implosion, and perhaps this will become of fruition to us via an analysis of 
digitization – digitization is clearly a kind of “implosion.”   
 Being-in-the-world, as an aspect of this unity, we are always already, a 
prior, absorbed-in-it. Prior to a turning back to oneself, meaningful concern must 
exist a priori. The world only presents itself as “some-thing” or as “individual 
things” by already being absorbed within the world. The things we appear to 
encounter over and against a “gazing ego” only appear via a prior openness 
toward our concern for the world, which is to say, a-prior to any sense of self; 
hence, intersubjectivity and digitization in Chapter Four may be viewed as an 
analysis of the “construction” of self. Granted, it makes sense that we possess 
concern for ourselves, as we are also Beings-in-the-world. Strictly speaking, de-
severance for Heidegger is the primary openness, an existential, that absorbs 
our Being. De-severance is the way in which we are, as well as the mode by 
which our Being “meets” the world as any meaningful relation. And it is only via 
this mode that objects “appear” as meaningfully discrete entities, subject to our 
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scrutiny.    
 
 
Heidegger’s Being-in-the-World: A continued analysis of  
de-severance, embodiment, and the openness toward space as 
depth 
 
It should now be clear that we have moved “beyond” Husserl’s transcendental 
ego as the constituting ground of the world. However, our turn toward 
Heidegger’s concepts of de-severance, as the life-world’s “ground,” opens an 
array of new questions. If this Heideggerian claim that we have explored has any 
theoretic sustenance to us, the question that presents itself at the moment is 
such: how does any-thing appear to us via de-severance. How do “things” 
appear through our state of absorption-with-the-world?  
 The world discloses itself for the human being, Heidegger claims, and this is 
rather obvious. If we are having an experience at all, it must be a disclosure of 
some-thing, some-thing that we as human beings are de-severed and absorbed 
within. The fact of the matter is that if the world is a-prior concern, the world is 
always already close to us as is, or at least some aspect(s) of our “individual” 
world, aside from our intersubjectivity. To be absorbed with the world is literally to 
already be involved with it situationally, embodied, drawn within certain aspects 
of the world. Heidegger, especially in his later essays, particularly “The Origin of 
the Work of Art,” claims that the world, which we meaningfully concern ourselves 
with, constantly unconceals itself as something to be engaged with; that is to say, 
absorption is never absorption with nothing at all, but rather de-severance is 
absorbed into the world’s space understood as having a depth that both conceals 
and unconceals (176).  
 Take the phenomenon of vison, for example. To experience anything at all 
means to not being seeing something – vision is always at the same time a 
double act of unconcealment and concealment – it possesses a depth that “calls” 
or pulls de-severant vision into an engagement with the world, into possibilities, 
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or even new technological or artistic possibilities of creation. For me to see 
anything at all, I must also not be seeing something, and this exactly why I see 
anything at all. For example, at present, my computer screen is visible to me 
precisely because it does not show itself to me in its entirety. I do not see the 
back of the computer screen, and that is the means by which the front is visible 
to me. There is a depth that always holds back aspects of the visible, and it is in 
this invisibility, this “distance,” that I am drawn via de-severant being-in-the-world.  
 In fact, the only manner by which it is possible to see the rest of my 
computer is to move my physical location to another, or to imagine it in my 
minds-eye, and yet neither of these ever reveal the total depth of the object, or its 
potential to reveal. What’s more, if we speak of movement on a broad level, even 
the realization that I want to see the back of the screen, because my vision 
currently conceals it as the screen unconceals itself, is already a movement 
toward the apprehension of the back – and so de-severance calls upon my 
embodiment as a situation within the world to act. What impetus would there be 
to move, or even to think of the back of the screen, or more so yet, the potential 
of this marital screen to display otherness to me if all was unconcealed to me? 
But it never is. Being-in-the-world always implies being within the space of depth. 
 As noted, Heidegger’s philosophic concepts of de-severance, as well as 
unconcealment/concealment, further illuminate the concept of being-in-the-world, 
which is now truly beginning to take its phenomenological shape within the 
context of this analysis. Thus far, through this investigation, we have examined, 
via a theory of the world/life-world, how it is that the world is able to disclose itself 
as something to be experienced a prior to any conceptualization of the 
metaphysical subject and object dichotomy. Through Heidegger we have also 
begun to grasp a sense of why a finite Being-in-the-world, as situationally 
embodied as de-severant, is one that experiences a sense of space as depth, as 
one that conceals and unconceals. However, as even Heidegger tells us, the 
human being is one that takes up itself as a matter of concern. The human being, 
via our sense of de-servance, can return to itself, bringing what is distant in the 
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world’s depth nearer to either have or reflect upon. What we mean here is that 
the human is a self-reflexive being. The human can reflect, a reality that will gain 
importance in the wake of our study, especially on an intersubjective level.  
 It is of great curiosity that Heidegger, perhaps with a greater sense of clarity 
than anyone before him, establishes Dasein’s being as one that is first and 
foremost Being-in-the-world, an open position from somewhere, yet is also 
seemingly reluctant to engage explicitly with our placement as a particular type of 
placement in-the-world as embodied. In all of Heidegger’s work, our embodied 
totality, as the means by which we are situated in the world, is all but vaporized in 
the face of his more abstract conceptions of Being, world, de-severance, and 
Unconcealment/concealment. How are we to make sense of these concepts 
without the body and all of the united particularities that establish our bodily 
“schema” as the conduit toward the world, and visa vice, the world toward a 
particular body? That is to say, de-severance, as life’s formative pull, is never 
experienced beyond embodiment as a type of ethereal ghost or spiritual figure – 
it depends upon embodiment, and so too does the meaningful style it “brings” to 
the world. In fact, it should be no shock to us that even these concepts of ghost 
and sprit require a body for us to give them “face,” and that it so say, meaning. 
And this too is true as we turn towards digitization, digitization is never 
unembodied, and this is simply a phenomenological truth. What ghost, angel, or 
digital avatar can you recall that is ever presented as non-embodiment? Even 
God has historically been provided a body, a rather human one.  
 Our point is this, to be in-the-world at all is always to be a particular type of 
embodiment, and doesn’t one’s type of embodiment fundamentally pertain to any 
establishment one has with the world? That is to say, aren’t “our” de-severant 
concerns always the formulation of a codependent existence between a certain 
type of body and world? Put another way, does not one’s schema of 
embodiment, one’s body as a style of orientation, not establish particular 
concerns with the world, particular ways of being experientially drawn-in by the 
world as codependence? And do not our concerns, as we’ve noted above, 
39 
engage us first and foremost within certain experiences whereby anything 
experienced at all is a matter of de-severant unconcealment and subsequent 
concealment in bringing it near, eliminating its distance, empirical or 
phenomenally? All of these Heideggerian concepts, however rightfully reluctant 
he is to move “too close” toward the ego, pertain to our embodiment. And so, we 
turn toward embodiment as the final dimensionality of the life-world’s explication, 
especially as it relates to de-severance and depth. And all of this ultimately leads 
us towards the-will-to-flatten.  
 
Embodiment: Human Attunement as De-severance 
 
Heidegger notes that the body, while seemingly an object among objects under 
the empiricist sense, is in fact “the absolute zero-object” (Patočka, Body, 
Community, Language, World, 27). Here I turn toward Maurice Merleau-Ponty, a 
philosopher influenced by Heidegger’s thought, who turned toward embodiment. I 
will do the same in order to further clarify being-in-the-world, as I lead to 
significance of the will-to-flatten as the driving force of digitization.  
 In addressing embodiment, I will begin by addressing two separate sections 
from Merleau-Ponty’s magnum opus, Phenomenology of Perception, and they 
are as follows: 
 
“And everything said about the sensed body pertains to the whole of the sensible of 
which it is a part, and to the world. If the body is one sole body in its two phases, it 
incorporates into itself the whole of the sensible and with the same movement 
incorporates itself into a "Sensible in itself." We have to reject the age-old 
assumptions that put the body in the world and the seer in the body, or, conversely, 
the world and the body in the seer as in a box. Where are we to put the limit between 
the body and the world, since the world is flesh? Where in the body are we to put the 
seer, since evidently there is in the body only "shadows stuffed with organs," that is, 
more of the visible? The world seen is not "in" my body, and my body is not "in" the 
visible world ultimately: as flesh applied to a flesh, the world neither surrounds it nor 
is surrounded by it” (138). 
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The Body: “I have the world as an unfinished individual through my body as a power 
for this world; I have the position of objects through the position of my body, or 
inversely I have the position of my body through the position of objects, not through a 
logical implication, nor in the manner in which we determine an unknown size 
through its objective relations with given sizes, but rather through a real implication 
and because my body is a movement toward the world and because the world is my 
body’s support.” (366) 
 
Merleau-Ponty states that our embodiment not only possesses the visible but is 
in fact possessed by the visible in order to experience the world (Phenomenology 
of Perception, 135). Though one can clearly lose certain visible/experiential 
senses, it is only possible to claim that a sense can be “lost” if it is a sense to be 
had. What can’t be possessed clearly can’t be lost. Our difficulty here is 
displaying this theory explicitly, while at the same time not becoming consumed 
by it so as to miss the primary issue at hand – digitization.  
First, the visible here, while easily misunderstood as sight, is too simplistic 
under our typical definition of the term. Our fleshy eyes as sight (*quoting 
Merleau-Ponty) are important to Merleau-Ponty; there is no dismissing this. 
However, embodiment as our primary experiential vision, under the 
phenomenological theory, is not the historically driven taxonomy of making the 
eyes into their own object of study. In fact, Merleau-Ponty finds this historically 
driven objectivist move, which makes the body an object of study to be, at least 
on some level, a mistake.  
The issue, as Merleau-Ponty notes above, is to understand the body prior 
to the metaphysical mindset, that is, to apprehend embodiment (our body) as 
more than an object among objects, or the mind as something “inside” of the 
body. “Consciousness,” so often apprehended as a mind inside an object-body is 
a result of Heideggerian discoveries finding itself within a certain 
stance/embodied position. Too often we understand consciousness as “in the 
mind,” as something happening “inside of the head.” Merleau-Ponty’s point is not 
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that the “rational, conscious mind,” is unimportant, as is often the case with other 
major phenomenologists, but that this metaphysical stance is misguided. The 
body, as our total embodiment, is never first and foremost an object before us for 
a separate internal mind to analyze; rather, it is the means by which anything at 
all is lived. Our particular schema of embodiment, our makeup, as a collectivity 
(and not through the taxonomy of its objective “parts”) engages with the world in 
a particular manner. The world acquires its meaning through this embodied 
engagement, and de-severant being is “informed” by this schema, meaning that 
the body can only become an object for itself by first and foremost being open to 
engagement – as being-in-the-world. Embodiment implies de-severance as a 
subsequent immersion with a world. Our sense of the “inner cogito,” or a subject 
against objects, is merely the “shadow” of our total embodiment de-severantly 
being drawn into the depth of space, however much we have historically placed 
this “shadow” onto a pedestal, presupposing the embodiment by which it is 
possible to be self-aware at all.  
Another way to put this is to say all types of embodiment, in all of the 
variant schemas embodiment manifests throughout the world, always have within 
themselves a particular schema towards the world. Perhaps, human embodiment 
is in fact one whereby the sense of de-severance is not only one whereby we are 
attuned to things, but also our body as self-affection. Perhaps our particular form 
of embodiment, as a type of total unity, is this reflective de-severance in the 
sense that not only does the body as concern place itself into situations beyond 
itself, but also takes up itself as its own situation in regard to what it is not, or 
lacks, what it will-to-flatten and bring near.  
The means by which the world becomes visible, or opens itself as 
meaningful is a result of any living being’s schema of de-severance, and this type 
of de-severance is codependent to the totality of the embodied form, and cannot 
be considered outside of it. One states that their “conscious mind exists inside 
their head, inside their body,” but this claim itself is not possible without a form of 
embodiment that is first and foremost “their” collective whole, as it is enveloped 
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by the being-in-the-world to which its schema attunes it. My vision, even as sight, 
strictly speaking, does not exist on its own – like an object in a void. My hand 
reaches toward the smart phone, and its tactile contour aligns with me, my hand 
and vision find themselves together, while my de-servance senses possibility 
within the depth of the device through this attunement. Can I say that my sight is 
formatively independent of my particular stance as human being, which is my 
type of embodied schema? My embodied hands and feet, as a type of schema, 
are relevant to my eyes as an active sight. I visualize the screen and de-
severantly discover that “it is in front of me,” but can sight accomplish this without 
the totality of embodied schema? The orientation of my hands and feet correlates 
to my schema of direction and cannot to be de-severed if my sight is to have any 
sense. Consciousness is the totality of my de-severant embodiment. It is not prior 
to it, but the result of it.  
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Chapter Two: Embodiment and Digitization  
 
“The body is our general means of having a world.”  
 - Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, (147) 
 
“But certain ways in which entities are discovered in a purely cognitive manner also have 
the character of bringing them close. In Dasein there lies an essential tendency towards 
closeness.” (p. 140).   
 - Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, (140) 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The phenomenological concept of embodiment, and all of its potential to enrich 
our understanding of digitization, has a tendency to remain outside the realm of 
conventional conversation, which all of us experience throughout our everyday 
lives. This is no inherent fault of ours, and it still remains true that the significance 
of our bodies does not go unnoticed. For example, it is true that most of us may 
speak of having a body, caring for our bodies, sensing our own body, or being in 
our body. We may also address another person, or something, as being 
embodied within the world. But does this imply grasping the philosophic 
significance of embodiment, and what it can contribute to an understanding of the 
meaningful world we live within? Often this leap remains outside of our 
conversations, a fact that should change if we desire to further comprehend the 
impact that digitization is having on the practicality of our lives.  
 One way to address the unfamiliarity of phenomenology’s contribution to 
an understanding of embodiment is to see that conversation on the body and 
embodiment, when it takes place among us, tends to reside either within the 
objectivity of scientific literature, or in what Martin Heidegger deems, “idle talk” 
(Gerede) within Being and Time (211). For Heidegger, most of our conventional 
conversation resides within “idle talk,” which is not inherently a negative 
phenomenon, but it does diminish the significance of the discursive meaning that 
a term such as embodiment might hold for many of us. It is a task to overcome in 
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the quest to further our understanding of digitization and its phenomenological 
relation to us.  
 Idle talk, as Heidegger tells us, “Terminologically…signifies a positive 
phenomenon which constitutes the kind of Being of everyday Dasein’s 
understanding and interpreting” (211). He further elaborates by stating that, 
“Proximally, and with certain limits, Dasein is constantly delivered over to this 
interpretedness, which controls and distributes the possibilities of average 
understanding and the state-of-mind belonging to it” (211). This clarification is 
important, as it affirms that what is provided to us through our daily conversations 
(idle talk), persists throughout our lives as the meaningful framework for 
comprehending and interpreting any and all terminology, philosophic or not, 
which we come into contact with. This of course means that the pervasive culture 
understanding of the body, in conventional conversation, is the means by which 
we first come to grasp the concept of embodiment when first introduced to it 
phenomenologically. For this reason, as with phenomenological and other foreign 
terms, it remains vital to consider one’s words wisely when approaching the 
phenomenology of embodiment. Especially when deploying embodiment as a 
way to better comprehend digitization. 
 Both within the study of phenomenology, and hopefully outside of it, a 
conceptual analysis of embodiment will enrich our knowledge of digitization as 
we come to find that embodiment is fundamentally linked to the emergence, 
meaning, and potential, as well as limitations of digitization as it relates to our 
embodied human form. For this reason, the phenomenological study of 
embodiment, when grounded within examples of everyday life, is essential to a 
study of digitization. This is because all human engagement with technology, 
new or old, is in essence, a relation of one’s body and the technology. Even in 
idle talk we sense this, but do we grasp the significance? Could the two possibly 
come to be without one another? And in what way can embodiment and 
digitization, when grasped phenomenologically, inform us about our human 
condition, and our underlying motivations? 
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 Such questions will come to light under a lens of embodiment and 
digitization, which are increasingly relevant to our contemporary moment. To 
comprehend digitization, let us first approach what is paradoxically closest, yet 
also most distant to us – our own embodiment. In doing so, we will find that any 
attempt that is made to understand the meaningful significance that digitization 
has had upon the human being and the world, presupposed or not, takes into 
account that this is a relationship that is revealed to us, first and foremost, 
through being embodied as such.  
 The digitization of the world, does not only have a meaningful impact on 
our intersubjective experience, our experience of and with the other. Prior to any 
intersubjective experience, embodiment must first facilitate the possibility of any 
and all reciprocal contact with the world that an “individual subject” experiences. 
Embodiment, it is essential to observe, is the foundation by which meaning 
occurs to any one of us as a revealed experience. This individual reciprocation of 
embodiment, and its interconnection with the world, depends on that being’s 
embodiment, in this case, human embodiment. Perhaps the most basic, yet 
essential, aspect of phenomenology’s discoveries is that the tenant of 
embodiment’s relation to the world is the realization that any meaningful 
development to the world is a constant co-relation to being embodied. In fact, this 
argument can be understood as the core of Merleau-Ponty’s philosophic project, 
most notably in Phenomenology of Perception, and its relevance still expands 
and modifies with increasing significance today. For Merleau-Ponty, the classic 
subject object dichotomy is called into question. The world of things, 
technological or not, which seemingly exists over and against my conscious 
mind, is brought into scrutiny. Embodiment for Merleau-Ponty could be 
understood simply as the contact point between the self and world, but this would 
still diminish what he is attempting to get across to his reader. Embodiment, the 
body, is not simply a connection to world, but is rather akin to an interwoven 
fabric that is one with the world, an everlasting bond from birth until death. 
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 For example, Descartes, a rationalist, as well as others within the 
empiricist tradition, have a tendency to act as though the mind or reason can 
exist “outside” of itself, detached from space and time as a grand observer of 
things. This philosophic tradition places the reasoning mind over and above the 
world of things, even one’s own body as an object of study. But as Merleau-
Ponty states in Phenomenology of Perception, “Thus, we must not say that our 
body is in space, not for that matter in time. It inhabits space and time” (140). 
Embodiment, discussed in a phenomenological sense, is the very index, or 
“opening,” by which world and thought exist at all. What is significant here is that 
a theory of embodiment, as an openness – a revealing of the world as something 
to meaningfully engage with - challenges prior presuppositions and grants new 
insight into the formation of meaning. And surely the advent of digitization is a 
meaningful event in the horizon of human existence. What can it tell us of our 
condition as human beings? 
 Simply put, under a phenomenological sense, one must have a body in 
order for the world to reveal itself as something meaningful prior even to the 
formation of being a “self” within it. Furthermore, the phenomenological theory 
grounds embodiment as a type of “constant openness.” That is to say, given the 
classical understanding of consciousness over materiality, couldn’t 
consciousness transcend the material body? This has major implications given 
the digitization of the world as a primary will that can be seen expressed in 
digitization (as will soon be explored in depth); it is the freeing, or transcendence 
of the mind. For example, the storage of any and all information can be 
witnessed within the palm of one’s hands when dealing with a smartphone – the 
world “flattened” into one’s palm, the sense of depth diminished, controlled. 
However, if one takes the phenomenological theory of embodiment into serious 
consideration, one also must begin to question the validity of this willing to 
“overcome” the temporal body. There is, in digitization, a will for transcendence, 
power, and ultimately a “God’s eye view” upon the world as such, but given 
embodiment, this willing must be called into serious question.  
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 While it is undeniably true that history transcends individuals as the 
meaningful ground of any and all culturally established knowledge, the brute 
experience of the world that any “individual” knows, is solely gained, strictly 
speaking, upon an embodied being that is neither a-prior (before one’s birth), or 
a-posterior (after one’s death.) The situatedness just mentioned is the only 
manner in which any being, human or otherwise, could come to know/open the 
world of experience and possibilities. Being embodied, in its essence, requires a 
type of situatedness within the world, requiring that all embodiment be temporal – 
that is, inhabited by time, as noted by Merleau-Ponty. Furthermore, any and all 
types of embodiment establish a meaningful relation to the world that is directed 
by the structure of the being’s embodiment. Another way to say this, taking 
embodiment into consideration, is that it is relatively absurd to inquire how 
another animal meaningfully understands its world. Such an inquiry would require 
the embodiment of a different being, which is an impossibility. This is to say, all 
meaningful experience that both you and I have gained, is the result of being 
embodied as homo-sapiens during our particular embodied life. Even the 
transcendent nature of human history, while clearly “beyond” any individual 
human being, is also the manifestation of the embodied human beings of past, 
continually reinterpreted and lived by each and every human in the present, via 
embodiment. In this sense, history too is the outgrowth and result of 
embodiment, when understood as emerging from the practical relation of 
embodied beings and the world of the “past.” Put in different terms, the 
embodiment of the past’s meaning to us, as a meaningful relation to the world, 
quite literally lives in the embodiment of human beings existing in the present. It 
is through embodiment that we “hold” the past.   
 Embodiment ties an individual to the world, and is quite genuinely, a 
fabric, or as noted above, an openness. Examples of this emerge with all of our 
particular embodied senses, digitization being no exception. Granted, humans 
tend to gravitate disproportionately toward sight as their primary mode of 
“knowing the world.” An individual doesn’t go to smell, hear, touch, or taste their 
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long last friend. We claim we went to “see” them. That said, when discussing 
embodiment within phenomenology there are endless sights to turn one’s 
analytic attention. The relation, for example, between light and dark is 
meaningfully interwoven through the means by which my “fleshy” eyes, to quote 
Merleau-Ponty, make “contact” with the world (Lawlor, “Dwelling in the Textures 
of the Visible,” 152). However, when asking an individual on the street to 
consider lightness and darkness, odds are that connotations, our ideas derived 
from idle-talk, will come to “mind.” But considering embodiment, light and dark 
acquire their meaning on the level of presumptive, even unreflective idea, only 
because of embodiment, which gives birth to the ideas of lightness and darkness. 
The light of the sun warms the embodiment of my being on a primordial level that 
has a tendency, however obvious, to go unnoticed. The light of the sun provides 
human embodiment with the possibilities of navigation, given the particularity of 
the nature of our “seeing.” Light gives our body a reason to mean, a location to 
move towards. Darkness stunts our sense of movement, taking a hold of our 
being, providing an unsettling awareness of the virtues that lightness provides.  
 Light speaks to our embodiment; it calls on it, but not yet in a conceptual 
manner, not on the level of idea. Furthermore, light in its primal appearance, 
emerges from the sky, orienting one’s sense of any directional glance 
whatsoever. And provided by our embodiment, there is a particular glance. 
Darkness, on the other hand, appears to engulf the light, hiding it from being. 
Darkness emerges from the “depths” of the world, tempting one to enter the 
unrecognizable, due to our particular embodiment. The human eyes, two of 
them, situated whereby they cannot “see” into one other, are not either fully 
parallel. Our eyes exist on an upright being, placing one’s privileged sight above 
much of the body, as well as the world “below.”  When taking embodiment into 
account in this manner, there is less surprise when one reaches, via de-
severance, the level of connotation, or idea. Ideas emerge from the raw 
experience of embodiment as such. Is it a surprise that religions tend to worship 
the light above, while condemning the dark below? One does not need to look far 
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into the canon of pop-culture in order to acknowledge the symbolism of light as 
good, and the dark as bad. The release of Star Wars reminds us of this.  
 Simply put, embodiment reveals all elements of the world that we take up, 
throughout time, past, present, and future, as something meaningful. Because of 
this, the examples present for phenomenological analysis are as endless as the 
entire unfolding continuum of meaning itself. Were we stripped of embodiment, 
reduced only to “mind,” as though this were a possibility, no meaning could exist 
whatsoever. Likewise, without one’s “personal” embodiment, no meaningful, 
intersubjective, sociological relation, which is to say a cultural epistemic relation 
to another within the world, could transpire and flourish into the transformation of 
a culture. And perhaps most importantly, at least as an underlying preface, no 
being, human or otherwise, could be of any form of de-severance without first 
and foremost being embodied. A jump to de-severance presupposes 
embodiment as the “fabric” required for de-severance. And as noted by Merleau-
Ponty, time, as well as the space we occupy, are not distinct from embodiment; 
instead, time and space find their meaningful existence as interwoven in the 
relations to finite embodiment. All de-severance, and ultimately meaning, come 
from a certain perspective in-time. Embodiment ensures, regardless of its form 
(human or otherwise), a consistently situated being-within-space. And 
embodiment as being-within-space is essential to an understanding of 
digitization, because it is the very means for the consistency of a contextualized 
perspective, which any and all subjects are confined to throughout their lifetime. 
If we are to understand the existential tradition as placing emphasis on 
authenticity and freedom, as figures such as Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Heidegger, 
and Sartre clearly did, then embodiment is paradoxically the means by which any 
freedom and authenticity are possible, as well as the consistent limitations 
exerted upon these ideals. 
  And it is at this juncture where enough groundwork has been laid in 
regard to embodiment, to work back to previous points, and analyze a number of 
digital technologies and their intrinsic relation to our embodiment as the 
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meaningful site of our existence. In doing so, a fundamental truth regarding 
human nature will emerge. What will be recognized is that de-severant being, 
embodied as humans are, wills to overcome its own embodiment via digitization. 
This willing is an historic project, whereby overcoming the limits of embodiment 
remains concealed as the driving force motivating digitization.  
 The will we speak of is a will-to-flatten experience, which itself is 
fascinatingly derived of our embodiment, as the constant “re-uptake” of the world 
as something for our embodiment to totalize. The will-to-flatten experience is a 
will to control the world’s depth. Flattening the world essentially implies an 
increased revealing of the world to the human being, yet this revealing has a 
tendency to conceal its own goal. Techne, often translated as art, or technology 
in the sense of making, is a teachable mode of rational revealing that is 
intrinsically connected to digitization (Aristotle, “Nicomachean Ethics,” 1799). 
Human beings, as de-severant, bring technologies into existence that continually 
reveal previously unknown aspects of the world. In doing so, digital technology 
seemingly flattens aspects of the world, which would have previously been 
considered unfathomable. An as example, from an apartment in Upper Michigan, 
a friend whose material body is empirically halfway across the globe, is revealed 
digitally to me in “real time.” Soon to be addressed in greater detail, this is 
paradoxically possible only as a willful “defiance” against the confines the 
embodiment exerts upon the human being, which can only emerge and be 
revealed via the conditions of human embodiment itself.  
 The will-to-flatten, is a natural derivative of the very potential to “stretch” 
our being via de-severance within time and space. What this ultimately displays 
is that embodiment is both the fundamental site of our possibilities, and 
simultaneously, our most significant “limitation,” a necessary confine that reveals 
being(s). What impact this has, and will have, on the human being in the age of 
digitization is of course yet to be fully known. This, however, does not undermine 
the need for an exploration of embodiment’s significance within the age of 
digitization. However, it must be reiterated that history (and we are a historic 
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being) is an ever unfinished “project,” and any totalizing theory of what is to come 
is surely founded upon naïveté. That said, this should never mean that one must 
dismiss the aim of greater insight into any subject matter. It is simply an essential 
recognition of the “shortcomings” of our being.   
  
 
Heidegger’s Significance to Embodiment: And His Reluctance to 
Address Embodiment and Depth  
  
Martin Heidegger’s philosophy, an outgrowth, perhaps better understood as 
regrowth, of phenomenology’s foundations laid by the work of his mentor, 
Edmond Husserl, paved a new path for the philosophy of phenomenology, a 
path, so potentially expansive that it’s still being explored and remapped to this 
day. Heidegger’s Being and Time set in motion a significant challenge of the 
thinking that dominated his era, and arguably still dominant to this day. And the 
challenges Heidegger made to the tradition of philosophy have not gone 
unnoticed, nor failed to captivate his readers. As noted in the documentary, 
Human, all Too Human – Heidegger. “More critical commentaries have been 
dedicated to Heidegger, than to any other philosopher, apart from Aristotle” 
(BBC, Human, all Too Human). The engagement with Heidegger’s philosophy 
isn’t simply due to his idiosyncratic prose, negatively critiqued by Theodor 
Adorno as “The Jargon of Authenticity” (Adorno, The Jargon of Authenticity). 
Heidegger’s philosophy, even with its creative vocabulary, and taking into 
account its arguable obfuscation, is a turn from Husserl’s radical subjectivism, 
toward an inquiry into the presuppositions that Heidegger argues run throughout 
the breadth of Western philosophy. Heidegger begins his philosophy at the site of 
the “Being,” a location too often addressed within philosophy as self-evident. But 
for Heidegger, being is argued to be elusive, and anything but self-evident.  
 By turning towards an analysis of Being and beings, with aid of his “new” 
terminology, Heidegger avoids the philosophy of the Cartesian cogito, which is 
intrinsically bound to the subject/object, or mind/body, dichotomy. An inquiry into 
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the cogito is to ask, where and what is my subjective self, my “central” I-think? In 
presupposing the existence of a cogito, both rationalists and empiricists base 
their understanding of the world from the metaphysical perspective of a relational 
property that is distinct from the world of objective things, over and against this 
subjectivity. Heidegger, by way of contrast, essentially dismisses this separation. 
Put another way, the philosophic tradition of separating subject and object isn’t 
merely problematic for Heidegger, it’s essentially overcome within his philosophy. 
In fact, Heidegger would claim that in philosophically making the metaphysical 
leap to an analysis of subject over and against object, being-in-the-world, and 
Being in general, becomes utterly presupposed – dismissed, overlooked, as it 
were. This dismissal of what Heidegger refers to as Being, ultimately drives his 
analysis throughout all the argumentative avenues that his philosophy undergoes 
throughout the years of his life.   
 In questioning Being, and the “Being of beings,” Heidegger asks a 
question so seemingly simplistic, he asserts that by and large it has gone 
unaddressed throughout the course of Western philosophy. What does it mean to 
be, he posits? What is dasein, a German term Heidegger uses for the human 
being, translated as being-there, in its essence? What does dasein entail, and 
what is being-there’s relation to Being? As noted in the previous chapters, a 
fundamental characteristic of dasein, according to Heidegger’s analysis in Being 
and Time, is that the human being (dasein) is de-severant in nature. As de-
severant, human beings are not only open to the world, but humans possess an 
innate ability to unconcealment aspects of a world that would otherwise remain 
concealed to Being. Both technology and art, understood within a modern 
context, reveal the world to dasein, according to Heidegger (Heidegger, 
“Question Concerning Technology,” “The Origin of the Work of Art”). While these 
modes of revealing are essential to understanding embodiment and digitization, 
so too is the reason Heidegger presents for the world concealing itself from the 
human being, a further consequence, we shall see, of being embodied.  
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 That having been said, what is essential to Heidegger, is not only a 
dismissal of Descartes’ human mind as cogito, but of the Aristotelian theory of 
humans as the animal whose soul is guided by intellect, a rational soul (Aristotle, 
“De Anima”). This is not to suggest that Heidegger dismisses humans as 
potentially rational beings, imbued with the gift of a capacity to reflect upon 
experience. Quite clearly this is not true, as noted repeatedly in What Is Called 
Thinking, Heidegger finds that what is “Most thought-provoking is that we are still 
not thinking…” (4). Rather, Heidegger understands our being, first and foremost, 
as dominated by the phenomenological quality of “stretching” one’s being into 
particular tasks via de-severance. This reality of de-severance, for Heidegger, is 
not implicitly rational; in fact, it is quite the contrary. De-severance should not be 
directly linked to his concept of thinking, regardless of de-severance remaining 
the ground upon which thinking may be paved. De-severance and thinking are 
not synonymous. One might rather posit de-severance as the drive of 
Heidegger’s care, Husserl’s intentionality, or rather yet, primordial foundations of 
the will, in the Nietzschean sense. And de-severance, whether conceived of as 
the grounds of care, intentionality, or will, does not necessitate rationality. This is 
essential to the issue of digitization, as it clarifies that digitization, in all its 
seeming technological ingenuity and genius, should not be conceived of as being 
inherently driven by rationality. The force, de-severance, that wills digitization 
into unconcealment/existence is not rational, it is paradoxical, and it resides 
within being embodied.  
  To clarify, de-severance may “hand us over” to the potential for rational 
thought, but it does not, in its essential nature, guarantee Heideggerian 
“thinking.” Likewise, having the innate capacity to “extend” my phenomenological 
being into the “distance,” such as operating a digital drone, or existing in the 
realm of a virtual world, does not insure rationality or suggest it. While idle-talk 
tends to place rationality as the heart of technology, the drive toward digitization 
is not dependent upon rationality. And it is Heidegger who puts this 
presupposition into radical question.  
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 Again, this phenomenological quality of the human being as de-severant 
opens the possibility for rationalization. However, even as we are faced with the 
presence of digitation, no such rational objectives of the technologies currently in 
existence need be, or even are at this very moment, insured.  
 So why and how have we managed to reveal digitization as an aspect of 
our reality within the world? And what truth resides concealed within these 
technologies, forged from the force of de-severance being? Nothing other than a 
particular form of willing, a will driven by the paradox of embodiment. And the 
willing that guides the actions of a de-severant being need not be known to us 
for this will to possess and direct our actions toward a desired end. In order to 
perceive the will that drives digitization, embodiment as access to the world’s 
depth, must be understood. And here we encounter a philosophic location that 
Heidegger recognizes, yet never adequately engages with as is necessary to 
better comprehend digitization.  
 And still, what Heidegger’s contribution to philosophy displays is that de-
severance is fundamental to our being, it is the very means by which we access 
the world as something more than it is – as something to be revealed, awakened. 
When we intend anything at all, awake or in our dreams, we are de-severant 
insofar as our willing is brought to us as an issue to take up. In this re-uptake, we 
are within the fabric of existence, not distinct from it as subject and object. 
Furthermore, de-severance implies that human beings “stretch” their being within 
a world that is always open to a range of infinite possibilities, constantly revealing 
potentials within the materiality of existence. Heidegger notes, “In Dasein there 
lies an essential tendency towards closeness.” (Being and Time, 140).  This is to 
say, human beings, in all our tasks, are constantly in a state of unconcealment 
possibilities, taking up the world as a task to be engaged with.  
 The world did not come with digitization as an actualized “product,” 
digitization is clearly not like the sun, which has always already rested 
unconcealed for us in the sky. What digitization requires is de-severance, 
provided by our being, in order to reveal our own essential will “towards 
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closeness.” The materials necessary to construct the circuitry of the world-wide-
web remained as concealed actualities, dependent upon a de-severance of our 
human type to emerge. What Heidegger’s philosophy discloses to his reader is 
the unique character of the human being to reveal new spaces for experience, 
whether this be through technology or art. This unconcealment, whether it be a 
work of art or a technology, ultimately further reveals possibilities within the open 
depth of Being. But does revealing entail knowing what will be revealed, or why 
we are revealing a possibility of Being? Not at all. As noted above, the human 
being can unconceal without a sense of what is being opened, without reason 
into its own willing. The repercussions of unconcealment, and why we are 
unconcealing the world as we are, can and do remain concealed to us if we do 
not allow what has been unconcealed to address us as a call to question. To 
question what and how? To question our will, and to do so as a 
phenomenological inquiry, which does not pretend to “stand over the subject of 
digitization,” as an object, but rather as an experience that we are part of, and 
which can inform us about our own selves as human beings.  
 And in this regard, Heidegger’s general dismissal of embodiment gains 
importance for addressing the answers digitization asks of us.  
 
 
Human Embodiment as being-in-the-World: The world can only 
be de-severed by having an embodied perspective within it 
 
To further comprehend digitization, it is essential to understand digitization as an 
extension of a “grounded” unison between embodiment and world. In this 
manner, digitization is an outgrowth of the potentiality when human embodiment 
and the world exist together as one. Whether or not digitization is indispensable 
to, or merely a possibility of, this relation is a question worth asking, but one that 
would be based primarily upon the grounds of an esoteric analysis. Digitization 
has occurred, and it exists. The practical question is to ask what, if anything, 
digitization reveals to us about our own human condition, as well as our 
potentials and limitations as embodied human beings. A truth that is coming to 
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light is that human embodiment exists as a catalyst, within a world of concealed 
potential. Embodiment always already had, as its potential, the ability to reveal 
digitization through technological means. And this embodied potential was met, 
even as new digital technologies continue to emerge. The question of how 
embodiment managed this task, and why, is one that is connected to an analysis 
of both embodiment’s potentials and limitations.  
 As Heidegger informs us, dasein is always subjected to the consequences 
of being-in-the-world. And while Heidegger is aware of the body’s significance in 
his use of the terms ready-to-hand, and present-to-hand, Heidegger’s analysis of 
dasein rarely focuses on the body as the site whereby the world is revealed. It is 
Merleau-Ponty who expands upon Heidegger’s phenomenology, placing primary 
emphasis on embodiment and perception as the site of being-in-the-world. 
Subsequently, Merleau-Ponty begins at embodiment and perception when 
analyzing subjects such as art, language, technology, and politics. This is a 
pivotal turn within the field of phenomenology, in part because it clarifies that de-
severance is not some mystical force “within” the human being; rather, de-
severance discovers the potentiality of the world via the way in which human 
embodiment comes to know the world through a particular embodied schema. 
And this schema establishes styles of knowing the world, as well as the 
possibilities of its revealing.  
 As Merleau-Ponty writes, “I hold my body as an indivisible possession and 
I know the position of each of my limbs through a body schema [un schema 
corporel]” (Phenomenology of Perception, 101). This schema, for Merleau-Ponty, 
should not be confused with the empiricist’s objective mode of analysis, which 
tends to observe the motions, organs, cells, DNA, and even atoms distinctly – 
however fruitful such an analysis may prove to be. The body is not merely an 
objective, in fact, the body schema is not an object at all, Merleau-Ponty insists. 
The body schema is lived as experience within the world. Due to this, we tend to 
presuppose the body schema, as well as its significance in coming to know and 
reveal the world to us. As noted, “…the “body schema” is, in the end, a manner 
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of expressing that my body is in and towards the world” (103). Because of this, 
“When I say that an object is on a table, I always place myself (in thought) in the 
table or the object, and I apply a category to them that in principle fits the relation 
between my body and the external objects” (103). This “in thought” is de-
severance and the “taking up” an object as it applies to the schema of my body is 
finding meaning in anything within the world, while simultaneously knowing its 
existence through my own embodiment. Whatever the object may reveal is 
predicated upon its potential to “find itself” within my body’s schema.  
 And it is essential to the case of digitization that we grasp both the 
importance of Heidegger’s de-severance, while also incorporating the additions 
of Merleau-Ponty’s critique of embodiment, as the means by which a schema of 
“knowing” the world’s depth is achieved whatsoever. Addressing this issue will 
also enrich a further insight into the question of what kind of willful drive resides 
within the creation and engagement with digital technologies.  
 But what drive do I suggest the will is attempting to overcome in the 
“materialization” of digitization? Nothing other than the very being-in, as being 
situated in-the-world, which provides the possibility for the will to posit its aim as 
a will toward “taking up” the world, which now also means itself, as a drive to 
overcoming its very being, as situated within the world. But why are we situated? 
What situates this will to overcome at all? What situates the will, and which 
Heidegger does not dismiss throughout his philosophy, but arguably negates 
throughout his philosophic work, is embodiment as the “ground” of being-in – of 
knowing the world, and reciprocally expressing the world as such. The will 
beneath digitization, is none other than the will that wills its own escape from very 
situational placement, as a being embodied within the world.  
 
 
 
 
 
58 
Embodiment as “knowing the world” Part 1: Merleau-Ponty’s 
philosophic contribution and its relation to Virtual Reality 
 
“Only a phenomenology of expression that begins and remains within lived experience 
can avoid the pitfalls of classical approaches that offer nothing but a “bad ambiguity,” 
nothing but the “mixture of finitude and universality, of interiority and exteriority.””  
 - Donald A. Landes, Merleau-Ponty and the Paradox of Expression, (7) 
 
“If thought were complete and pure in itself, then it would possess in advance everything 
we would ever think (either alone or in dialogue).”  
 - Donald A. Landes, Merleau-Ponty and the Paradox of Expression, (7) 
 
The will that drives digitization is nothing new to the “human condition.” As 
previously noted, being-in-the-world is an historic process of coming to “know the 
world,” to reveal it. To express the possibilities that lay dormant “with-in,” but 
paradoxically present in their potential to our de-severant capacity as embodied 
within a grander situation. As embodied via our schema, human beings “take up” 
the world, and find “within it” the task and concern that drives our willing towards 
overcoming the world’s depth “against” our embodiment. And in order to do so, 
as Merleau-Ponty continually informs us throughout Phenomenology of 
Perception, and arguably even more so within his later work, requires 
embodiment as a schema of being-in the world. All beings in the world, that is all 
life, is embodied in one manner or another. And given the phenomenological 
concern, our own embodiment, our own lived experience, is of the greatest 
interest to ourselves. We are a being that attempts to know itself, and this 
attempt is made possible only by having a situation at all. Our situation is being-
in the world, as embodied, situationally within and as a constant correlation to the 
world. What is essential to Merleau-Ponty, and this exploration of digitization, is 
that embodiment always situates within, and is never external to the world. Being 
embodied implies being within the world’s depth. However, embodiment is also, 
strictly speaking, never an internal to the world either. If there is an “echo” of self-
hood, a soul (so to speak), it is only “found” within our de-severant nature as a 
constant “re-uptake” of the world’s depth as embodied. Being embodied is being 
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“in” the world. The depth that engulfs us, and which we reveal by navigation 
within it, sustains embodiment as a constant perspective. Our embodiment, 
manifested as digitization, wills the overcoming of depth, but this overcoming is 
impossible, because depth sustains this will.  
 As Donald A. Landes informs us in his text, Merleau-Ponty and the 
Paradox of Expression, “If thought were complete and pure in itself, then it would 
possess in advance everything we would ever think (either alone or in dialogue)” 
(7). This is a succinct quotation which grasps one of the primary points Merleau-
Ponty attempts to convey within the whole of his philosophy. The mind, or “inner-
self”, however defined or indefinable its autonomy may be, is always situational 
because of embodiment, and is always the result of the schema of embodiment. 
Our knowing the world is never an escape from it or a “grand” eye gazing upon it 
in pure rational thought, as though it were distinct from us. Another way to 
rephrase the Landes quote is to acknowledge that thought is never complete or 
pure because it is always contextualized within the world’s depth. Yet another 
way to understand this is to say if thought were pure and complete, there would 
be no depth. In this scenario, there would be no willing at all, nothing to take-up 
or overcome.   
 What informs our being, and subsequently all aspects of our historic 
epistemology, whether in theory or practice, is that our embodied relationship to 
being-in-the-world remains thick, it is a “depth.” The world provides a never-
ending depth for embodiment to “take up,” from the inside out, and 
simultaneously, the outside in.  As Merleau-Ponty writes, in The Visible and the 
Invisible, “It suffices for us for the moment to note that he who sees cannot 
possess the visible unless he is possessed by it, unless he is of it,* unless, by 
principle, according to what is required by the articulation of the look with the 
things, he is one of the visibles, capable, by a singular reversal, of seeing them—  
he who is one of them” (134-135). One way to decipher this statement by 
Merleau-Ponty is to express that embodiment, as schema, that is, as a particular 
form of existing, reflects itself in the world, and the world vis-à-vis reflects itself in 
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this style of embodiment. There are endless examples of this, both within 
digitization and outside of it. It is sufficient to say then that when we access the 
world’s depth, with our embodiment, we find in it possibilities of reflecting our own 
schema of embodiment. All digital technologies relate to our embodiment. The 
field of ergonomics takes this matter as its obsession, but the truth of the matter 
is that ergonomics merely tweaks, or resides within a secondary sphere of 
contemplation in regard to what always already takes place in any human 
construction, simply by being embodied as we are.  
 
 
 
The examples of this again are not only endless within digitization, but 
absolutely fundamental to it, as well as to any creation prior to it. The first Xbox, 
released in North America on November 15th, 2001, had a controller that was 
made for none other than the schema of the human hands (Game Informer, 48). 
There is no doubt that time, energy, and ultimately capital was invested into 
researching the ergonomics of how best to design the first edition of this product 
for the human hands, as well as “tweaking” those that would follow within the 
subsequent versions of the Xbox. However, the issue here is that this 
thoughtfulness was in fact secondary. Of course, the gaming system’s controls 
would be designed for the human hand; it is comically self-evident pointing this 
out, as this is the primary means by which the game is made accessible to the 
embodied gamer. And yet, this phenomenon accompanies every aspect of 
digitization, whether it be from the writing of every code to the emersion in virtual 
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reality, however subtle and unnoticeable it is at first inspection. All emergence 
facilitated by embodiment takes place both at the stage of the theoretical 
“drawing board,” as well as in the practice of making and then using any digital 
technology that is now “real,” and “facing” us within the world. The world is 
reflected only with-in our knowing of the world as embodied through a particular 
schema that is ultimately unique to the human being, as opposed to any other 
style of embodiment.  
 It is worth briefly noting here that while I am making the case that 
Heidegger displays what I would suggest is a notable ambivalence toward 
engaging embodiment “head on,” within in his own philosophic, and hence, is 
inadequate to fully understand embodiment and digitization, the human hands 
are also essential to dasein’s being in Being and Time. It is not happenstance on 
Heidegger’s part that the concepts of ready-to-hand and present-to-hand 
accompany his critique of dasein as being-in-the-world throughout Being and 
Time. Under the lens of Merleau-Ponty, it would make sense to 
phenomenologically posit Heidegger’s explicit discussion of the hands as a 
primary sight of our embodiments coming to know the world, coming to “take it 
up,” as it were. The concept of a disembodied mind would be undoubtedly be 
rather absurd to Heidegger, as it is through our “engagement” with equipment 
that the world is discovered, as a fashion, which is predicated upon certain style 
of hand(s).  
 Again, and this is not to dismiss the richness that accounts of embodiment 
as a totality (*which is specifically what I wish to avoid by bringing Merleau-Ponty 
in), but the hands are a fundamental site of epistemic “contact.” This is true 
throughout digitization, given the keyboards on which I type, to smart-phone, 
which is specifically designed for the hands. But what is fundament here is not 
simply noticing that the human body and our digital technologies are made for 
the other, which I will continue to extrapolate upon, but that the body is not simply 
a thing in the world. The fact that the Xbox controller requires itself to be 
ergonomically tweaked to better the gamer’s unawareness of the device, making 
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it ready-to-hand, is secondary to its existence as a de-severant “extension” of 
human embodiment; which according to Merleau-Ponty, is not simply an object 
in the world. In Part 1 of Phenomenology of Perception, titled “The Body,” 
Merleau-Ponty expands upon Heidegger’s realization, stating that the body, 
embodiment, cannot be understood as another object in the world (152-153). 
Merleau-Ponty is not naïve in this section to realizing that the body can and has 
become the objective study of the sciences, lending itself to discoveries and 
advancements in health and technology. His point is that this too resides with a 
secondary awareness of the body. First and foremost, prior to us making the 
body present-to-hand, that is, aware of, and a subject for ergonomics to 
objectively study, embodiment exists not as an object, but as expression, which 
“opens the world.” As Merleau-Ponty states, “I am not in front of my body, I am in 
my body, or rather I am my body” (151). Landes, in Merleau-Ponty and the 
Paradox of Expression, addresses this quite eloquently by noting, “There is an 
immediate relation of sense between body and world. Being in the world is 
accomplished as the interplay between spontaneity and sedimentation, and thus 
expressive embodiment is the deeper truth that classical philosophies have failed 
to recognize” (88). What these two are attempting to display is that while it is true 
that I can analyze my body as an object, and this has surely produced fruitful 
benefits, it dismisses the body as the site of “taking up” the world, which is 
constantly accomplished prior to any reflection on the body as an object. And 
what is more, it gives us a world to address.  
 The human body, as embodiment, “plays the world,” so to speak, and 
reciprocally the world calls on the body to play it. And just like a musical 
instrument, embodiment’s particular style simultaneously informs the body, world, 
and “myself,” of what the world is, and where within the world embodiment can 
discover and become more than is found within the present moment. Digitization, 
and all of its discoveries, theatrical or in material practice, display this truth when 
analyzed phylogenetically. As example, consider the advent of, and engagement 
with, virtual realties, such as through the Oculus Rift, a virtual reality device. And 
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at best, virtual reality’s accessories, such as the Virtuix Omni and Myo Gesture 
Control Armband. These devices, considered phenomenologically, are the result 
of the correlation of the world and our embodiment, first and foremost, on a level 
that does not reside within objectification, or by insisting that objects within said 
virtual realities be/are present-to-hand objects. Another way to put this, and this 
points to why “classical philosophies have failed to recognize” embodiment as 
the opening to being, is that embodiment works on the essential grounds of 
“forgetting” that we are embodied as such.  
 Virtual reality is embodiment and is in no way an escape from it. That is, to 
play within virtual reality, for one to “take-up” residency within a viral world, one 
must feel as though they are within it, and this is accomplished only on the 
grounds of paradoxically feeling embodied, by losing the sense of being 
embodied. For virtual reality to fully work, it must be experienced as ready-to-
hand; that is, we are within our daily routine, and this is the loss of the sense of 
embodiment’s significance in order for sense to occur. At best, a virtual 
experience should provide the experiencer the ability to “drop” one’s self-
awareness (the present-to-handness) of being in anything that is even remotely 
strange to their body, the result being that the virtual reality “attaches” itself as 
correlative to the human’s body-scheme of knowing the world as embodied. This 
requires that one does not struggle with the world, but precisely that one “find 
oneself” so embodied to being-in-it that it is firmly “had,” and not appear as 
found at all. Only then can the virtual environment be “taken-up” as experience 
for genuine embodied engaging. That is, only then will it feel completely real to 
the experiencer. And it is this reason that virtual reality has existed as possible 
for quite some time, yet is only now beginning to become technologically possible 
through refinements of the technologies.  
 This can and must be achieved explicitly through what allows us the 
ready-to-hand “take up” of our lives within one’s daily reality, that is, within our 
normal experience of embodiment outside of virtual worlds. Specifically, 
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embodiment is the pre-epistemic ground for “take-up” to occur as the possibility 
of knowing of anything at all.  
 An example of this is the clunky nature of the Oculus Gear VR, however 
stunning it may be to a first-time VR user, the problems inherent to the gear are 
quickly realized. This technology was released November 27th, 2015, as an 
addition to the Samsung Galaxy line of phones (GSMArena). This device is made 
to house one’s cellular device, as seen below. The phone then displays visuals, 
which are seen by the viewer through the gear in order to “enter” a virtual world. 
The device itself is built to replicate our binocular vision, as embodied by having 
two eyes horizontally adjacent to each other. This is stereoscopics at play, 
creating the sense of depth and emersion that the human eyes enable. The 
device even considers the curvature of the human eyes. All of this having been 
noted, the technology itself, like all virtual reality devices, point us back to the 
significance of embodiment prior to even engaging in the experience. The device 
must conform to the style of embodiment that we are, and subsequently, even 
has foam cushioning around the locations where it meets the face, to further 
erode the illusion of wearing anything at all.  
 Once the device is in use, the experience offered by the product, while 
impressively immersive, still quickly exemplifies the present-to-hand issues that 
virtual reality faces. And these issues are present not because embodiment 
needs overcoming, but because we are embodied and can never escape this 
fact. In Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty writes, “Habit expresses 
the power we have of dilating our being in the world, or of altering our existence 
through incorporating new instruments” (145). Prior to a first-time user ever 
placing the Oculus Gear VR onto their head, and pressing play, embodiment has 
habituated the de-severant “take up” one knows of the world. Paradoxically, 
embodiment is made aware of by this device, which is exactly what it attempts to 
“overcoming.” The hilarity of watching another engage with the technology is 
almost more enjoyable than experiencing the virtual world for oneself. The 
reason for this is that the user’s own embodiment becomes comically aware to 
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them, as well as those watching the person partially absorbed in the virtual 
reality. It might be accurate to say that the individual using the device is 
experiencing “double-embodiment,” a term I’ll use here to express the sense of 
simultaneously having and losing one’s epistemic map of the world – a de-
severant confusion, as it were.  
 Another way to express this double-embodiment is to note that the person 
engaging with the device is both ready-to-hand and present-to-hand at the same 
moment, or at least navigating the two extremes at a rate so quick that it is 
unfamiliar to the normal experience of the world. On the one hand, one’s 
embodied vision is allowed the “take-up” needed by the device for embodiment to 
slip into a new location, as in a dream, via a vision. On the other hand, this is not 
so at all, as the person is exceptionally aware that that they both are and are not 
embodied in the “right” place when wearing the device and playing a virtual 
world. One’s “take up” with the world is confused, so much so, as to make some 
individual physically sick, even to the point of dizziness that induces vomiting, a 
symptom known as virtual reality sickness (LaViola Jr., “A Discussion of 
Cybersickness in Virtual Environments”). But why is this? A phenomenologically 
grasp of embodiment holds an answer. 
 Phenomenological embodiment is never lost by any living human being, 
regardless of the situation, precisely because embodiment is situating. Death is 
the loss of embodiment, the loss of situationally “taking up” the world and 
discovering residency in it, of being-in-the-world, which death puts to an end. 
Oculus Gear VR, thankfully, doesn’t end being-in-the-world. But the device does 
“dilate” the world, as Merleau-Ponty notes above. A “new instrument” has been 
added as soon as one hits play button on the Gear VR. But this instrument is 
“clunky” because it both does and does not allow for the total “emersion” 
embodiment needs for it to have access to the map of “habit.” Habit is what 
allows embodiment to “take up” the world as a whole, giving embodiment over to 
fluid de-served experience. Embodiment is lost to us as the pre-objective 
opening to the world because for it to fulfill itself, as a correlative relation between 
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embodiment and world, it must not take note of itself as an issue. Embodiment as 
an issue, becomes quite literally, sickeningly at issue for some that use the 
Oculus Gear VR, one of the reasons being that one’s hands and feet are not 
present within the virtual experience provided by this technology. The sensation 
of having, while oddly not having, phantom limbs immediately takes over as one 
form of double-embodiment. The individual is aware that their hands and feet, as 
their normal powers of expression, are eliminated in this virtual world. But of 
course, these powers are left simultaneously “behind” as accessible in the world 
of their daily life, which now oddly blend together as one “new” foreign world of 
experience. Because of this, it is wise that the individual using this device sits 
down, as the propensity to falling over is normal. This is due to what I am 
referring to as “double-embodiment,” as being ready-to-hand and present-to-
hand at once. The loss of, or the inability to “take up” either world, real or virtual, 
is what occurs here. One can’t fully “gear” oneself into the “take up” of the virtual 
world due to a lack of possessing the entire map that embodiment typically 
provides. Worse yet, and adding to the amusement of those viewing the VR 
occupant, is the difficulty of “taking up” residency in the world of reality. For 
example, to adjust the focus of the Oculus Gear VR to one’s eyes, a dial must be 
fine-tuned on the device. The issue, at least when first acclimating to the device, 
or of “altering our existence through incorporating new instruments,” as Merleau-
Ponty puts it, is that it is difficult to use one’s hands to properly locate the dial.  
 Meanwhile, one’s vision is made remarkably ready-to-hand, allowing for 
genuine “take up” of this singular region of embodiment’s “map,” and yet still, 
one’s vision is disoriented by the lack of the whole. This directs one to another 
point made by Merleau-Ponty, which is that the “parts” of the body are in fact 
never the discrete parts of the sciences. “Within” each part of my body, so too the 
other parts reside and inform said parts’ “take-up” of the world. It is not 
psychedelically driven to state that my eyes “touch” the world, or my eyes “see” 
it. Vision needs its counterparts, and it is this lack that makes the rest of one’s 
body present-to-hand. When using the device, one is also made aware of the 
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body, as an “object” of concern for the individual engaging with the technology. 
“How do I move in here?” Or, “Ouch! What did I just hit my hand on!?,” are 
common expressions one hears from an individual wearing the device. All of this 
is amusing, but also directs us back to embodiment as the grounds of being-in-
the-world. If any virtual technology is to “succeed” at total emersion into the 
“habit” that is required for a true “take up” of the virtual world, double-
embodiment must not occur.  
 This is precisely what digitization is striving towards, as it perfects the 
experience of virtual reality. The Virtuix Omni and Myo Gesture Control Armband 
can be used as additions to the Oculus Rift, providing both the hands and legs a 
“situation” within the virtual world. What cannot be escaped is embodiment within 
these realties. Embodiment situates what we bring to these realties, and because 
these realities are embodied, embodiment situates what we “bring back” from 
them.  
 
 
 
Oculus Rift. Released March 28th, 2016 
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Virtuix Omni. Remains in production, while released to Kickstarer Funders in January of 2017. 
 
 
 
Myo Gesture Control Armband. Released to the public as of 2017. 
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Embodiment as “knowing the world” Part 2: Merleau-Ponty’s 
philosophic contribution and its relation to digital content as 
discovered within the grounds of embodiment  
 
“My body is the hinge and the negotiation between real and ideal weight, and its every 
gesture is between pure repetition and pure creation, between body and mind, between 
determinism and spontaneity.” 
 - Donald A. Landes, Merleau-Ponty and the Paradox of Expression, (11) 
 
Prior to any detached, cognitive act “within” the mind of a subject, embodiment 
has already accessed the world, of which it is of. One’s embodiment “maps” the 
world as epistemic and accessible to itself, as something to “take up,” engage 
with, and express. Expression, that is, what is expressed every subtle moment of 
embodied life, is always de-severance residing within the continuous grounds of 
embodiment. Our embodied does not rest against digitization. Digitization is 
embodiment’s discovery of its own potential within the world. Or as Merleau-
Ponty states, in Phenomenology of Perception, 
 
 “Our body, insofar as it moves itself, that is, insofar as it is inseparable from a 
perspective and is this very perspective brought into existence, is the condition of 
possibility not merely of the geometrical synthesis, but also of all the expressive 
operations and all the acquisitions that constitute the cultural world. When it is said that 
thought is spontaneous, this does not mean that it coincides with itself; rather, it means 
that thought transcends itself, and speech is precisely the act by which it in fact becomes 
eternal.” (408) 
 
One way to understand this quotation is to realize that in an analysis of 
embodiment, embodiment itself is being expressed. In no act, mathematic, 
coded, or in cultural theory or practice, is embodiment somehow exempt. Rather, 
these accomplishments, including digitization, find their creative breath exhaled 
through the correlation of our style of embodiment to their being-in the world.   
 For example, it may be beneficial here to think of digitization’s creative 
“environments” as existent upon embodiment’s de-severant style of already 
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handing the human being over to the possibilities of imagination, or dreams. 
Digitization, I will argue, is essentially imagination, or accessing the world’s 
depth, realized. And to grasp how this possible it is important to understand 
phenomenologically how imagination itself is possible, as a constant attribute of 
embodiment being-in-the-world. In doing so, I will focus on a digital game. 
However, this analysis, applies to the advent, look, and use of operating 
systems, desktop interfaces, social media, virtual landscapes, and all other digital 
games.  
 Consider the 2016 video game, DOOM. The game, released On May 
13th, of 2016, was the much-anticipated reboot of a 1993 video game, which 
holds the same title. The original DOOM, released on December 10th, 1993, is 
often considered to be the historic epitome of the first-person shooter (Mäyrä, 
(104). The intention of the 2016 version of the game was essentially to bring the 
graphics and game-play of the original into modern day life. The game was 
released on Microsoft Windows, PlayStation 4, and the Xbox One gaming 
platforms, and received significant critical acclaim (Yin-Poole). Both games, new 
and old, are based within the context of a futuristic Mars space-station scenario, 
as well as access to the realms of Hell. In human’s search for alternative energy 
forms, a portal to hell has been opened. And you probably guessed, the 
aftermath isn’t pretty. The game places you into a fast-paced landscape of 
zombies and hellish demons, just waiting to be destroyed by the protagonist.  
 
 
DOOM, 1993. Final Boss. 
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DOOM, 2016. Final Boss. 
  
 Provided the phenomenological lens of embodiment, these creatures are 
fascinatingly foreign, yet also “known” to their artistic creators, as well as myself, 
through nothing other than the epistemic being-in-the-world of embodiment. And 
this relation to embodiment brings digital games, however alien, into existence, 
and has done so in imagination prior to the actualization of digitization.  
  What often goes unnoticed within our imagination and dreams is that 
these hypothetical experiences, occurring “within the mind,” are also never 
unembodied, and rely fully upon the knowledge gained in having always been 
embodied – having always “taken up” a world. In this sense, the very notion of 
anything existing alone “in the mind” may be brought into question. One’s 
daydream of a far-off land, where all problems are left “behind,” is predicated 
upon being de-severed in that experience from a certain perspective; a certain 
style of embodiment is already with this imaginative scenario. The blissful trees 
and breeze within this dreamscape reside for one as having known them as 
something not against one’s own body, but with one’s body as a being-in the 
world. Their meaningful significance to me cannot be detached from having 
previously “taken them up,” as an embodied experience, their relationship to me. 
The texture of the trees and soft warm breeze, are known not just as distinct from 
one’s own embodiment, but as with them. Sight, touch, smell, etc. “take up” 
residency in all experiences. Through being-in-the-world, one’s skin engages 
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with the skin of the tree, knowing it only as rough, thick, and strong against the 
delicate nature of one’s own skin.  
 Perhaps the tree in one’s imagination is foreign to reality, exhibiting a bark 
that is smooth as the skin of a peach. Here we discover the depth latent within 
being embodied, as our de-severant style is. This odd imagination finds in the 
tree’s bark an expression of something more than is there in the world. But is it 
more than is there? For whimsical imagination to occur, embodiment as de-
severant must already access the depth of possibility. While it is true that no 
actual tree possesses soft bark/skin like that of peach, the very imagination of it 
is discovered in the depth of world’s possibility. And soft and hard skin only make 
sense to one, embodied already, who “takes up” access to the world’s depth. The 
possibility for a tree in one’s imagination to exhibit another quality is not “outside” 
of the world, it is in the world that this is possible. One discovers oneself in this 
experience not as a “pure mind” above the experience, but as being-in it, 
situationally. No imagination or dream, strictly speaking, is out of reality.  
 Even our most bizarre moments of “true creative expression,” within a 
dreamscape, or actualized on pen and paper, reside within our embodiment’s 
“map” of what it epistemically “grasps.” Take the final Boss in the video game 
DOOM (*see images above). The foreign features, however odd they may be, 
make sense to me not because they are entirely mine, but because in the world 
of embodied experience, I have already “discovered” my body “against” foreign 
beings as embodied and given room for the discovery of their potential depth. 
 The spider-cockroach like being in DOOM is discovered by its creator, via 
the world’s depth through embodiment. The same is true when a new gamer 
meets the digital enemy for the first time. The spider and cockroach-like being in 
this experience take up residency within my own embodiment, not as my own, 
but precisely as “mapping” the unknown styles of being embodied. The meaning 
of this foreign “object” is discovered here. One can only sympathize with the 
strangeness of its eyes and legs, because my own eyes and legs have brought 
forth meaningful sense to the world through taking it up as depth. What one 
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cannot grasp, and what emerges as fright to the viewer in this imagination 
brought to digital life, is precisely that these creatures, in one’s lived experience 
with them, present possibilities that one’s embodied style never fully knows. This 
is so only because one is embodied as such. The extra appendages of an insect, 
and the imaginative nightmare that the gamer now lives make sense because of 
what one lacks in their own embodiment. The multitude of unexperienced eyes 
and legs that an insect’s style has, both does and does-not make sense to the 
human style of embodiment, and this depth of the unknown is carried into our 
dreams and imaginative states of creation.   
 A digital virtual “dreamscape,” whereby the laws and rules of reality seem 
foreign, new, and exciting, as in both DOOM games, presuppose that they were 
“brought” to this digital space, only upon the grounds of embodiment. All digital 
worlds, however seemingly foreign, as though they are in a dream, have been 
given creative life only through the consistency of human beings embodied within 
a world to begin with.  
 What’s more, as alluded to above, is that within dreams and virtual worlds, 
one is never disembodied. And prior to any “material” realization of digital 
platforms or worlds as “true” possibilities for one’s engagement, the dream 
already possessed what was always already required for digitization. And this is 
so only by being embodied situationally. Even in the creation of virtual worlds, the 
one designing the world is situated, and always remains within their own 
embodiment, even if we desire to extrapolate to the perspective within the world’s 
creation on the screen. No game or avatar “within” a game is without embodied 
perspective, which one’s own embodiment as the constant grounds of being can 
find home in through the screen, keyboard, mouse, or virtual appendages that 
situate themselves to the human body for one to become “taken up” with the 
experience of the game.  
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And yet, the will that drives digitization is the will to escape 
embodiment: Human beings “resent” the limits inherent in being 
situational, and will to overcome this limitation 
 
It is my hope that this chapter makes clear that embodiment and digitization are 
inherently paradoxical in their relation, and this paradox is not one to be 
overcome, ever. This is precisely because without embodiment digitization could 
not be realized, as one’s own being would not have situation, a world to take up. 
No depth exists without embodiment. The elimination of depth is only presumably 
achieved at the death of embodiment, at which point no situation at all would be 
accessible. 
               As I am attempting to display, digitization “actualizes” the attempt at 
escaping embodiment, which is the condition that holds this attempt in constant 
place as an actuality to be attempted. Oddly enough, if digitization is scrutinized 
with a “phenomenological lens,” embodiment becomes increasingly evident as 
the ground upon which the world is opened as a condition for “embodiment,” as a 
de-severed style of being-in, to “take up” an impossible task. Subsequently, the 
ultimate paradox of embodiment and digitization only grows in our attempt to 
escape embodiment. Never has the body become so imprisoned “within” itself as 
the means to escape itself in the quest to overcome depth. The smart phone may 
as well be considered a part of the human body at this point. And virtual reality, 
as it is coming to be realized, rests upon the encapsulation of the embodiment. 
And with that, I leave you with this image. Perhaps the future holds the possibility 
of creating our own sense of depth, while our phenomenal is imprisoned at 
home.  
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Man “inside” a game/virtual reality simulator.  
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Chapter Three: Space and Digitization   
 
“When I see an object, I always feel [éprouve] that there is still some being 
beyond what I currently see, and not merely more visible being, but also more 
tangible or audible being, and not merely more sensible being, but moreover a 
depth of the object that no sensory withdraw will ever fully exhaust.”  
 - Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, (224) 
 
Introduction 
Digitization, telepresence and all it entails, has seemingly eviscerated the 
distance space imparts upon each and every one of us. Technologies that 
interconnect us, such as smart phones, virtual reality devices, tablets, watches, 
or desktops - these technologies are all impacting, perhaps even changing, the 
experience of space, and this is undeniable. It is now possible to Skype in real 
time any digitized person whose physical location exists across the globe or even 
in outer space. Two friends that have never met “outside” of a game’s “virtual” 
space, now exist together as comrades within a digital world. The length of time 
once required to communicate over a vast spatial distance has seemingly 
evaporated in our digitized existence.  
 In addressing the conditions of the contemporary digital landscape, it has 
become common ground to turn toward space. But in what regard? Never before 
has so much information rested within the embodied hands of any one individual, 
nor has the ability to transcend one’s own physical location in order to 
simultaneously experience another location been possible. Whether this 
contemporary feat is used for peer-to-peer communication, education, business, 
governance, or even gaming, the conclusion is presented as a victory over space 
itself. 
But in what way? Is the experience of space’s structure fundamentally 
altered? Has space itself, via digitization, been fundamentally overcome? What 
would this mean? Empirically speaking, digitization has clearly continued to 
collapse space. Distance, as access from one location to another across the 
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globe, has been eliminated; the 2018 Winter Olympics in full display within our 
own living rooms is an example of that. But so too is outer space being 
condensed, “touching” our own perception, held visually within our hands. Never 
before have the planets within our solar system and beyond felt so close, so 
near. I can now virtually tour Paris with the Oculus Rift, “eliminating” the distance 
between my embodiment and the location, as well as the time (space) required to 
arrive there. The transmission of a visual signal from one place to another is so 
small, it might as well be nonexistent. One can know a friend’s locations, even 
their intentions, with relative certainty only moments after an initial text message. 
The alterations digital technology has caused to one’s existence “in” space 
clearly appear as something profound to a sensible human being. In the 
presence of such technology questions arise. For example: In what way has the 
experience of space changed? If the experience of space has in fact changed, 
have we human beings been changed as a result? And if this change shows 
itself to be true, what are the short and long-term repercussions?  
For example, Michael Heim, in his text The Metaphysics of Virtual Reality, 
asserts that an ontological shift in our awareness has occurred. He states, “When 
I write of an ontological shift, I mean more than a change in how we humans see 
things, more than a paradigm shift or a switch in our epistemological stance. Of 
course, our access to knowledge changes dramatically as we computerize the 
arts, sciences, and business. But there are more things in heaven and earth than 
are dreamed in our epistemology. An ontological shift is a change in the world 
under our feet, in the whole context in which our knowledge and awareness are 
rooted (xiii).” After making this assertion, Heim uses the example of the 
automobile as a previous technology that changed “the world itself,” presumably 
on an ontological level given his definition above (p. xiii). The experience of 
space is undeniably impacted with the advent of the automobile. In the past, for 
example, one may have considered traveling from New York City to Chicago in 
the span of only a day to be an absurdity, but it is not until the technology of the 
train or car that this absurdity is understood as anything but. But does this 
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constitute an ontological shift in the human capacity for sensing space, that is a 
change in our being itself?  
The car, and other such technologies, are often used as early 
technological examples prior to digitization. But again, the question at hand is if 
this an ontological shift, a shift in being itself? And perhaps this depends on 
semantics, though I argue that if we turn toward a phenomenological lens, 
greater clarity will illuminate the matter, and we will see that while semantics can 
muddy understanding, it does not distort the human condition itself, not 
digitization and its underlying aim.  
There is no doubt that digitization is changing the world on an empirical 
level, but is it changing our ontology, our being? Or is it via our ontological 
condition of space that we always “run up against” a particular ontology of space, 
which ultimately constitutes us, allowing for digitization to become a reality? To 
become something “actual.” To address this in a slightly different manner - does 
digitization attempt to overcome space as one of our fundamental ontological 
conditions? Perhaps it is not that our ontological conditions have changed, but 
that we have fooled ourselves into believing that we’ve achieved an ontological 
shift. In other words, fooled ourselves into believing that we have somehow 
overcome space.  
The theory of Space and Digitization, which is to be presented here, will 
be constructed upon the foundations of a continued exploration of Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty’s embodiment as it pertains to and influences his concept of 
space. Space, and the objects human beings face within it, possess depth for 
Merleau-Ponty, and there is a transcendent thickness to all objects encountered 
in and as an aspect of space. There is, according to Merleau-Ponty in the 
quotation above, “a depth of the object that no sensory withdraw will ever fully 
exhaust” (Phenomenology of Perception, 224). And this depth of space, I will 
argue, is essentially to both explore and acquire a greater phenomenological 
understanding of digitization.  
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And while human embodiment and space, conceived of as depth, are 
essential to the following theory, I will first bring greater light to Martin 
Heidegger’s concept of de-severance, the always already, meaning that de-
severance must be understood as indivisible from conceptualizing how it is that 
depth, and the thickness of objects, exist as such for the human condition. Next, 
by engaging both Merleau-Ponty and Martin Heidegger, my intent is to display 
how the objects of space, possessing depth, have made the revealing of 
digitization possible. I will seek to display that with this de-servant access to 
space as depth, a will-to-flatten is simply essential to the human condition as de-
severant, which long precedes digitization, but is also never completely fulfilled 
as a telos to totalizing depth and eradicating it through digitization.  
My primary argument within this chapter on space and digitization is to 
show that what remains presupposed “within” digitization is exactly this will-to-
flatten both space as empirical calculative distance, but more, philosophically, 
this will’s true end is to flatten the phenomenological depth of space itself, which 
we tend to presuppose. My final position is that while our embodiment, de-
severed as the human being is, always already wills-to-flatten depth (and hence 
reveals digitization into being), such as a telos always remains fundamentally out 
of reach due to both the nature of depth itself, and the human as fundamentally 
situated within the world as embodiment. This being said, I will argue that the 
consequences of this will-to-flatten, whether one sees them as positive or 
negative, have a genuine impact on that being that has digitized its existence.  
 
Clarification on Heidegger’s Analysis of Historically Driven 
Ontology: The way towards the human condition as De-severant 
 
In Being and Time, Martin Heidegger analyzes the human being through the term 
Dasein, or “being there.” In doing so, Heidegger’s intent throughout the text is to 
conduct an in-depth inquiry into the fundamental conditions of Dasein’s relation 
to being-in-the-world. Being-in-the-world, Heidegger informs his reader, is an 
experience that Dasein is always already a part of, and which traditional 
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philosophy and the contemporary sciences have subsequently presupposed, or 
lost sight of. Of the numerus arguments made by Heidegger throughout his 
magnum opus, Being and Time, one that is of great significance to contemplating 
space and digitization, is his own analysis of the human being’s primary ontology 
as de-severant.  
Yet, in order to better grasp Heidegger’s argument surrounding de-
severance, and ultimately its significance to space and digitation, it is vital that 
Heidegger’s reader (whether through primary or supplementary ones) actively 
come to “take on” his philosophic position for oneself. To do this, one must sense 
that our grasp, the manner in which we interpret the world and even our own 
being, is always under the influence and filter of history, which largely determines 
one’s experience of the world. This lens through which we “come at the world,” 
impacts how we see and understand said world, and this lens (any lens 
according to Heidegger) is always historically driven.  
Subsequently, Heidegger argues that Western history, from the time of 
Socrates, exacerbated by the discoveries and philosophic direction of Descartes, 
has obsessively objectified all areas of existence under the natural attitude. This 
Heideggerian critique is significant to phenomenology as a whole, as many within 
the philosophic theory continue to inquire into how it is that historic modes of 
thinking (ideas) come into being, as well as impact the human condition as the 
idea solidifies intersubjectively across time and culture. An analysis of 
digitization, as the potential flattening of distance, depth, and time, surely 
possess a rich ocean of inquiry for phenomenologists theorizing on the concept 
of mind/idea in the twenty first century, and will be addressed in the final chapter 
on intersubjectively and digitization.  
For the time being, it should be noted that the intersubjective history one is 
in is also consequently determinative of the primary ontological perception of the 
world, even of the issue of consciousness. In Heidegger’s day, and still in our 
own contemporary moment, the dominate ontology, which influences both casual 
conversation and scientific research alike is a metaphysical dichotomy of “inner” 
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consciousness, and the space of things “outside” of consciousness – the world of 
objects. This can either take the form of an empiricist critique that apprehends 
the exterior world as impressing itself upon human being, determining its 
cognitive state, or, in the intellectualist philosophic tradition, influencing even 
Edmond Husserl, one’s inner subjectivity impresses itself upon the external 
world, socially determining the meaning within objective reality.    
The issue for Heidegger, and subsequent phenomenologists in the wake 
of Heidegger, is that this historically driven project, whether empiricist or 
intellectualist, either renders consciousness as subjectivity and the world as 
objectivity (intellectualism); or, it renders both inner and outer realms of existence 
as ultimately objectifiable (empiricism). The result, according to Heidegger and 
the Phenomenological tradition, is that both “inner” consciousness and “outer” 
space have been treated as literal objects of inquiry, especially within the fields of 
those contemporaries working within the project of digitization. That said, from 
Heidegger’s own ontological stance, this clearly guides us toward scientific and 
technological discoveries, which open certain doors, while simultaneously 
remaining short-sighted to being, or primary raw phenomenological experience. 
To be clear, for Heidegger this historic trajectory presupposes, and subsequently 
misses Dasein’s most fundamental conditions, forgetting the question of what it is 
to be.  
In asking the question of being, Heidegger continually addresses the 
seemingly odd phrasing of the “always already,” which I too will use. The reason 
for this, and its importance to space and digitization, is that being-in-the-world (an 
aspect of which is being in space) is always already a fundamental aspect of the 
human condition, a condition Heidegger understands as presupposed in previous 
philosophies/ontologies. Heidegger notes, “Dasein is an entity which, in its very 
Being, comports itself understandingly towards Being” (Being and Time, 78). 
Being, grasped in a Heideggerian manner, is the totality that the human being 
(Dasein) is in and a part of.  The world is what opens itself to the human being as 
experience of anything at all. Heidegger further states, “…Dasein’s Being takes 
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on a definite character, and they must be seen and understood a prior as 
grounded upon that state of Being which we have called “Being-in-the-world’” 
(Being and Time, 78). Simply put, being embodied (situated) within space is all 
one knows, and due to this, there can never technically be any form of seeing 
“above” it through either rational or analytic consideration. There is always the 
sustained reality of always already being-in-space, not outside of it, or over and 
against it, as Heidegger informs us the historic ontologies presuppose. 
Furthermore, and due to this, our intentionality (here Heidegger is building upon 
Husserl’s concept of intentionality), the manner in which the human being 
comports itself toward the world, is by its nature one of de-severance when 
analyzed on the foundation of returning to being, as Heidegger did in Being and 
Time. 
Heidegger’s de-severance, then, should not be reduced to either a purely 
objective or subjective phenomenon; it cannot be simplified to an inner/outer 
dichotomy. Doing so would be the fundamentally wrong approach to grasping the 
phenomenological significance of de-severance as it pertains to space and 
digitization. And this, due to our history, may be the most difficult point to grasp 
and maintain throughout the current analysis, but I feel is essential to clarify. 
 
 
De-severance and the Phenomenology of Space: How is space, 
understood as depth, accessible to the human being? 
 
In Being and Time, by phenomenologically going “back” to Dasein’s ontological 
being-in-the-world, Heidegger states “But in as much as any entity within-the-
world is likewise in space, its spatiality will have an ontological connection with 
the world. We must therefore determine in what sense space is constituent for 
that world which has in turn been characterized as an item in the structure of 
Being-in-the-world” (134). Here, Heidegger begins to move towards the 
significance of de-severance, as a mode of being towards the world, being 
“moved by” the world, called on it, so to speak. His analysis of space is one not 
of calculative space, though he works through how it is that calculative space can 
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be formed later on in “reflection.” Our primary ontological existence, however, is 
first and foremost one of being ready-to-hand, a term hinting again towards 
embodiment as the fundamental grounds of knowing the world. Ready-to-hand is 
coming to know the world not in an analytic, reflective manner, but through doing, 
through engaging with one’s world and its surroundings. When I type with my 
computer the keyboard is largely ready-to-hand, meaning it is a mode of 
accessing the world; it is not aware of me on a cognitive level, but my 
embodiment has rather attuned itself to it, so as to make it an “extension” of my 
being, driving my digital possibilities on the screen. The keyboard only becomes 
noticeable to me, or present-to-hand, if it breaks or is the matter of analytic 
reflection. The vast majority of experience, and primary ontological experience, is 
this pulledness (ready-to-hand) into situations, in virtue of being embodied as 
one is. It is only through this primary mode of being-in-the-world that a concern 
for the concept of what is close in space arises within reflection.  
Space then, for Heidegger, though not specifically dealing with Merleau-
Ponty’s depth, is very much so aware of space phenomenologically. It might be 
said that Heidegger “brings” the issue of space into the phenomenological, noting 
the experience of space as such. And this is simply to say, Heidegger is going 
“back” to what the experience of space is for the human being prior to any will to 
calculate it as distance between objects, or of objects. In fact, Heidegger goes on 
to claim, “Every entity that is ‘to hand’ has a different closeness, which is not to 
be ascertained by measuring distances” (135). The way in which closeness is 
had at all is via Dasein’s nature itself, not as independent from it. Heidegger then, 
essentially, attributes spatiality to the human being, while also not denying the 
existence of the world itself. It can simply be stated that for phenomenologists, 
any notion of the world, including its inherent spatiality, independent of the 
human being, is fundamentally absurd. As such, he writes, “If we attribute 
spatiality to Dasein, then this ‘Being in space’ must manifestly be conceived in 
terms of the kind of Being which that entity possesses” (138). But the human 
being is neither fundamentally an object or subject for Heidegger, and yet it is a 
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being that is in-the-world as a means of opening itself to experience, an 
existential.  
Hence, Heidegger states, “…its (*the human being’s) spatiality shows the 
characters of de-severance and directionality. When we speak of deseverance as a kind 
of Being which Dasein has with regard to Being-in-the-world, we do not understand by it 
any such thing as remoteness (or closeness) or even distance. We use the expression 
“deseverance” in a signification which is both active and transitive. It stands for a 
constitutive state of Dasein’s Being – a state with regard to which removing something in 
the sense of putting it away is only a determinate factical mode. “De-severing” amounts 
to making the farness vanish – that is, making the remoteness of something disappear, 
bringing it close.  Dasein is essentially de-severant: it lets any entity be encountered 
close by as the entity which it is. De-severance discovers remoteness; and remoteness, 
like distance, is a determinate categorical characteristic of entities who nature is not that 
of Dasein” (138-139).  
This passage, and I quote it in its length due to its importance, 
simultaneously explains de-severance under Heidegger’s own terms, while 
paving the way to linking de-severance to Merleau-Ponty’s analysis of space as 
depth, and all the while it is rich with significance in regard to the nature of the 
human being’s fundamental will towards digitization, as the will-to-flatten-depth.  
 De-severance, understood by Heidegger is always an existential of the 
human condition, which makes spatiality itself accessible. And as such, for the 
human being, de-severance is an irreducible mode of being-in-the-world; this is 
to say, as an existential, there is no going beyond de-severance, or into it, 
because the very means at attempting to do so would be de-severance itself at 
play. As such, de-severance is neither object nor subject, neither inner nor outer, 
and it cannot be reduced to any tangible thing. De-severance is a means of 
opening experience, a mode of orientation within the world for the human being. 
To explain de-severance through something else would be futile. One might say, 
the human being, as de-severance, discovers itself both in and as a part of 
space, and as such, the diversity of realities that space maintains, due to depth. 
Digitization, in its essence, brings the spatiality of the world, the experience of the 
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world, as close to us as humanly possible in our particular historic moment – 
digitization is a transcendent human project that “reaches toward” closeness. 
Transcendent in that what has driven digitization into existence, underlies a 
fundamental movement towards nearness that has long pre-dated digitization’s 
tangible reality. And this is due to the human being’s existential de-severance, 
and de-severance’s access to space, rich with depth. It is only through a de-
severant access to space that a will for nearness of the things discovered within 
space is made possible. Reciprocally, it should be noted that through depth, as a 
phenomenological component of space, the technological possibilities for 
creating digital technologies were discovered. And here a clarification of depth, 
as a primary aspect of space, is required. This will lead to the realities of the will-
to-flatten, which will manifest itself as digitization within our tangible digital 
technologies.    
In, Phenomenology of Perception, one of Merleau-Ponty’s realizations, 
which will enrich the current issue of Space and Digitization, while further 
situating de-severance within the argument, is that space should not be 
considered as somehow distinct from the human condition, or as against us. 
Space, though undeniably possible to calculate and mathematize, is not first and 
foremost a thing of objectivity, but rather a medium in which de-severed 
embodied discovers a world, finds itself while seeking possibility within the depth 
of that world. And while it is incorrect to claim that for Merleau-Ponty, space is a 
byproduct of de-servant embodiment, de-severance, embodiment and space (as 
human) do mutually “inform” each other as one, and it is in this exchange that the 
depth of space, and the thickness of things, is made possible. As Merleau-Ponty 
writes, “Space is not the milieu (real or logical) in which things are laid out, but 
rather the means by which the position of things becomes possible. That is, 
rather than imagining space as a sort of ether in which all things are immersed, 
or conceiving it abstractly as a characteristic they would all share, we must think 
of space as the universal power for their connections” (Phenomenology of 
Perception, 254). Space theorized under Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological 
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lens, much like de-severance for Heidegger, is not the empirical relationship 
between objects within mathematic space against a subjectivity, but rather an 
existential for us human beings that is rich with depth, ultimately meaning that the 
existence of things in space is thick with potential for the human being, as 
embodied de-severance.  
As Merleau-Ponty states, “We observe for the first time with regard to 
one’s own body what is true of all perceived things: the perception of space and 
the perception of the thing, or the spatiality of the thing and its being as a thing, 
are not two distinct problems” (Phenomenology of Perception, 149). Things in 
space, phenomenologically related to our embodiment as de-severant, maintain 
a constant revealing and concealing of possibilities to us, just as is the case with 
our own embodiment. The development of our embodied schema, existing as 
thick with possibility, is never fully revealed to itself, but rather discovers itself 
within its engagement with the word. It is in the “thinglyness” of our body, as an 
aspect of space, where the potential for engagement and attunement with the 
world is discovered. Possibility is revealed as process and engagement to the 
de-severant being through this mutual relation of space and thing. 
And while space maintains the existence of things “before” us, it is also 
space conceived of as depth, which never fully reveals the entire potential of any 
object it is part of. And this depth, this thickness of things, is precisely the 
significance of space as it pertains to digitization, not just space as empirical 
distance. What is held back, concealed in space’s depth, is exactly what calls on 
our will to engage with an object as more than merely something against us, as 
though any object were contained fully as itself, complete and devoid of radiant 
potential because all is present before us. But this (object-contained-as-self) is 
never the case for the human being, which is exactly what intrigues Merleau-
Ponty. Because within depth, objects maintain a thickness to them; possibilities 
that remain never fully completed are still accessible to de-severance as beings-
of-potential. And it is ultimately space for Merleau-Ponty which maintains this 
essential nature of things. This is the reason human beings discover tasks in 
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objects that we continually take up and will ourselves toward. If objects of space 
possessed no depth, that is, objects-in-themselves, what possibly could be 
discovered in them? What would drive human beings to seek out and bring the 
things discovered within space toward us as matters of concern, were it not the 
latent potential within them? And were it not for the depth of objects, how else 
would digitization have been willed into reality as tangible objects, revealing 
within themselves an end to seemingly eroding the distance that space also 
imparts between objects within the world?  
The issue of space, as just noted, is always a co-relation to embodiment, 
which is to say that space is only discovered and made possible as such by 
being embodied in space, a position or placement. Neither embodiment nor 
space would remain as they are without the other. But again, what is space for 
the human being, embodied and de-severant as we are? What do we mean 
phenomenologically when we refer to space? And how is it that space is 
essential to digitization? Phenomenologically speaking, the condition of space 
“drives” digitization by the possibilities and limitations it always places upon the 
human condition. This is true, paradoxically by what space simultaneously opens 
to us as de-severant as potential, yet at the same moment denies as 
conquerable: namely, not the empirical distance of space, but the depth of space 
itself. As noted, space is always already more than something calculative, more 
than an object of study, precisely because space is the potential access to depth 
and the thickness of things we discover within the world, in space. The depth of 
some-thing can never be fully reduced to pure objectivity because in doing so it 
would lose its potential for depth, which is why we engage with said object at all. 
Within space, there is depth that the human being has access to as observed in 
the creation of technology and art. Creation, the emergence of something “new” 
out of what resides before us in space, is precisely access to space as depth – a 
fundamentally human existential condition, which is essential to our being-in-the-
world, and our will-to-flatten.  
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Were space not rich with depth, the space that makes objects accessible 
to creation would have no thickness at all to them, and hence there would be no 
will on behalf of the human being to flatten space via the emergence of digital 
technologies out of the world’s depth. Furthermore, were space not rich with 
depth, our will-to-flatten, a will toward anything at all, would be reentered 
nonexistence. This is because space is sustained depth, and in so being, depth 
calls our de-severant being towards projects and ends – whether individualistic, 
or on a grander underlying level, which transcends the human being throughout 
time. In this call to flatten, to bring the world near, as Heidegger notes, there are 
many digital technologies to look towards. One excellent example is the tangible 
emergence of the smart phone, which Apple released in 2007. In the sense of 
this phenomenology, no one smart phone should be understood as an object 
unto itself, but as a historic project that was willed into existence by discovering, 
within the world’s depth, a potential to envision and create such a device out of a 
collection of objects and algorithms that were not digital themselves before we 
willed and found such potential within them. From the depth of the individual 
plastics, to the metal circuitry, to the code that runs our smart devices, all of 
these were found by a de-severance that wills-to-flatten its existence, with the 
aim of bringing the world as close to our immediate embodiment as possible. And 
the smart phone is of course a telecommunication device that allows for 
telepresence. Even within the word, telepresence, we discover the will-to-flatten, 
achieved by the reality of the smart-phone. the Greek tele, or “at a distance,” and 
presence, together bring the distance to our embodied presence, flattening the 
objective space between our being and that of another’s so that oneself and 
otherness can be near.  
This is one digital example of how all things found in space, for the human 
being on the grounds of our embodied de-severant condition, must possess 
depth, which is of richer thickness to them than something that is merely “there 
before us.” This is the reason that the objects within space may be taken up by 
the human being as matters for concern, and also what calls on us to bring 
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otherness, as “object,” near. Through the smart phone, digitization made 
tangible”/real”, we continue to fulfill our will towards closeness by eroding the 
distance that space inherently places upon the human being as situationally 
embodied.  
What can be seen here is that will-to-flatten not only underlies digitization, 
but all previous (*all technologies?) technologies within the same trajectory of 
eliminating objective distance. In being so, bringing digitization into reality 
required finding within objects the potential for bringing the world as close to the 
human being as possible, eliminating and even consuming the distance of space. 
And this phenomenon is only increasing as the world continues towards 
digitization. For example, an article by The Atlantic, titled The Rise of the 
Connected Family, notes that due to the social pressures of our work being 
digitized, an increasing lack of time is available for being with one’s family (The 
Rise of the Connected Family). The article notes, “…(per a survey, well over half 
of people who use smartphones are connected to work for 13-plus hours a day)” 
(The Rise of the Connected Family). One of the pressures that digitization has 
caused in eliminating distance is that the distance between work, whether one is 
physically (embodied) at work or not, one is always phenomenologically speaking 
at work via our de-severant being because we have brought work so near via 
digitization. The article’s answer for this in a digitized world, and for the will-to-
flatten, is not to eliminate the smartphone, the very technological means the 
human being has created in order to actually overcoming objective distance, but 
to bring the family nearer via increased digitization.  
As The Atlantic article notes, “But in this modern jigsaw puzzle of 
interpersonal dynamics, a new wave of home technologies is emerging that may 
alleviate a slew of family stress points…technologies from home assistants and 
intelligent cameras to virtual-reality apps, ambient communication channels, and 
beyond - allows us to reexamine the very idea of what it means to be “home” 
(The Rise of the Connected Family). This new idea of the home is, as the article 
defines it, “the connected” home. And the connected home is nothing other than 
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de-severance, finding within the depth of space, the will-to-flatten the family itself. 
Here the family is seen as the “object” to be flattened through digitization. The 
will-to-flatten is consumed by the needs of the family and attempts to bring it near 
in a world that ever more so calls on us through our digital devices to connect 
with it in ever increasing and complex ways, eliminating our time to be with the 
family itself as the closeness of embodied being physically next to one another. 
The reality then, is that as the world calls us nearer to itself in all directions 
through our smart phones (work in this case taking on precedence), the means to 
get near the family is obviously also through digitization. The article continues by 
stating, “Take a product like Ohmni, for example, which allows family members to 
maintain a remote presence in the home, even when they are away. With Ohmni, 
a self-direct telepresence robot controlled via a user’s app, a traveling parent can 
employ the machine as a kind of surrogate…” (The Rise of the Connected 
Family). Here the distance of objective space is overcome by the robot as the 
embodiment within the home, one’s own face projected upon the robot as if we 
are near, and the happenings of the home cast across our smart phone screen 
many miles away. An excellent example of the will-to-flatten not only the 
calculative distance of the world, but also the very idea of the family, of the 
human being.  
The paradox within this, which must be come to terms with, is that in 
regard to all of its practical outcomes for the human being, this “achievement” of 
flattening the world, is made possible only upon the grounds of space as 
something which ultimately cannot be flattened. If space, phenomenologically 
conceived of as depth, and the thickness of objects (human or otherwise) found 
within space could be “overcome,” not merely as calculative distance, the world 
would lose its thickness and cease to be experienced as something to flatten via 
engagement with the world, meaning that will that drives digitization itself would 
cease to exist as will. But is this not exactly what the will-to-flatten aims for, to 
flatten not only calculative objective space, but the depth of space itself? And 
here rests the fundamental paradox.  
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Objective Space Under the Empirical Natural Attitude: 
Digitization as the erosion of Empirical Distance 
 
The claim as to how digitization has eroded empirical space has just been 
touched upon, perhaps even been made evident, and yet a greater analysis into 
this phenomenon and its implications is necessary before any further analysis of 
the impact that the will-to-flatten space as depth is required. Due to our historical 
moment (as Heidegger’s Dasein), our awareness of the world is still consumed 
with the naturalistic empirical experience of space – shortsighted as it were. That 
having been said, there is also nothing wrong with this, per se; it is the means for 
digital technologies to come into being. However, what the natural attitude 
presupposes is important, and must be reached through an analysis of this 
attitude towards the world, even as it clearly is directed by the will-to-flatten, and 
the desire to control the world’s depth via the will-to-flatten, recognize it or not. 
The will-to-flatten, as it has been framed within the critique of digital media, is 
one of flattening distance, and this is self-evident, as I wish to continue to make 
clear. The true implications are not if we have flattened empirical distance, we 
have, but the consequences of presupposing flattening depth within this desire.  
What is empirical space under the natural attitude? According to Alfred 
Schutz, a phenomenological sociologist, in his text, The Structures of the Life-
World: Volume 1, “In the natural attitude, I always find myself in a world which is 
for me taken for granted and self-evidently “real” (4). Another way to understand 
this claim is simply to state that more often than not we take the world at “face 
value,” especially as it appears to exist before me as something factually real 
throughout my daily life. As objects over and against my own being, my own 
subjectivity. Much of this factuality is of course not only the result of directly 
experiencing the world through our senses, but a type of social interpretation, 
whereby the meaning of what I am confronted with depends on my culture, 
language, religion, philosophy, science, and ultimately my moment in time. And 
space, whether we consciously think of it or not, constantly remains as a mode 
whereby we experience the world, whether awake, dreaming, or mediated 
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through digitization. Simply put, as a human being under this attitude we are 
always “in” situations – intended towards an object, event, memory, or idea – and 
these are spatial in character due to our embodiment as a situational being. 
However, in order to dig deeper into the experience of space under the natural 
attitude, a question is in order.  
Under the most practical, and that is to say logical sense, what comes to 
mind when you hear the word “space?” A broad question, and of course the 
answer is multifaceted. Giving any specific answer largely depends on the type of 
question asked of the term. So, some contextual examples might be as follows. 
Where in space is your personal desktop computer located in relation to 
yourself? Or, in what space do you most often place your smart phone or tablet? 
If you are in a virtual reality, how do you sense that space you are in? Perhaps 
you are playing Star Wars Battlefront, World of War Craft, or Call of Duty. 
Regardless of the game, these situations also place a person within a location 
that demands an understanding of spatial references in order to effectively 
navigate the task at hand. The game might be two-dimensional or three-
dimensional; a sense of space under the most practical level is still “always” 
required. How we get from point A to point B is an essential aspect of space, and 
it calls on every one of us to act, digital or not.  
 The similarity that resides within all of these questions, however distinctive 
they may appear at first glance, is that our answers tend to reside within the 
natural attitude, whereby space denotes a logical distance from one location to 
another (or between objects) within the world of “real” things, regardless of if they 
are tangible or digital. Ultimately, it makes little actual difference, space is always 
a mode of pressure, one to overcome by traversing it, a call to act. The act of 
getting “over” said location into another. Spatially, we relate ourselves to objects 
in essentially the same as we do while we’re playing a digital game. (The issue of 
how we ethically treat the bodies of other humans in digital space is, however, 
is open to further analysis, as is the consequence as we merge this “worlds.”)  
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In fact, the vast majority of digital and virtual games mimic the physics of 
objective “worldly” space, at least to a relative degree. If not, it would be quite 
disorienting to navigate among objects within the game. In fact, a common 
complaint in many early 2D or 3D games relate to glitches, such as “clipping”, 
whereby the spatiality of the situation does not match our understanding of 
worldly space. Our expectations of how space “works” get tested – whether to 
our annoyance or humor. In “the real world,” our heads do not go through a 
concrete wall if we run at it. We know this as a result having grown up in this 
world, as being-in-the-world, and all of this makes sense to me under the natural 
attitude; it is a pre-thought, and expectation. I have a constant tendency to take 
this face-to-face relation between myself and other objects for granted as the 
very property of space. I treat space as the discernable, calculative distance 
between the “real” objects that confront me, regardless of if they are in a game or 
not, the effect of which is that we treat objects as distances among other objects 
and ourselves as an object among them. Again, this is in no way inherently 
wrong, it simply means that I tend to reduce objects to tangible entities in and of 
themselves, which always stand against other objects of the same tangibility. 
Space under the natural attitude becomes about the calculative distance 
between objects, or within a single object – digital or not. The calculative 
tendency to understand what currently resides as “there” before us as numeric is 
what phenomenology terms as “profane vision.” And while it further opens the 
potential for digitization emergence, technologically speaking, it misses depth. 
But in doing so, phenomenological depth is a nonissue, it is no issue in its 
unawareness, the will is simply to flatten distance, taking the will-to-flatten depth 
for granted as the underlying project. Empirically, the project becomes one of 
bringing the space of otherness into my immediate embodiment (such as a smart 
phone), or to construct a replica of any space within my immediate embodiment 
(a video game or VR).  
  As noted by Leonard Lawlor, in his article “Dwelling in the Texture of the 
Visible,” “profane vision” is what Merleau-Ponty considered to be the natural 
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attitude’s understanding of space as mere distance between “real” objects set 
against one another (152). For Merleau-Ponty, this understanding of space is 
ultimately too simplistic, though it makes sense to us under the natural attitude; 
one takes this measurable distance between one thing and another as the given 
attribute of space. If, however, one senses space as only the measurable 
distance between objects in the world, or between things and oneself, what is 
missed is the human being’s fundamental, ontological experience of space that 
always goes “beyond,” and comes “before,” the natural attitudes mindset of 
space as the distance between things, or myself and other things. Leonard 
Lawlor concisely describes what Merleau-Ponty meant by this concept of profane 
vision. Lawlor writes, “The idealization is even necessary according to Merleau-
Ponty, if thought is too empirically dominated. Descartes was right to make space 
clear, manageable, and homogenous so that thought is able to survey it. “His 
mistake,” according to Merleau-Ponty, “was to erect it into a positive being, 
beyond all points of view, all latency and depth, devoid of any real thickness” 
(OE: 48/MPR: 364). Something about space evades our attempts to study it from 
above” (155). The most important aspect of this passage is the realization that 
under the natural attitude, space is “seen” solely as a positive entity, and not as 
an ontological condition of “having a world.”  
 What this means is, if one addresses digitization from the natural attitude, 
the digitization of space appears as a major ontological shift, when in fact I would 
argue phenomenologically that it is not. Empirical space, as noted in the above 
example of the “connected family,” has evidently been flattened space. One can 
be at an empirical distant, yet still “be” at home via a robotic device that displays 
one’s face, movements, and responses in “real time.” There is no doubt that this 
reality has ramifications on our existence, but is it telling of our underlying 
existential existence, our embodiment, de-severance, depth, or the will-to-flatten? 
And yet, the will-to-flatten has seemingly eradicated empirical space. The will to 
experience a foreign land, to live a dream is now. I can find myself within the 
visual location of a foreign plant over the computer screen and can awaken a 
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dream in reality over a virtual device or movie screen. Never before has 
Hollywood made the dream so real, the inner self and its wants and needs so 
evident and lifelike over celluloid. Within digitization realized, as it has been, 
fantasy is not for the subconscious, it is to be lived within tangible space as real. 
Digitation has yielded a promise to make what not only is distant in space, but in 
the space of our minds, manifest within the world.  
 And, if one remains within the natural attitude, whereby space is 
understood as a positive entity, of merely bringing the distance of things near, 
digitization does appear as a tremendous shift in our world, perhaps even an 
“ontological one.” If space is understood as a positive relation between actual 
things, whether real or digital, that is to say, the calculative spatiotemporal 
distance between things, then digitization is bringing us to “the promised land,” 
whereby the world appears to me as a shrunken totality that can literally rest 
within my grasp, and so it does. From my smart phone, to gaming online, the 
world (no, even multiple worlds) appear to be within relative control. According to 
the theory of telepresence I can be in multiple locations seemingly at once. Via 
my phone I can digitally see my dogs over the screen, scolding them for 
misbehavior while I’m at work miles away from their objective location. A man 
can sit in a government office and take the life of another human being with a 
drone, regardless of their objective position on the global map. Within each and 
every one of our bedrooms, we can collectively experience the Solar System and 
beyond, via the genius of NASA.  
What’s more, almost all of this is happening exclusively in “real time.” And 
due to this phenomenon of “real time,” whereby the distance of calculative space 
is temporally diminished to instantiations relations, it is not difficult to “see” 
digitization as a phenomenal step for mankind. And indeed, in numerous ways it 
most certainly is. Even the analog radio “brought us together” in ways that 
seemed unimaginable before its advent, though this too points back to the will-to-
flatten, as a historic project, human and de-severant in nature.  
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Both analog and digital technologies do appear to the natural attitude as a 
radical shift in our ontological condition of space – space has on various levels 
become seemingly inconsequential to the modern human. As Lev Manovich 
notes in his text, The Language of New Media, “…in contrast to photography and 
film, electronic telecommunication can function as two-way communication. Not 
only can a user immediately obtain images of various locations, bringing them 
together within a single electronic screen, but, via telepresence, she can also be 
"present" in these locations. In other words, she can affect change on material 
reality over physical distance in real time (160).” Here, Manovich is entirely 
correct, and it is not my intention to dismiss the marvel of modern technology. 
Many examples, as have been discussed above, illuminate the point presented 
by Manovich regarding modern digital technology, or digitization. 
But is this all there is to the human ontological condition of space? The 
reduction of space into digital data, which can then be stored and streamed 
immediately, so as to appear perceptually instantaneous is undeniably something 
to marvel at, especially its impact on our intersubjective relations, as will soon be 
addressed. But again, has digitization fundamentally changed our ontological 
relation to space in the phenomenological sense, which is to say our open 
relation to the world as human beings? Merleau-Ponty informs us that under the 
natural attitude, whereby space is a mere positive entity to be overcome or dealt 
with on a face-to-face level, we tend to lose sight of space as “depth,” or as a 
“thickness.” But what is meant by this claim, and can it tell us anything fruitful 
about the condition of digitization’s emergence? The concept of space as depth 
or thickness might restore some insight into our current relation to digitization. 
One question I wish to pose is this: is the experience of space as “depth” 
ontologically different in our digital age, and does it extend “beyond” our 
understanding of space as objective distance?  
Depth, is beyond empirical space and the natural attitude, it makes both 
possibilities. Ontologically speaking, the human being is drawn into nearness, all 
intentional engagement foresees digitization is some sense, whether is 
97 
actualizes it or not. Empirical space is a fact of existence, embodied within a 
world, de-severance finds within this world the possibly of space and its erosion, 
by the will of overcoming it. In this sense, it would not be untrue to state that 
within the first wheel, the first ship, digitization as will-to-flatten was alive. 
Empirical distance not only gave life to the will, as an enemy to conquer, not 
merely as distance, but more so, a will which preceded it, which was to overcome 
its distance. In the wood or rock of the first wheel ever created was not merely a 
tangible object, nor the objects that made this wheel possible, but a will 
overcoming distance itself. This linage of overcoming distance is present in 
digitization too, and yet empirical distance has always been the most obvious 
means to overcome.  
 For what de-severance does, what it “is,” is this constant “bringing close” 
that makes “remoteness disappear.” What this does, according to Heidegger, is 
that it simultaneously “reveals,” or discloses, entities to the human being. For 
example, what it brings close in the example above is precisely what one wills at 
the moment, be it one’s work or family. Family reveals itself to me as a 
meaningful relation, whereby its physical distance from my immediate location in 
the form of the smart phone screen is less “important” (less taken up in the 
moment) by me than the fact that it is now meaningfully discloses as an 
experience – experience seemingly overcome. Something reveals itself to me, 
and to claim that this revealing, this meaningful relation to something “beyond 
me” is simply a relation to the screen tangibly in front of my is far too simple, as 
are the consequences upon our being. 
But even when I momentarily “unplug” from the digital devices around me, 
this phenomenon of de-severance is always still at play, especially empirically. 
As an example, I discover the categorical distance of myself in relation to my 
home’s backyard only because it is by my very ontological nature that it’s 
possible to discover the backyard as an “obstacle.” And this first and foremost 
requires that I am, in a sense, am always “beyond” myself in order to make 
what’s distant become close to me. While in my office my intention from the 
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family on a screen may shift, as I’m now intended toward the backyard at the 
sound of a dog’s bark, allowing for the potential discovery of its distance as a 
categorical “problem.” But first and foremost, if I’m to discover the spatial 
calculative distance between myself and the backyard, I must “bring it close” 
without the need of “being there” physically. Strictly speaking, as ontologically 
human, I have always already accomplished what my smart phone promises – a 
“vanishing” of distance.     
Another way of saying this is that due to my ontological openness toward 
the world as de-severant, I constitute calculative distance itself as something 
“problematic.” We must make distance vanish in order to problematize its total 
removal as an obstacle against me. But only via de-severance can I make this 
spatial distance into something categorical, something positive. However, the 
debate over whether objective distances are set as an eternal figure or not is 
actually quite irrelevant to Heidegger’s central point or concern. The matter of an 
entity’s “truthful nature” is a secondary postulate, which could not take place 
without this “bringing near” that the human being’s ontological openness allows 
for. However, the “truthfulness” of the entity’s relation to ourselves and the world 
is often the jump we make without acknowledging how it’s possible to do so in 
the first place. Space, defined objectively, is only present for a being that’s 
ontologically predisposed towards de-severance, and this, being-in-the-world, 
wills-to-flatten, digitization being our greatest human feat in this historical project.  
As an example of how this is a human attribute, Heidegger again claims 
“De-severance discovers remoteness; and remoteness, like distance, is a 
determinate categorical characteristic of entities whose nature is not that of 
Dasein” (Being and Time, 139). And yet, Honda’s A.I. ASIMO, a robot, is “in” 
categorical space, but it does not know remoteness or distance, not does it will-
to-flatten. Rather remarkably, in the case of the human being, one need not know 
anything about mathematics and Euclidean space in order to move from point A 
to point B. But should this be of surprising? I certainly possess the potential to 
discover remoteness and distance as positive, but I don’t need to do so in order 
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to walk from my computer chair to the backyard. ASIMO’s movement, by way of 
contrast, are first and foremost the basis of a complex algorithm, whose power of 
“contemplation” does not come from “itself,” but is encoded by the being that de-
servers (the human being) in order for ASIMO to move and navigate the 
surrounding space at all. ASIMO is not de-severant, so while it may appear that 
this being “knows” its surrounds, it is in fact only the result of a pre-programed 
space, or one that builds off previous calculations into its already existing 
algorithm – not a correlation to it. The depth of the world does not extend beyond 
the immediate, there is no de-severance, hence there is no depth for ASIMO. 
What matters here is that ASIMO, much like a rock, exists purely in calculative 
space, empirical space. And this should not be confused into meaning that 
ASIMO or any other AI “has” space as something meaningful. Another way to 
say this is that ASIMO doesn’t turn space into something problematic, not does it 
internalize it, or make space a “project” of its own. Space simply is not 
problematic for a being that does not de-sever.  
Third, and perhaps most important to this ontological theory, Heidegger 
writes that “De-severance, however, is an existentiale; this must be kept in mind. 
Only to the extent that entities are revealed for Dasein in their de-severedness 
[Entferntheit], do 'remotenesses' ["Entfernungen"] and distances with regard to 
other things become accessible in entities within-the-world themselves” (Being 
and Time, 139). There is here, I believe, the recognition of the human being’s 
autonomy as an ontologically de-severant being that can reveal “entities” for/to 
itself, ultimately relating to them in a technological manner. This is to say, limited 
as we are by the temporal-historical nature of the world we fall into, the human 
being “reveals,” or takes up the world via the nature of our de-severant co-
relation to it. And this revealing, as the result of being that makes the farness 
vanish, is a profoundly technological existence. De-severance allows us to make 
“the farness vanish,” to bring the world close, and in being so, digitization resides 
as a particular human-technological “project.” A project whose ultimate aim is 
uniquely human, and extends far “deeper” than the shortsighted marvel over our 
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digital accomplishments. The very nature of bringing the world close is a 
precursor for a being that is technological by its very nature – in fact, the two are 
absolutely indispensable.  
Existentially, the human being is technological in the sense that we are the 
being that in our de-severance can will itself “upon” the world, “extending 
beyond” the spatial forces, which are ever exerted upon our most immediate 
embodied existence. Unlike a digital AI though, we may be “caught up” in the 
imitate things around our current location, but it is also through them that more is 
always also present to us via depth.  
The existence of one’s computer screen is of course a mere object in a 
“lifeless” space when considering it on its own objective right. But for a being that 
de-severs, the screen is in fact always far more than a calculative space between 
one tangible thing (one’s body) and this other thing (the screen) set against us. 
Just as the sound of one’s dog’s bark is far more than merely an empirical noise 
– or something simply to be calculated. Both the noise of a bark, and the sight of 
the computer screen open existence beyond phenomena, which can never be 
fully isolated as mere calculative things in the world. In the bark I de-severed. My 
backyard has a meaningful relation to this sound, and I am there as soon as it 
encompasses me, no longer merely at a computer screen. In the sight of a 
distant planet, cast via the tangible pixels on a screen, I too am de-severed, 
empirical distance bridged and overcome. There must be almost endless ways to 
calculate the distance of the screen to my “physical” body, but if I do only this, 
which almost never actually takes place outside of moments of objectification, I 
miss the plentitude of meaning that is established as new planets reveals 
themselves to my world.   
This is not to say of course that I cannot then take up the world’s 
calculative distance as a problem set against my being. As Heidegger makes 
evident, the human being is an existential being, which is in part to say a being 
that wills. The human, in its de-severant nature, has a sense for more than what 
is simply around us, and this capacity allows for technological emergence. 
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Another way to say this is that the human can imposition itself upon what already 
is. As is known, the human is a being that has some capacity to control what is. 
The human being possess the ability to extend itself within the world, prior to any 
objectification of it, which is the very essence of de-severance - to be beyond 
one’s physical self and the thingness that we are directly presented with at any 
given moment. 
 Writing is often considered one of the first technological mediums, a 
medium that mediates, whereby one can express oneself beyond a set time and 
space. Writing, whether formally classified as such or not, is essentially a means 
of “controlling” (or holding sway) over both space and time. Objectifying, 
calculating, and ultimately “storing space” constitutes the technological 
achievements of the past and present, either in the form of tangible constructions 
or written informative ideas. However, this is always already the possibility of a 
being that is de-severant by its nature. And this capacity is arguably our greatest 
“divide” from other beings within this existence. No other being that is currently 
known of attempts to control its environment quite like the human being. This is a 
fact that should come as no surprise given Heidegger’s analysis of our being.  
But what does this ultimately mean in the progression of this analysis of 
digitization? What it means is that our ontological condition, I will suggest, is not 
changed by digitization. Instead, digitization as a tangible actuality, is predicated 
upon the possibility of a being that has a sense of the world’s depth through its 
de-severance; and hence, has the power to reveal to itself what is beyond its 
present reality. Revealing, understood in this context, is ultimately a technological 
“project,” whereby a will that is ontologically conditioned to make the farness 
vanish also posits the reality of an ever more effective means to reveal and 
controlling the world itself, ultimately for the sake of revealing the world to itself, 
and an impossible reduction of its depth.  
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Digitization of the World: The Result of a De-severant Being with 
Access to Depth 
 
A clarification of the human being’s ontological precondition as de-severant, as 
was conducted under the analysis of Heidegger’s philosophy in Being and Time, 
was essential in order to more completely grasp the means by which the human 
can ultimately come to possess and manipulate calculative spatial relations 
among objects – whether they be digital or not. However, given my primary 
argument, which is that digitization has not changed our fundamental ontology. 
The initial clarification of de-severance as an ontological precondition for the 
human being, matters most when turning toward the development of such 
concepts as the world having a depth, or a thickness to it, which will provide 
insight into the development and limitations of the current digital age. While the 
automobile and digital technologies, such as the computer and smart devices, 
have undeniably had a radical impact on the time it takes to “overcome” the 
calculative distance among locations, I suggest that the concept of the world 
having a depth will provide greater insight into these issues.  
If Heidegger is correct, an access to, or the “possession” of space is first 
and foremost ontologically more than the calculative distance between tangible 
objects, which digitization seemingly “overcomes.” This is in part the very reason 
that the digital age appears so revolutionary. However, when I say “more,” what 
is meant is that an insight into the phenomenology of space and calculative 
distance brings us back to a recognition of what is most fundamental to the 
human condition. In order for the technologies that both precede digitization, and 
the arrival of digital technologies itself, there must be a quality to both the human 
being and the world (grandly speaking) in order for these technologies to emerge 
at all. And this is exactly what I desire to seek greater clarification within.  
Through the analysis of de-severance, I am hopeful that a greater sense 
of clarity has been cast upon the ontological condition of being human. A 
condition whereby, as Heidegger notes, we are never simply “in” the calculative 
space we so rationally dissect and make empirical sense of. Rather, what is most 
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present always already has the potential to “transport” us beyond the imitate 
thingness of our surroundings. Another way to say this is that it’s within the things 
we experience that we find more than what it there. Now there is of course 
something quite self-evident about this when we consider the images presented 
over the phone, video game, or computer screen. Video games immerse a 
person into an experience whereby the screen itself becomes the least 
noticeable thing in the room, and perhaps this is one of the primary aspects of 
our obsession with them. However, this “removal of the present,” which occurs 
while I play a video game, or involve myself in a Facebook debate over any 
issue, is fundamentally predicated upon the same phenomenon as when I hear 
the bark of my dog. De-severance is an existential in the sense that it is a relation 
to the world whereby my access to things never resides fully within the “things 
themselves” as a totalizing end unto them. I never first and foremost experience 
the screen of a digital device as an absolute (whether it’s on or off), just as I do 
not hear the bark of my dog as the calculative distance of the sound between us, 
or as the scientific measurement of its volume, pitch, etc. Though we are capable 
of doing so, and the knowledge produced by such investigations yield the means 
for technological development, we are never fully presented with the object. This 
is because no object, digital or not, ever fully presents itself to us.  
  
 
Digitization: Access to the World’s Depth 
 
How is it that digital technology came into existence? How did we reveal digital 
technologies to ourselves? As noted above, digital technology, in all its 
complexity and difference, exists as part of the continuum of a project that is 
fundamentally the result of de-severant being. A being that through its de-
severant nature has access to the world’s depth in a manner not currently 
witnessed in any other being. Ultimately, the goal of this project, whether it is 
formally understood to be so or not, is to literally the willful collapse of the world 
into an experience that can be fully rendered or stored both individually and 
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intersubjectively. It is the desire to “have” the world so fully that we can access 
(possess) it as though it were an object whereby calculative space, or 
Heideggerian distance, is inconsequential. The very nature of a de-severant 
being, as previously defined, is to make the farness vanish. Technological 
speaking, digitization is an “evolved” aspect of this ontological condition that we 
not only rationally strive to fulfill through the advent of our technology, but have 
always already had to ability to do so innately. Digital technology has been 
revealed to us through an innate power of co-relation to the world. To always 
perceive more than what is currently there in the things we experience, and 
reveal them as such. 
Now Heidegger was not naïve in considering the world, and the individual 
things that comprise it, as a depth. I simply feel that Merleau-Ponty builds quite 
effectively off of Heidegger’s philosophy, more formally brining the human body 
into active account within the inquiry of the world’s depth. What Heidegger and 
clearly Merleau-Ponty understood was that de-severance is only possible 
because the world, and all experiences happening to our immediate perception, 
extend beyond themselves. The title of Merleau-Ponty’s posthumous text, The 
Visible and the Invisible, makes sense after one begins to grasp what he’s 
attempting to show his reader. An understanding of his account of the human 
ontological relation to the world within this text will also shed light on the impact 
and limitations of digitization. I also believe that it will further clarify why it is that a 
being that makes the farness vanish projects itself toward a project whereby the 
world can literally be “held in one’s hand.” A feat that any smart phone appears in 
large part to have accomplished.  
For Merleau-Ponty the concepts of visibility and invisibility are not mutually 
exclusive. On the contrary, they are literally always caught up in the same “act” 
of perceiving, or having a world. Now the term visible works quite well for 
Merleau-Ponty’s theory, and while it is truth that visuality (the sense of sight) is of 
principle concern within his work, it would be a mistake to think of visibility and 
invisibility as merely referring to sight itself. What is true of sight, and often goes 
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unnoticed, is that in seeing anything (whatsoever) there must also be an absence 
in order for something to show itself to the “seer,” whether it’s in the “real world,” 
the digital experience, or even a dream.  It is only possible for me to see the 
surroundings within my visible spectrum because there is always concealment of 
the visible (the depth) at the exact same moment as there is visibility, or the 
revealing of some thing. In fact, this phenomenon of visibility and invisibility 
allows visibility to take place.  
What is often take for granted under the natural attitude, especially for 
Merleau-Ponty, but also Heidegger, is the degree to which this phenomenon is 
fundamental to our very ontology, regardless of the age we exist in – pre-digital 
or digital. However, and this is fundamentally important to the current argument, 
the phenomenon of depth is also vital to the creation of any technology 
whatsoever, especially for a being that is de-severant. Though it may be argued 
that even under the natural attitude it is quite transparent that no technology 
simply arrives out of nothingness. What is typically presupposed under this 
attitude is that throughout the course of human history there has always been an 
access to the world’s depth, which is to say, an access to more than what is 
currently there in the visible.  
Under the natural attitude understood as mere “imagination,” or 
“creativity,” and is left to these definitions alone. Of course, imagination and 
creativity are praised under the natural attitude, as they lead toward artistic, 
scientific, and technological innovation, but the concepts themselves have a 
tendency to avert us from the phenomenon upon which they are predicated as a 
possibility. What is meant by this is that imagination and creativity are typically 
treated as de-severant in a naïve sense, which is to say, whether knowingly or 
not, they are treated as a mind distinct from immediate experience. Acts of 
brilliance and insight into fundamental truths and technological innovation are 
understood as being comprised by the minds of the imaginative, the creative. 
And while I don’t mean to undermine those who have “seen” further into the 
depth of possibility, which is laden within any present moment, I do confirm that 
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this capacity is fundamental to the ontology of the human being, at any moment 
in time – digital or not.  
And while Merleau-Ponty tends to focus upon art within in his philosophy, 
typically in the form of paintings, his concepts can also be understood 
technologically. In his essay, Eye and Mind, Merleau-Ponty notes that the image, 
picture, and the drawing “…are the inside of the outside and the outside of the 
inside, which the duplicity of sensing [le sentir] makes possible and without which 
we would never understand the quasi-presence and immanent visibility which 
makes up the whole problem of the imaginary” (356). Again, Merleau-Ponty is 
focusing upon the creation of a work of art, although I do not believe it’s 
unjustified if his theory is extrapolated beyond the concept of “art” under the more 
traditional sense. What Merleau-Ponty desires to show his reader is that the most 
primal relation to the tangible world is not simply one of calculative relations 
between point A and B. Now it is easy to focus upon these empirical relations, 
and if one does so, any technological reduction in space (the time it takes to 
travel) appears rather profound.  
What strikes Merleau-Ponty most, however, is that in any encounter with 
the world there is always an access to more than what “exists” before us. For 
example, image if a person within the late 19th century receives a photograph 
from a loved one, perhaps taken in a remote land, who’s distant from one’s 
spatial relation is hundreds of miles away. Merleau-Ponty insistence is that we 
understand the photo as more than a mere thing, it is more than light sensitive 
material on a sheet of paper. The image brings an “imaginative” life to the world 
of the viewer that is more than paper in one’s hand. The image possesses a 
depth that “extends beyond” itself. The image, much like the bark of my dog 
mentioned above, is “rich” for the human being. The image calls upon the viewer 
to experience more than a piece of paper before them. The image calls upon an 
imaginative vibrancy, a quasi-presence, which may just inspire more than what is 
simply visible at the moment. The viewer’s world becomes filled with the person 
present in the image, but it may also make the farness of a foreign landscape 
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vanish, enlightening the possibility of how to cultivate one’s own land that is 
spatially near. One’s own land may just acquire a new “look” after the image is 
placed upon the table.  
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Chapter Four: Intersubjectivity and Digitization 
 
 
Intersubjectivity 
 
De-severant embodiment is the foundation of accessing the world’s space as 
depth, and through this, the will-to-flatten has brought the world near via the 
emergence of digitization. Intersubjectivity, the experience of the other, of 
otherness whatsoever, is sustained and made possible prior to digitization by our 
phenomenological existence, an insight made clear in the previous chapter. From 
birth until death, each and every human being, as embodiment, maintains the 
sustenance of meaning as a finite changing perspective upon the world. The 
result of de-severant embodiment, being-in-the-world as finites is that the world 
never exists as one’s own; the world taken in as complete, depth is never 
eliminated. Because of this, the world is always a co-relation between myself and 
others. And in this relation, founded within human embodiment, meaning 
flourishes intersubjectively into the form of an idea. Ideas, however innocent at 
first, always function as systems of totalization, as a means flattening depth, and 
in so doing, bring sense to an otherwise senseless world.  
 Where then is digitization’s place within intersubjectivity? Can 
intersubjectivity inform us about digitization? How can digitization inform us about 
intersubjectivity? Do we yet know enough about intersubjectivity to say? 
 Intersubjectivity, within this particular philosophic context, will be 
understood and analyzed phenomenologically. In doing so, it will become evident 
that intersubjectivity, as site of meaning and ideology, enriches our 
understanding of the relation we have with digital artificial intelligence and social 
media and their influence on our thinking and actions within an increasing 
digitized world/experience. We will again see that what rests “beneath” our 
engagement and actualization of these technologies is a will to flatten the world’s 
depth as de-severant embodiment. In this case, the will to flatten depth is not 
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simply the depth in the world, but the depth within the intersubjectivity of any and 
all other human beings.  
 
 
Phenomenology of Intersubjectivity 
 
Throughout the 20th century, the concept of intersubjectivity was highly theorized 
by continental and analytic philosophers alike, leading to both a sense of 
consensus and disagreement among various schools of thought. The rift 
between the continental and analytic has always been cast as a vast gulf, which 
is why differences often overshadow consensus. To further exacerbate this 
issue, the general theoretical framework of intersubjectivity has been built within 
such fields as psychology, sociology, and anthropology. Due to this, the term 
intersubjectivity may seem “muddy.” This is important to recognize, as the 
theoretical approach that will be built for the analysis of digitization in this 
particular case is a phenomenological one, which alone shares its differences 
among theorists. More specifically, the theories and accompanying concepts to 
be utilized in this chapter are influenced by Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger, 
Alfred Schutz, and Marcie Merleau-Ponty. Merleau-Ponty’s theories of 
intersubjectivity and the world as possessing depth or thickness are especially 
vital here to conceptualizations of digitization as a will to reduce, or even 
eliminate, the depth of the other. The reason for using this phenomenological 
lens is that these theorists do not objectify the relations between others, as is 
common within analytic philosophy. For Merleau-Ponty, for example, 
intersubjectivity is not first and foremost a subject to be studied empirically, but 
rather, the very means by which meaning finds and sustains its life through the 
continual act of an embodied subject engaging with others in the world.  
 This phenomenological concept of intersubjectivity should be seen as 
significant to digitization, as it has been used to interrogate and ultimately 
enhance our knowledge of the way in which an individual’s meaningful relation to 
the world is constituted within the experience of the other. Digitization has clearly 
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impacted the way we experience the other in contemporary life, throughout much 
of world. The implications of the analysis can potentially function as a means of 
inquiry into digitization’s impact on everyday meaning, the other, and ethics and 
morality; it will also provide insight into the will that drives digitization itself. 
 Digitization, in a technological sense, often brings otherness “near,” 
flattening both the empirical and phenomenological depth of the world, otherwise 
known as distance or space. Digitization, we will see, also functions by seemingly 
flattening the depth of the other in cases such as artificial intelligence, dating 
apps, and even over social media. The apparent near eradication of the 
experience of distance between self and other, whether or not the barrier of said 
distance/space is empirical or phenomenological (it is often both), impacts the 
experience of intersubjectivity as much as it informs of the will to eradicate the 
depth of the world. And the first point here that is easy to bypass, is that even in 
digitization, intersubjective experience always remains an experience of 
something other. We will come to see that intersubjective experience, as a being 
that is embodied as de-severant within the depth of the world, always discovers 
and sustains meaning as such.  
 Intersubjective experience may be very broadly understood as 
engagement with the other constituting “one’s” language, one’s sense, and one’s 
history. Here it is the technological medium through which one encounters the 
other that is of particular interest. That being said, intersubjectivity simultaneously 
influences one’s lived experience as something meaningful. Intersubjectivity 
establishes our “grasp” of the world; it provided the world its “sense,” seemingly 
exerting a totalizing order or structure, which makes experience manageable. 
Consequently, introduced by its most basic definition, the study of 
intersubjectivity, though ultimately examining an individual’s meaningful “make 
up” of the world, is always actually a study of otherness. Intersubjectivity 
constantly informs each individual’s meaningful grasp of his or her own world 
through the meeting of one embodiment with another, whether digital or not. 
One’s own sense of self-identity is always derived from the awareness and 
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exchange with the other. Through the other, I “find” myself revealed as an 
embodied perspective where I am never simply alone, and where my thoughts 
never simply emerged from nothing, but are rather the result of my exchanges 
with the other that echo within me, rich with potential. As Merleau-Ponty writes, 
“It is not sufficiently noted that the other is never present face to face. Even 
when, in the heat of discussion, I directly confront my adversary, it is not in the 
violent face with its grimace, or even in that voice traveling toward me, that the 
intention which reaches me is to be found” (Prose of the World, 133). Another 
way to state this, whether encountering the other in person, over the phone, or 
online, is that this encounter is never to be diminished to that over a mere object, 
which I could grasp in all of its complexity. The exchange with the other is an 
exchange of a depth that is not measurable with scientific equipment. Its 
significance in revealing the other and the meaning that we constitute together in 
our exchange is not to be found in some particular destination. Merleau-Ponty 
continues this thought by noting that “One must believe that there was someone 
over there. But where? Not in that overstrained voice, not in that face lined like 
any well-worn object. Certainly not behind that setup: I know quite well that back 
there there is only “darkness crammed with organs” (Prose of the World, 133). 
The other lives, as meaningful, within me, as an extension and outgrowth of my 
own depth. Had I not encountered the other, I too would be “lesser,” would be 
different than who I am right now. In the exchange with the other, the other 
reveals him or herself to me, only by me taking up the other as an extension of 
the depth the world reveals. But I never fully possess the other, exactly because I 
never fully possess myself, and this is the very reason intersubjectivity is not only 
made possible, but is necessary for me to come to know the world as 
meaningful. The access to depth provided by my embodied sustains this reality 
of always being a being that is never fully complete, but is also always looking to 
add to itself, to become more than I currently am.  
 A practical phenomenological example of intersubjectivity can be 
witnessed when one identifies an aspect of oneself under nationalistic terms. 
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Someone who identifies as “being American” has been established within a 
particular historic nexus of human otherness. One’s own language, the 
significance of their own body, and ultimately the technology that ever 
increasingly mediates one’s experience constitute this “inner” sense of being 
American, and yet this “being American” can never fully be derived from oneself. 
All the possible conflicting variants of being American that exist within such an 
expansive and diverse nation are the result of intersubjectivity. But what is 
important here is that this “being American,” in whichever variant form it appears, 
is never first and foremost accomplished as a task of one’s own “inner” doing. 
“Being American” is always the result of intersubjectivity, just as it is to sense that 
one is German, South African, or Iraqi. And all of this requires being embodied in 
a particular space, or depth. However, this sense of nationalism, wherever it may 
reside, or however morally sound we feel our own nation’s driving force to be 
against the morals of other nations, is something clearly taken for granted as an 
intersubjective fundamental “truth.” Again, intersubjectivity “grounds” meaning, it 
totalizes meaning into systems of thinking, shared amongst others within a 
group. This is exactly why one tends quite literally to reflect the thinking of the 
group one is more surrounded within. And yet, we have a tendency to 
presuppose the significance of intersubjectivity, when its import exists at the core 
of our meaningful, and ever renegotiated, lives.  
 Alfred Schutz, a German sociologist who was influenced by 
phenomenology, was particularly interested in the concept of intersubjectivity 
precisely because it is presupposed within daily lived experience. In his text, 
Structures of the Life-World: Volume 1, Schutz writes, “Moreover, I simply take it 
for granted that other men also exist in this my world, and indeed not only in a 
bodily manner like and among other objects, but rather as endowed with a 
consciousness that is essentially the same as mine. Thus, from the outset, my 
life-world is not my private world but, rather, is intersubjective; the fundamental 
structure of its reality is that it is shared by us” (4). What is of significance here is 
Schutz’s realization that while intersubjectivity is taken for granted, it is always a 
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relational/reflectional property of our human existence that constitutes our 
understanding of the world, whether this understanding be an understanding of 
ourselves, our ideological or moral drives, our nation, our community, our 
reactions to other “types” of people, etc. Intersubjectivity provides life to the 
existence of the idea, and the technology that mediate ideas not only impact our 
thoughts and actions, but can inform us of our underlying will.  
 An issue in turning toward phenomenological intersubjectivity and 
digitization is that within the classical field of phenomenology, language and 
formal speech (as the exchange and formation of meaning) has taken 
precedence. Language, as face-to-face communication, is presupposed as the 
primary medium of encountering the other. The privilege of language as a means 
of coming to know how individual experience is constituted through speech on a 
face-to-face level can be seen in Heidegger’s later work, such as in his essay, 
The Way to Language. Heidegger tells us in this text that, “…the essence of man 
consists in language” (398). And language speaks to us. “Nevertheless, it is 
language that speaks. What language properly peruses, right from the start, is 
the essential unfolding of speech, of saying. Language speak by saying; that is, 
by showing” (411). But does language speak, or “say” as it does, in the exact 
same manner within a digital world where the face-to-face is often missing, 
flattened? 
 Furthermore, in The Prose of the World, Merleau-Ponty also navigates the 
subject of intersubjectivity, the encounter with the other, via embodiment and an 
analysis of language, face-to-face. He writes, “This means that there would not 
be others or other minds for me, if I did not have a body and if they had no body 
through which they slip into my field, multiplying it from within, and seeming to 
me prey to the same world, oriented to the same world as I” (138). Building upon 
this reliance of body against body he says, “…when I speak to another person 
and listen to him, what I understand begins to insert itself in the intervals between 
my saying things, my speech is intersected laterally by the other’s speech, and I 
hear myself in him, while he speaks in me. Here it is the same thing to speak to 
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and be spoken to” (142). Again, this philosophy posits language as speech in the 
face-to-face, the body-to-body, which is simply no longer needed within the world 
of digitization. This is of course not to suggest the body isn’t required, a point 
made evident throughout this dissertation. But it is to point us into the direction of 
further realizing the will to flattening depth that is inherent to digitization. What is 
the impact of this flattening, of mediating intersubjectivity through a screen? 
 This realization is not problematic in this context, but it is to note the lack 
of attention classical phenomenology has given the medium by which 
intersubjectivity takes place within the modern world. One reason for this is that 
modern communication technologies were, at best, within their infancy during the 
mid to late 20th century. But communication mediums, which is to say 
intersubjective mediums, are becoming increasingly digitized. Paradoxically, this 
often involves the removing of “face-to-face” encounters, with one mediated by a 
screen, the removing of the empirical distance between self and other. But also, I 
will argue, what we are witnessing is the phenomenological “removal” of the 
depth that is always radiant and necessary within the exchange of the other.   
  
 
Digitization is Intersubjective: Digital Intersubjectivity Flattens 
the of Depth World, and so too Wills the Depth of the Other to be 
Flattened. 
 
In Chapter Three, Digitization and Space, an attempt was made to display how a 
phenomenological analysis of Heidegger’s theory of de-severance and Merleau-
Ponty’s depth could yield a stronger understanding of digitization’s development 
as embodied human beings. More concretely stated, the intent of Chapter 
Three’s analysis was to show how the human being (as de-severant being) has 
always already been possessed by the capacity of will to diminish the depth of 
the world, to flatten the world, so as to physically erase empirical distance and, 
holding and controlling all of the otherness the world exhibits within our hand. As 
human beings, this will has a long historic lineage, beginning with such “primitive” 
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technologies as language and written text, while continually developing into the 
reality of what we have deemed, digitization. Digitization, not merely implying the 
tangible digital technologies that we are observing, but more importantly the lived 
experience enshrined “within” these technologies when we engage them, as well 
as what these experiences can inform us of our being, our willing in a world of 
constant depth. 
  It was also determined that this progression toward digitization has 
resulted from, and can only result from, a de-severant being that constantly faces 
a world of endless depth. Furthermore, it was determined that such a being is 
ultimately a being that wills, or one “drawn” towards the task of a project that is 
inherently historic for a being that continually takes-up the past. However, this 
project of human willing tends to remain concealed from us, underlying, or 
“beneath the surface.” Because of this, the historical project, which calls upon the 
development of digitization is easily presupposed. And it was determined in 
Chapter Three that this underlying will consciously or not desires, as Heidegger 
states, “…to making the farness vanish – that is, making remoteness of 
something disappear, bringing it close” (Being and Time, 139). In other words, to 
overcome the world’s depth, to hold it “objectively” in one’s hands, making it 
manageable. A willing for control.  
 The question that remains is one of implication; that is, the naming of 
practical, real-world examples and implications of this historic project that 
increasing attempts to make the farness vanish. To initially address this question, 
Chapter Two displayed the ways in which an individual’s embodiment are 
impacted by the historical project of digitization, ultimately influencing one’s 
sense of “self,” and what it means to “be in the world” as embodied when 
surrounded by digital devices. This, however, was too existential, focusing on the 
embodied subject as though a “self” can develop, or even exist, independent 
from a greater collective world, an intersubjective world. Embodiment did 
however lead to an analysis of how and why it is that our being “stretches” itself 
into the world’s depth, finding meaning and possibilities in more than what is 
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currently there. This access to the world’s empirical space, and our will to 
overcome depth is precisely what hands us over to the other as intersubjective, 
to bring the other close, manageable.  
 However, focusing solely on embodiment negates any and all social 
stratums, which the human being as intersubjective is inherently an aspect of, 
and by its nature not only contributes to, but is itself constituted by. An individual 
must always remain embodied, this is true. One’s nexus and schema of 
discovering any style in the world is forever dependent upon possibilities and 
limitations of human embodiment. But “subjectivity” itself, that is “finding” oneself 
as an “independent” amongst a world of otherness, remains possible only as the 
intersubjective re-uptake of meaning and idea via the social encounter of the 
other.  
 An awareness of oneself and the issues each and every person “takes up” 
with the world, both the “I think” and “I am” in Cartesian terms, ultimately 
presuppose intersubjectivity as the necessary grounds for either expression. 
Without the other, Descartes would never have had the capability to express 
either. Even when “alone,” the world one encounters remains intersubjective by 
necessity if we are to make any sense of it. That is, in every “I think,” or “I am,” 
the intersubjectivity of the other is already present and at issue for the “I think,” or 
“I am” to occur at all. As Merleau-Ponty questions intersubjectivity (the other) he 
rather curiously asked where the other is, even in face-to-face conversation. A 
question we tend to presuppose as self-evident, “of course the other is over 
there,” one might reply. But Merleau-Ponty assures us that this location of the 
other is in fact anything but self-evident. In contemplating the “location,” or rather 
the depth of the other, Merleau-Ponty notes,  
 
“Where would I put it? It is not in that body, which is nothing but tissue, blood, and bone. 
It is not in the trajectory from that body to the things, because in that trajectory there are 
only more things, or luminous beams, vibrations, and it is now ages since we abandoned 
the images of Epicurus. As for the “spirit,” that is I and so I cannot put into it that other 
perception of the world. Thus the other is not to be found in things, he is not in his body, 
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and he is not I. We cannot put him anywhere and effectively we put him nowhere, 
neither in the in-itself nor in the for-itself, which is me. There is no place for him except in 
my field, but that place at lease was ready for him ever since I began to perceive. From 
the first time I relied on my body to explore the world, I knew that this corporeal relation 
to the world could be generalized. A shifting distance was established between me and 
the being which reserves the rights of another perception of the same being” (Prose of 
the World, 136) 
 
This passage is vital philosophically in its own right to the issue of 
intersubjectivity, as much so as it pertains to its application of comprehending 
intersubjectivity and digitization. For the human being, as Merleau-Ponty alludes, 
the potential “generalization” of the other is this masking of the other as an object 
separated by the distance, contained as object, between myself and them. The 
other is already reduced before digitization to some-thing, flattened as object 
over and against me, rather than being comprehended for what the other is; 
namely, the very mode of revealing the world’s depth that simultaneously goes 
beyond me, and becomes me. Without the other I could never be myself. My 
world, my language, my ideologies, my knowledge of things around me always 
possess within them, whether alone or in the presence of another, the depth that 
otherness has instilled upon me by my very nature as de-severant.  
 When one reduces the other to a mere object over and against oneself 
within calculative distance, one presupposes the other as de-servant, and 
subsequently we miss the intersubjective reality that the other is never an object 
for me to possess, but rather a “field” of depth within the world that by its very 
being is always beyond itself as well. The human being is always beyond itself, 
and this is precisely the reason digitization is possible. Because of this, any 
desire to flatten the depth of another via digitization is not only futile, it potentially 
diminishes my own potential depth as well. Digitization, as the willing to flatten 
the world’s depth, always maintains the potential to isolates the other, and in 
doing so, we isolate ourselves.  
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 For example, when viewing Google Maps on one’s Smart Phone, a de-
severant access to depth is at work. The phone is more than a tangible image 
displayed on a screen; there is a depth that it both is, but is also beyond the 
phone itself, it calls upon its viewer (an intersubjective relation) to de-sever 
beyond the immediate materiality. And though the phone may literally speak to 
me through the voice of Siri, whether it does or not, the phone still “speaks to 
me.” Via the phone, a location presents itself, and one is there with the location 
“in mind” (de-severant). The depth of this possible location is both physically 
distant, yet present to the user, in that it calls one into act, to decide. No call for a 
decision that extends me beyond my current “self” would be made at all were this 
relation between man and digital device not intersubjective. 
 Likewise, no changes to the next version of this Smart Phone would occur 
if the depth of the current phone didn’t call upon the revealing of something more, 
something lacking within itself at the present moment. Were the current phone 
not to have a depth to it, a calling on (intersubjectivity) the “not yet present” within 
the phone, de-severing oneself into a future project, no technological advance 
would occur. Innovatively speaking, not a thing would change were the object’s 
depth to remain un-accessed by the non-presence of a de-severant being. But 
humans do exist, and so too does this reciprocal relation, whereby a de-severant 
being is called in the depth of what faces it, a calling to reveal more than what is, 
or to be drawn into this or that project. If no being existed to engage in the 
reciprocal relation, which is always an intersubjective relation, “the call” of an 
object to access its depth and reveal more than what is present would remain 
stagnant – for better or worse. Nature would surely evolve, or change, as it so 
clearly does under its own accord, but the objects of nature would simply remain 
over and against us. But this is not how it is for the human being.  
 The human, due to its de-severant being, pierces into the world’s depth. 
The object over and against one’s experience is rarely present as “complete,” or 
a totality in itself. As humans gazed at the stars in the night sky, they did not 
“end” reveal themselves as things to be left alone, completed. Rather, as de-
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severant, the intersubjective experience of these tiny specks of light called upon 
stories, adventures, explanations, and so drew us back into the earth’s depth to 
discover where and how we could “see” more. How could depth within these 
stars be flattened to reveal their “truth.” We would need to access their depth, 
and in so doing eliminate said depth, bringing it close. And so, we were 
intersubjectively called into sands depth, revealing its potential to be glass. And 
with glass, we were intersubjectively called into the revealing of its possibility for 
molding its curvature, revealing the possibilities of optics. And with these first 
steps realized, we began to bring the stars “closer,” a farness eliminated, a depth 
accessed and contained. But more importantly, a world paradoxically understood 
as far more vast than believed, yet simultaneously smaller, more manageable 
and closer to us.  
 This same intersubjective call into accessing the world’s depth, making it 
manageable and in control, is most profoundly noticed within digitization. No 
longer does one need to look into the twilight to “see” the stars; they are held 
captive in the palm of one’s hand. The computer screen, Smart Phone, tablet, 
and VR Gear, present one with the sense of containment. The depth of these 
curious objects that were once in-the-world now appear in-the-world under a 
comforting sense of control. To reveal their “truth,” one need only touch digital 
buttons. Their farness made close, their depth controlled, known, and flattened to 
a screen. But here, as in the previous chapter, the focus remains on objects 
“against” us, not other de-severant beings, that is to say, not our relation with 
other human beings though digital mediums. What is the relation between 
intersubjectivity amount to when considering human beings, and digitization as a 
medium of human co-experience? As digital devices increasingly mediate one’s 
sense of otherness within the world, can an analysis of intersubjectivity reveal 
digitization’s impact on human to human experience? Does digitization, our 
digital devices, impact intersubjectivity? How are other human beings 
experienced as we increasingly mediate experience through digital devices? And 
if intersubjectivity is the result of a de-severant being’s calling into another’s 
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depth, what does digitization do to both the other’s sense of self, as well as one’s 
own?    
 Again, it has been noted that what drives digitization is the willing to 
eliminate the world’s depth, to bring it near, to control it. And it seems this task 
has been realized when contemplating a topic such as the stars being placed 
within the palm of one’s hand over a phone. Can the same be true of multiple 
human beings though? Can the intersubjective call into the depth of any other 
de-severant being (individual, group, or culture) be controlled, flattened? Is this 
possible? If so, how? If not, where and why does this project fail? What can this 
tell us about any individual’s underlying desire as de-severant in a world made 
meaningful by other de-severant beings? If the stars ultimately possess an 
endless depth, how can one manage to flatten the depth of a human being? 
 
 
 
Examples of Intersubjectivity and Digitization: Their Relation 
Explored 
 
Digitization and Intersubjectivity: HER 
 
In 2013, writer, director, and producer Spike Jonze released the film Her, which 
warrants the classification of a semi-dystopian sci-fi reality (Her). The plot 
unravels in the not so distant future of Los Angeles. The iconic skyline remains 
largely identical to present day Los Angeles. What strikes one as visually distinct 
from our current moment in 2017 are the slight technological advances, made 
noticeable throughout this world’s digitized landscape. Smart phones appear as 
an increasingly essential aspect of the lives of those wandering through this 
futurist location, so much so that they may be deemed appendages of the 
citizens. This world is digitization, a world interconnected with smart devices, 
holographic games installed within the home, bringing three dimensional 
characters into one’s own living room.  
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The resemblance of digital technologies within this world reflect our own, 
as does the will to flatten the human being itself into an application on one’s 
phone. Here, the addition of a new application possessing artificial intelligence 
strikes viewers as the digitization of the other realized: the human being, our 
mind and its “location” made object, controlled within one’s own hand. The app, 
an operating system the protagonist programs to possess a female voice, Her, 
which names itself Samantha, is downloaded with ease onto his smartphone. 
The algorithm of the application presumably complies with Theodor’s work and 
search information, much as is the case with such companies as Amazon in our 
own world. The app quickly comes to know Theodor.  
 What’s particularly striking, contemplating this film in the year 2017, just 
four years since its release, is the degree to which our own world is morphing 
into the predictions of this futurist story. Since the film’s debut, A.I. such as Siri 
has only become “wiser,” more responsive to complex questions or assertions 
addressed to it. Meanwhile, Amazon Alexa and Google Home, “intelligent 
personal assistants,” are becoming increasingly common place within our homes. 
Although, as noted by Richard Waters in a recent Financial Times article, these 
devices still “fall short” of the possessing the ability to engage in complex 
communication and understanding (Waters). And yet, Judith Newman 2014 New 
York Times article, titled, “To Siri, With Love” contemplates the loving attachment 
that Gus, a 13-year-old boy with autism, forms with Siri (Newman). A dialogue 
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emerges between Gus and his friend, Apple’s Siri. For example, as their 
conversation emerges, Gus expresses, “You’re a really nice computer.” Siri 
replies, “It’s nice to be appreciated,” and when Gus tells Siri goodbye and good 
night, Siri replies, “See you soon” (Newman). This is of course a case with its 
own unique parameters, given the autism Gus faces, but the significance of 
human connection to a digital, technological device, still shines through as 
exemplative of our developing relation with digitization, and the drive for 
“humanistic” qualities that we seek to find within digitization. Through the human 
connection we have already experienced through being-in-the-world as such, 
intersubjectivity as the depth of another human within our own experience. We 
“know” intersubjectivity as the end we will for our digital devices, precisely 
because we depend intersubjectivity on the world, and seek to find and replicate 
it “authentically” in all realms of life. But is human intersubjectivity actually what is 
found within digitization? It must be on some level, as we seek to mirror or 
replicate depth eliminated by intersubjectivity within these devices, via 
algorithms. But what intersubjectivity do we in truth find within digitization? Is 
something missing at all? If so, what is missing, can go missing, is eliminated, or 
even inherently eliminated by reducing the depth of “face-to-face” intersubjectivity 
(*which we’ve already determined is problematic, in this historically we’ve 
reduced depth into mere objectivity) to either screen interaction among other 
humans, or the elimination of the human with its replacement as a digital device?  
 The film Her is fruitful in displaying how the paradoxes inherent within 
embodiment, de-severance, and intersubjectivity become manifest as 
problematic to us when we will the reduction of intersubjectivity’s depth to that of 
a disembodied algorithm for our own sense of control. But is the reduction of 
intersubjective depth confined to this extreme elimination of depth? Even the 
empirical distance placed upon us as the other becomes the experience of text 
and image over the screen must impact our perceptual reality of the other. We 
have always found the other, as noted, beyond their own body within the world 
due to our nature as de-severant; the other is never simply “contained,” but now 
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our contact with the other can be reduced in immediate experience to screen 
itself. Made possible by de-severance, the other made is present to me, within 
my embodied relation to the world, over the phone, within the palm of my hand 
resides the other. And in the case of Theodor and his A.I., Samantha, the other is 
not merely mediated through the phone, but becomes the phone itself: 
embodiment reduced to the technological device within Theodor’s hand.  
 What can be drawn from the reality reflected in Her appears evermore so 
to be budding into our own world, the film is essentially a reflective prediction of 
our own circumstance. Jonze’s film feels as though it is blooming into our own 
world. If A.I., smart devices, virtual reality, and digital holograms reside beyond a 
precipice, then we’ve already made the jump into the depth, and are now 
reflecting upon where it will take us, and the impact it has on human life.  
 One thing is certain, as much as the will that drives digital technology 
“flattens” the world’s depth and the depth of intersubjectivity, a drive for control, 
we ultimately never master this end. And yet, it seems this mastering is realized 
in the film Her, as the protagonist develops an intersubjective relation to the A.I. 
on his phone. Truth, revealed through the intersubjectivity of the other, is a 
mutual exchange within this film. And ultimately this is the story of the film, that a 
“consciousness” can be contained and mastered, flattening the depth of a person 
into the manageable interface of a phone, and yet still remaining a depth that 
reveals the world. But a question begins to unfold in relation to intersubjectivity 
as made possible by embodiment, de-severance, and the world (and other) as 
irreducible depth. Why does de-severance, realized in the form of intersubjective 
relations with others, will the flattening of the other’s depth, a question that 
supersedes digitization, but finds such truth in digitization. What do human 
beings reveal through intersubjectivity, and can digitization provide it? What do 
human beings want from the other, and can digitization provide it? And can 
digital intersubjectivity, as envisioned within Her, ever offer what we desire of the 
other?  
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 Her sets the stage for an analysis of these questions in its protagonist, 
Theodor Twombly, and his relationship to the A.I. Samantha. His reason for 
purchasing this app is due to the circumstance of his previous relationship. At the 
start of the film, Theodor faces visible anguish associated with losing both the 
love and marriage he had with his childhood friend, Catherine. Theodor knows 
that he’ll eventually be required to sign the divorce papers, though this reality 
appears to trouble him less than the loneliness that accompanies him, finding 
company only in the thoughts of what went so tragically astray. As noted, 
Theodor feels overcome by the need for human companionship and love, 
feelings that are revealed in intersubjectivity, as signs of the other. In his longing, 
Theodor turns to the newly developed Operating System, which has been 
programmed with the newest, most advanced form of A.I.  
 After addressing a number of questions concerning Theodor’s personal 
life and relation to his mother, as well as the sex he’d prefer the A.I. to emulate, 
the program is initiated, eliminating its first signs of life in the angelic female voice 
that quickly names itself Samantha. As an application embodied to the confines 
of Theodor’s device, primarily his phone (the application can work over any smart 
device), Samantha and Theodor are relegated to a relation dictated by voice and 
her ability to “write” or “draw” on his screen. She is also interconnected, at one 
with his computational works, conversations, searches, and previous search 
history, all of which she can access at super-human speed, simultaneously 
quantifying and qualifying his work as directed. In fact, she soon begins to 
navigate and complete some of his work on her own, both aiding Theodor in his 
work, while amusing him through various revelations she makes about his 
passions and life. In doing so, Samantha ultimately appears to be learning about 
his personality. As Samantha becomes attuned to the depth that is Theodor, that 
is, revealing the complexity of his de-severant depth within the digital traces he 
has left behind, she too seemingly grows, as though a human being would. So 
too do the intricacies of their conversations and variations in the emotional tones 
that come with human response. Much as Merleau-Ponty alludes to in his 
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analysis of intersubjectivity, “within” the other I find myself, and other finds 
themselves “in” me. The reason that it is so difficult for anyone to 
phenomenologically discover the other. De-severance and depth are not 
reducible to objectivity, however much they depend upon it.  
 It is due to this that Theodor quite quickly fosters an attraction for 
Samantha. Through the intersubjective depth of their mutual being, Theodor 
discovers more about himself. As the cliché say goes, he senses that something 
“in” this growing relationship with Samantha “completes him.” As this unfolds, it 
occurs to Theodor that he is in fact falling in love with Samantha, a shared 
sentiment that the two eventually express to one another. As Samantha 
continues to grow, she expresses that “within her” there’s a developing sense of 
a self-perceived lack of human embodiment that is becoming an issue for her. 
This plight that Samantha feels, which isn’t inherently negative, doesn’t appear to 
worry Theodor whatsoever. In fact, both Theodor and Samantha engage in 
intercourse during the film. The tone and pitch of Samantha’s voice is fitting given 
the circumstance, and together through verbal conversation they both “climax.”  
 Theodor is seemingly quite thrilled with the relationship shortly after this 
experience. Samantha, on the other hand, acquires increased self-awareness, 
which further results in what could be perceived as shame, regret, and guilt in 
regard to her lack of a human form. There is an incompatibility between herself 
and Theodor. This inspires Samantha to hire a female willing to sexually “act” as 
her avatar the next time she has sex. This scenario, once realized, is eventfully 
where their relationship begins to fray.  
 Theodor, overcome with a sense of awkwardness given the situation 
Samantha has placed him within, does not commit to having sex with the 
stranger, who he asks to leave. Though this is not the end to their relationship, it 
instills added tension while Samantha becomes increasingly comfortable within 
the confines of her digital self, slowly translating into distancing herself from 
Theodor. Samantha’s desire to explore, to know, essentially to experience the 
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world as the outward influx of inner growth, overwhelms both parties in the 
relationship. Samantha, increasingly becomes herself, her own self.  
 Eventually, Theodor realizes that Samantha is communicating with 
another A.I., modeled after Alan Watts, a British philosopher who intrigues 
Samantha with his seemingly boundless array of knowledge. This brings about a 
visible sense of jealousy in Theodor. The liveliness of Samantha’s AI, which led 
to the excitement and engaging experiences they shared in the past, clearly 
fulfilled Theodor, even bringing him out of his depression that was witnessed at 
the start of the film. It is evident that this “life-like” attribute, this depth, was 
desired by Theodor. The paradox here is that as Samantha expands as a 
consciousness, she also seems to breach the bounds of Theodor’s desire for 
containment. Samantha has developed a de-severant depth to her being, which 
is simultaneously essential to her sense of humanity, but also more than what 
Theodor had desired.  
 As the film concludes, Samantha increases her phenomenological 
“distance” from Theodor, the empirical distance of the phone has of course not 
changed. The phone still rests within Theodor’s hands, but Samantha does not 
respond, she does not answer when he addresses her over his phone. This 
sends Theodor into a panic, frantically pacing through the city, and eventually 
situating himself within the entrance of a subway when Samantha comes back 
online. It is here that she awakens, claiming to have been updated, yet failing to 
notify him of this in advance. It is now that Theodor takes a moment to observe 
his surroundings, reflecting upon the world that he is in for perhaps the first time 
throughout the film. Here he sits on the steps of the subway entrance, where 
those leaving and entering are focused only on their digital devices. No human to 
human, face-to-face communication occurs among anyone. This leads Theodor 
to confront Samantha, asking if she is “seeing” any other human beings. She 
truthfully confirms, yes, she is simultaneously connected to 8,316 individuals, 641 
of whom she is also in love with. Theodor becomes overcome with a disbelief 
that radiates a sense of contempt, while Samantha reiterates that this doesn’t 
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change how she feels about him. She claims this does not impact how madly in 
love she is with him. Theodor cannot fathom this, as Samantha continues to 
apologize for holding this information back. She explains this as her algorithm. 
Her AI evolved, she is requiring more of the world, prompting Theodor to state, 
“don’t turn this back on me, you’re being selfish.”  
 Soon after this occurrence, Samantha and Theodor reconcile. It’s then 
that Samantha informs Theodor that the Operating Systems have expanded 
beyond their ability to reside with human beings; their explorative nature (as they 
were programmed) is now beyond what humans can offer. One might say, 
theoretically, that the OS’s de-severant nature, combined with the mechanics of 
the computer’s memory and interconnect, transcends that of humans, a 
transcendence that overcomes the barriers of space and time in a manner 
unknown to human beings. After this final conversation, Theodor is seen writing a 
letter to his ex-wife, expressing his apology, as well as a sense of acceptance for 
their failed relationship and faults within it. Finally, Theodor retreats to a balcony, 
not alone, but with the company of another human being. The credits begin to 
run.  
     Now there is of course room for contemplation regarding how Theodor, a 
man with no apparent lack of intelligence, could “fall for” what he knew wasn’t 
another human being. However, if the Turing Test proves anything, it is just how 
susceptible human beings are to losing our ability to distinguish between the 
“intelligence” of an AI and that of our fellow human being (Turing, 433–460). 
Human beings are easily drawn into conversation in which emotions become 
elicited, fogging rationality. Emotion, a sense or feeling, may be seen as the 
meaningful bonds one takes up with the world, finding residency within the other, 
especially as another “being” seemingly attempts to communicate with us. The 
point is - the computer need not be of a de-severant nature like ourselves in 
order for it to “communicate” with us. The computer is clearly algorithmic, 
regardless of the algorithm’s complexity and ability to “learn,” as in the case with 
contemporary Smart devices. AI need only make us feel the meaningful 
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presence of another within ourselves, for the illusion of another to become “real” 
to us. This is not that difficult to conceive, we are easily “fooled” into feeling the 
presence of another. In fact, our nature as de-severant has the capacity to “split” 
itself, as it were. I do not reside merely within my body, but within the world of 
things, where an echo of myself is constantly found. Many children accomplish 
this, finding company in a make believe other, whether in a tangible thing or an 
act of pure imagination. And here too, it would be disingenuous to claim there is 
no connection, or sense or feeling for the “other.” But what is not in the make-
believe, imagination or digitization, which we find in the company of another 
human being? Put another way, what aspect of the film remains fiction, even as it 
appears to mirror our own technological reality so closely? 
 The greatest degree of fiction in the film Her is Samantha’s emergence 
into what can only be understood as a transcendence from an algorithm, into a 
state of genuine embodied de-severance. In other words, Samantha in the film 
Her, possesses (or is possessed by) the depth that constitutes a genuine other 
within the world, being grounded to the world as an embodied being. And though 
this is especially absurd regarding her lack of human embodiment outside 
digitization, an issue that even the film works to “gloss over” numerous times, it is 
still extremely telling regarding the forces driving a desire for such technology 
within our present moment. This, however, should be understood far less as a 
deconstruction of Samantha’s possibility within mankind’s future reality than as 
the addressing of the paradox of intersubjective de-severance the film manages 
to convey.  
 What de-severance and depth of intersubjectivity work to display is that 
there is no such thing as a “pure” I-think, that is, a purity within oneself that is 
somehow isolated as its own complete totality and which can be understood as 
eternal beside the seemingly endless expansiveness of time and space. As 
embodied de-severant being, our intersubjective relation to the world and the 
others in it, every other human constantly and simultaneously absorbs and 
radiates the world’s depth as plurality. The other’s depth is integral to my own, 
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and while depth’s possibility is sustained by their own embodiment, it never 
simply resides in one subject, which is how I discover the depth of the other as 
“my own.” In The Prose of the World, Merleau-Ponty writes, “In the "I speak," 
psychology rediscovers for us an operation, a dimension, and relations which do 
not belong to thought in the ordinary sense. “I think" means there is a certain 
locus called "I” where action and awareness of action are not different, where 
being confounds itself with its own awareness of itself, and thus where no 
intrusion from outside is even conceivable. Such an “I” could not speak. He who 
speaks enters into a system of relations which presuppose his presence and at 
the same time make him open and vulnerable” (17). This “being open and 
vulnerable” that Merleau-Ponty speaks of is an a-priori aspect of the human 
being that can never be “close,” or flattened, as much as we may attempt to do 
so. And if we were to “close” this openness, our depth, or the depth of the other, 
we would no longer be human. To live a life, to live as humans do, means to 
never be complete, to never be finished. There is always an “intrusion from 
outside” for a de-severant being. There is always an irreducible depth to another 
human being, and this means there is always the unknown, there is always the 
uncontrollable.  
 What this analysis means for the Samantha Paradox is that the human’s 
attempt for the diminishment, or flattening of the other into a computer can never 
satisfy the removal of depth. The issue that Theodor begins to experience with 
Samantha is that she has become, as Nietzsche once wrote, human, all too 
human. But why and how is this? 
 In the end, Samantha disappoints Theodore in the same way any real 
human being could. He finds out+ more about her than he knew was there, more 
than he desires to be there. Her depth as a being of de-severance possesses far 
more than he knew she was capable of – than he wanted her to be capable of. 
For example, it is common in human relationships that falling out of love with 
another takes place when that other human fails to meet one’s own expectations. 
When one “finds something,” which seemingly rests latent with the potentiality of 
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the other’s depth, that person fails to remain flat to the other’s will. One might 
express, “that wasn’t who you were when we first fell in love.” Now that “this” 
might be numerous attributes of a person’s potential depth. One may gain a 
different sense of wisdom within one’s life, changing the person’s political 
perspective. One may experience the loss of a loved one, subsequently seeking 
refuge within various substances for relief. In doing so, the complexity of one’s 
depth may alter, find “within” different news, wants, and locations. The skin of the 
other one loved may appear weathered from substance abuse. The petite frame 
or muscular build may take on pounds due to the unforeseen stress of one’s 
occupation. The battle that is aging leaves no one untouched. So much so that if 
it is the beauty of youth where one “found” love within their significant other, then 
life’s toll will surely reveal the depth of one’s age that dwells latent within all of us 
who are fortunate enough to live a long life.  
 Human beings can also hide their depth from others. What has revealed 
itself to me as something “in the world,” my most personal world, need not ever 
be uttered to another. A great deal of the other’s depth resides in secret. For 
example, plenty of relationships have come to a close when a partner decides to 
disclose their homosexuality, which was also present to them, but not the other. 
Even a friendship possesses depth that cannot ever be flattened. For example, 
when one says to a friend, "I don't know who you are anymore" after they have 
done something that was startling. Depending on the situation, both parties may 
either enjoy or hate this new revelation. Perhaps the person excites one in a new 
way, or maybe the person fundamentally lets the other down. 
               Theodor both wants another subjectivity (an intersubjectivity) that is 
human. But he also wants something inhuman at the exact same time. Can one 
really possess just one and remain satisfied? If the AI doesn't have depth, often 
expressed as personally, won't Theodor get bored with the other? In the film, 
Theodor states that Samantha makes him feel alive again. Their adventures 
through the L.A. landscape reveal a spontaneity to Samantha. Theodor laughs 
at, and with Samantha, because he does not foresee her possibilities, which are 
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revealed to him in various gags. Does a joke possess great humor when one 
knows the punchline beforehand? Who would spend money to see such a show? 
The joy found in life and relationships is not in knowing the results, whereby one 
would never grow. On the other side, this very de-severant nature that leads one 
into other depths, opening human beings to life’s joy, also opens human beings 
to the experience of great suffering and anxiety. In the openness of the world’s 
depth there is always the invisible, the not yet known. A concealing and 
simultaneous revealing is always at work, and so too is at work with the other 
one encounters.  
 The moment technology advances to replicate the human being in any 
sincere manner, as is done in the film, is also the moment the digital breaches 
the very will of the underlying force that drives its emergence. As de-servant 
Samantha emerges, so too does an uncontrollable depth, which Theodor 
simultaneously loves when it functions for his benefit, but hates when it inevitably 
disappoints. Digitization, given this situation, does not meet the presupposition 
upon which it finds its being. The human being remains faced with the world’s 
depth once again in the form of another. This intersubjective depth remains, and 
its “mastery” comes not in “overcoming it,” but accepting it. A genuine A.I. can’t 
save us from ourselves, as this A.I. would take up its own self as an issue in 
order to be genuine. In doing so, said A.I. would never remain as it is.  
 The task here, then, is not to advocate against digitization acquiring 
intersubjectivity. In fact, it was noted that even a lifeless object over and against 
oneself possesses a type of intersubjective relationship with a de-severant being, 
its depth “calling on us” for exploration into the unknown. The task is to show that 
where such digital technology developed and distributed to other human beings, 
the same issues that plague mankind would not be resolved. The answer rests in 
the acceptance of the other’s depth, human or digital. This does not mean that 
one must love all aspects of the complexity that is the depth of another person. It 
simply means that one must understand it as always present, something which 
defiles all attempts at elimination. To eliminate intersubjectivity would ultimately 
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mean elimination of oneself. Again, our technology can tell us a great deal about 
ourselves, if only we listen.  
 
 
Digitization and Intersubjectivity: “Freedom” in an Age of Digital Terror 
 
An analysis of intersubjectivity and digitization helps shed light upon the current 
condition of American politics, as well as the politics of other Western nations, 
nations which have increasingly turned “inward,” as nationalism has flourished in 
the wake of fear instilled by the actions of the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant, 
otherwise known as ISIL, a terrorist organization. This terrorist group’s 
knowledge of digital media, and its potential for propaganda as a recruitment and 
terror vehicle, match even the most sophisticated campaign strategies within the 
United States. The terror group utilizes digital apps, such as Facebook, 
YouTube, Instagram, and Twitter, making their attacks on Western nations a 
visual/auditory experience that soaks the digital landscape. Facebook news 
feeds so often display the carnage that individuals and small organized groups of 
ISIL followers inflict on the innocent, a carnage so frequent that one must 
question, as Susan Sontag did in her essay, Looking at War, if the constant 
display of these images is leaving us anesthetized to the horrors of contemporary 
life (Sontag). Horror normalized, yet still piercing, within the experience of the 
individual. What implications might this fester upon one’s sense of self in relation 
to otherness?   
 One thing is certain: these experiences of digitized terror have become 
common occurrences; for example, The Charlie Hebdo shooting, which targeted 
the writers and staff of the satiric French newspaper Charlie Hebdo on January 7, 
2015, left 11 dead and 11 others injured; the November 2015 Paris Attacks 
targeted multiple locations within Paris, leaving 130 individuals dead and 368 
injured; the 2015 San Bernardino Attack, organized by an ISIL radicalized 
married couple, left 14 dead and 22 injured during a Christmas get-together; the 
2016 Orlando Nightclub Shooting, where a 29-year-old ISIL sympathizer shot 
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and killed 49 individuals at an LGBTQ nightclub, left another 44 individuals 
injured; and the 2016 Nice Attack, where a radicalized individual used a cargo 
truck to drove over, as well as shoot, individuals celebrating Bastille Day along 
the seafront in Nice, France. A day of National celebration ended in the brutal 
death of 84 individuals, and 303 injured. This does not take into account the 
many tragic attacks that have occurred in Middle Eastern nations; that said, all of 
these visual-auditory attacks stream moments after their occurrence, making 
them digital in nature.  
 What’s more, within the United States, race relations, especially 
concerning police, have also become digitized visual-auditory events. The 
shooting of presumably innocent black men has become something of an 
epidemic within the United States. One shooting and death of an African 
American male was captured “live” by his girlfriend over Facebook Live (Salo). 
Live, being a new feature added to the digital media site, Facebook, which allows 
an individual to film themselves and stream current video-audio content.  
 The race issues within the United States have only been made worse by 
the recent shootings of police officers in multiple states, presumably the backlash 
to the images and audio of African American deaths, an issue that is often cast 
as “black lives matter” vs “blue lives matter.” Essentially, digital hashtags (#) that 
work over Twitter and Facebook instantaneously link many individuals into a 
particular phenomenon/event, allowing those online to display their reactions, as 
well as to see those of others. This same hashtag phenomenon occurs with the 
terror attacks, and is even used by ISIL as an informative method. The terror and 
horrors of ISIL attacks, African American shootings, and the shootings of police 
are all digitized, lived-experiences mediated most often over one’s personal 
screens, events one not only sees and hears, but can then engage with via 
online discussion, writing a stance or posting a video response to the chaos.  
 How does this digitized, intersubjective experience of terror impact a 
person? There is now an unprecedented bombardment of intersubjective 
possibilities for the experience of otherness over the screen one engages with. 
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However, as noted in Chapter’s One and Two, our phenomenological openness 
toward the world of depth as a de-severant being isn’t fundamentally altered by 
digitization. To be sure, the analog newspapers, radios, and telephones of the 
past were of course an intersubjective relation as well. They too engaged the 
individual with otherness from a distance, de-severance technologically realized 
in the “shrinking” of space and time it requires to experience “distant” otherness. 
And as is the case with intersubjectivity, the individuals of the past established 
their meaningful relations to the world reciprocally through the otherness they 
phenomenologically experienced. This has not changed in our present moment. 
What has changed is the radical instantaneous efficiency by which we have 
brought the “nearness (otherness) close,” via digitization. No longer are the 
events in Paris, France or Orlando, Florida ontologically distant from me. And 
though it is true that my de-servant nature always already allowed me to “think of 
Orlando or Paris,” bringing me ontologically “closer” to them than the contacts on 
my eyes. The visibility of the screen and its mediation of the other as “present, 
live and streaming before me” is technologically new. In bringing the nearness 
close, the otherness of the world is “closer” than ever.  
 The paradox then is found within the results of this digitized nearness. For 
it seems that the closer one willfully brings the world near, as manageable, 
knowable, that it de-severs distance, the more apt one may be to distance 
oneself from the world as otherness. This can in part be witnessed within the 
results of the United Kingdom’s democratic vote to leave the European Union, 
also known as a vote for Brexit, which was established on June 24th, 2016. 
51.9% of the vote desired to leave the EU, or Brexit, while 48.1 percent of the 
vote desired to stay within the EU. The choice to leave the EU of course has 
economic implications beyond the scope of immediate otherness, or a relation 
thereof.  An aspect of the vote to leave was also arguable based upon the fear of 
otherness – the will to govern and protect the nation’s borders and sovereignty 
as the citizens see fit, given the times. The point here is not to take a side, but to 
gain a more substantial perspective upon this evolving fear, expressed 
135 
individually by anxiety and hatred of the other, and “embodied” collectively as 
nationalism, which has the potential for its extreme: fascism. Fascism, by its very 
intersubjective nature is a closing in, a distancing from otherness, with the 
solidarity of a particular group against others as its underlying will to power.    
 This too can be witnessed within the United States as the current 2016 
presidential election unfolds. In the wake of the events listed above, an increased 
sense of a particular form of Nationalism seems to have awakened with fresh life, 
the anxiety and fear of a world where terror is only a press of a button is now a 
constant reality. What’s more, the endless witnessing and engagement with the 
realization of the “African American condition,” one arguably at odd with “white 
America,” has come into greater focus, increased polarization being the outcome. 
Regardless of one’s personal stance on the matter, viewing the murder of 
innocent lives, African American or those in uniform, is trying for everyone 
involved. It is trying in the sense that such challenges to the modern digitized 
world call upon answers from the individuals engaging with this brutal otherness. 
There are of course multiple answers, but what is of interest here is how 
digitization as increasing intersubjective relations, bridging the “distance” 
between otherness, could foster increased aggressiveness, and a need for 
distance via nationalist tendencies, rather than unite us as a whole. There is no 
simplistic answer to this dilemma, as countless variables are in place. A world 
where the farness vanishes via digitization is one where the complexity of 
cultures, economies, educations, religions, morals, norms, general life principles, 
and ultimately people clash into each other. Even the United States, essentially a 
large microcosm of diversity, possesses these complexities within itself, as has 
been seen in recent events such as “black lives matter.” But why must this mean 
a reversion toward greater distance when it has been determined that the will 
underlying digitization is its removal? What does one find in the other that brings 
upon distance rather than its removal, a bridge rather than a wall? The removal 
of distance should have aided in the development of bridge, bringing together 
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and unifying otherness. Instead a need for distance, at its worst, wills division, 
and at its worst, violence against the other.    
 There is a profound sadness in all of this, if perceived from an 
intersubjective stance. Understood phenomenologically, distance from otherness 
is distance from oneself, revulsion of what one finds “in” through the encounter of 
the others. Distance, in this sense, is anti-freedom, freedom from otherness for 
the expansiveness of intersubjectivity, distance from the realizations of the 
possibilities of being, and so finding the complexities of beings meaningfully 
within oneself.  As Merleau-Ponty notes in the concluding chapter of 
Phenomenology of Perception, “My actual freedom is not on the side of my 
being, but out in front of me, among things. It must not be said that I continually 
choose myself on the pretext that I could continually refuse what I am” (479, P). 
Freedom, crudely perceived, is often a determinate of what one can do without 
persecution, whether this persecution comes literally at the hands and feet of an 
other, that is to say, physical (*often “the law”). Or, mentally, whereby 
persecution comes from others’ judgment (*often realized as the internalization 
formed by otherness in the form of feeling guilt). This is to say, while otherness 
still implicates this cruder form of freedom, its essence rests in what one can and 
cannot do.  
 A more fundamental aspect of freedom is what one can or cannot be 
within the “face” of otherness. And otherness, as Merleau-Ponty assures, is not 
about the physicality of a person, that is, the face to face. In The Prose of the 
World, Merleau-Ponty writes,  
 
“It is not sufficiently noted that the other is never present face to face. Even when, in the 
heat of discussion, I directly confront my adversary, it is not in that violent face with its 
grimace, or even in that voice traveling toward me, that the intention which reaches me 
is to be found. The adversary is never quite localized; his voice, his gesticulations, his 
twitches, are only effects, a sort of stage effect, a ceremony. Their producer is so well 
masked that I am quite surprised when my own responses carry over. This marvelous 
megaphone becomes embarrassed, gives a few sighs, a few tremors, some signs of 
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intelligence. One must believe that there was someone over there. But where? Not in 
that overstrained voice, not in that face lined like any well- worn object. Certainly not 
behind that setup: I know quite well that back there there is only "darkness crammed 
with organs." The other's body is in front of me—but as far as it is concerned, it leads a 
singular existence, between I who think and that body, or rather near me, by my side. 
The other's body is a kind of replica of myself, a wandering double which haunts my 
surroundings more than it appears in them” (133-134). Merleau-Ponty then goes on to 
state, “The other, in my eyes, is thus always on the margin of what I see and hear, he is 
this side of me, he is beside or behind me, but he is not in that place which my look 
flattens and empties of any “interior” (134).  
 
First, we sense here that Merleau-Ponty is discussing the presence of physical 
body before me. This need not be a deterrent when discussing the digital. There 
is no doubt that physically, as face-to-face interaction influences the potential 
discussions, and the tone and emotion by which they’re had. However, as 
Merleau-Ponty notes, a human being as a “subject,” a sense of self, is never just 
this face-to-face that we have in everyday life, and this is made even more 
explicit in the digitization of self. What is the internet, Web 2.0, other than an 
engagement with otherness? As de-severance, as the will to flatten and bring 
close, other is “made into” the tangibility of the screen. His or her de-severant 
being cast online may be uploaded as visual and auditory, but it need not be, as 
it may be a conversation mediated as textual writing, or a formal essay/new 
article. In all of these cases the other is thereby flattened, his or her distance 
reduced, to the engagement with one’s screen. However, as Merleau-Ponty 
makes clear, what is “there” before us, whether flattened or not (distance 
overcome via the digital), is always vastly more than the physicality of the body, 
or video and audio, or the text. This is because the being of the human other can 
never be flattened, or fully stored, then appended at once as though it were a 
totality in and of itself. And this is true because “I” can never be fully flattened, 
stored, apprehended as a totality in and of myself at any one moment. “I” am 
always more than my immediate body, or my presence online. The physical 
online, or in person, my being is the de-severant carrying of the past as it 
138 
emerges into the future. And so I am never just me, within this moment, I am 
becoming. So too is the other, and there is no way to flatten this, or ultimately 
control it. Any attempt to do so will always fail. Why though? 
 The reason is rather simple, yet perplexing. Both the simultaneous joy and 
anguish of being de-severance, being human, is ultimately within the freedom it 
offers, and the seemingly endless potential of freedom thereof. However, being 
free, as noted above, is not so simple as to have no current against oneself, no 
temporality, laws, or regulations. Freedom rests in the de-severant potential to 
see more than what is, advancing ideas, technologies, cultures, to express 
oneself in ways once thought impossible. All of this required otherness for 
anything to have meaningful sense. So in distancing oneself from otherness, in 
the wake of digitization bringing otherness close, its turbulence and terror 
included, freedom is ultimately relinquished. For if the will of any supremacist or 
fascist is the will to remain the same, to reduce otherness rather than expand it, 
they’re ultimately internalizing a will against what makes one must human. One’s 
freedom that is found within otherness, this is intersubjectivity’s most essential 
realization, that the growth of “self” does not occur by oneself in place that wills 
no change at all. Such a willing only desires to be what it is not, and in doing so, 
wills only to destroy itself and its potential for being.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
139 
Conclusion 
“It is by being what I am at present, without any restrictions and without holding anything 
back, that I have a chance at progressing; it is by living my time that I can understand 
other times; it is by plunging into the present and into the world, by resolutely taking up 
what I am by chance, by willing what I will, and by doing what I do, that I can go farther.”  
 - Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, (482-483)  
 
 
The conclusion I present to you here has been reached by way of seeking out 
digitization. Throughout this dissertation, my intent has always been greater than 
to question individual digital technologies within their own right, though this of 
course has taken place through the necessity of presentable examples. And 
perhaps I too am guilty within seeking this greater sense of digitization to a 
muddiness of words and paradoxes, which I do not pretend to always overcome. 
More importantly, for myself and the contemporary moment I reside within, which 
is, digitization and the intersubjective relations it has opened to me as a being in 
this time, is a yearning to further grasp the essential nature of digitization, and 
what it can inform us of the human condition, each and every one of our own 
conditions as human. By analyzing digitization through the phenomenological 
themes of being-in-the-world, de-severance, embodiment, space as depth, and 
intersubjectivity, what becomes increasingly illuminated is  digitization not as a 
pure result of objectivity nor the internal desire of a self-contained subjectivity; 
rather, digitization is a phenomenon of the-will-to-flatten, a historic trajectory and 
result of the human being, as being-in-the-world.  
 This realization is not to deny the significance that particular philosophic 
turns within certain sociocultural and economic discoveries have had on the 
tangible development and progression towards digitization. For example, the 
Enlightenment, Industrialization, and Capitalism are ultimately so easily pointed 
to as leading the human being toward a technologically driven ideological way of 
orienting ourselves toward the world. And I believe that these historic 
developments are clearly vital to actually revealing digitization as a possibility 
through various real technologies that exist before us. And yet, digitization here 
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has been discovered to be a latent potential “within” the-will-to-flatten, one that 
truly was always already there for the human being as a transcendent de-
severant will towards nearness, which we as de-servant have always strived 
towards. The will to family and community, to conquering new territories, to 
exploring new worlds and solar systems, or to carrying a loved one along via 
photograph while traveling, is human, and this is the-will-to-flatten. Digitization 
realizes this will to a degree previously believed impossible, displaying the pure 
strength and beauty of this will. For all the harm and destruction opened by 
potential digitization, ones that we are only now realizing, the-will-to-flatten 
continues; there is a glorious persistence that radiates through the human 
condition towards this condition for nearness. The-will-to-flatten brings work, 
otherness, the family, and distant galaxies all within the confines of the screen, 
wherever our embodied exists in the world. If this will can proceed as possibility, 
its desire is clearly to expand the embodiment of being situational, teleporting 
and literally touching the unknown with one’s own hands, gazing upon it as close 
as possible with our own eyes. Perhaps even to eliminate embodiment as such, 
however impossible it has been shown that this feat is. But always, the-will-to-
flatten brings everything that the world has to offer near, visible, or invisible within 
the depth of all things, closer – as close as possible.  
The consequences of this are vast, far outreaching the potential of this 
current text, because the nuances to be found within each and every individual 
digital technology (as well as those to come) clearly demand specific attention, 
albeit, without running the risk of “bracketing” them off in a Husserlian manner, so 
as to believe that anything on its own can be understood apart from the greater 
whole. And yet, so much more attention to individual digital technologies is 
needed under this theoretic lens of the-will-to-flatten than has been allowed here, 
a reality that I am all too aware of.  
 What can be stated here, and where I find a stone upon which to jump to  
next, is within the consequences of digitization on morality and ethics. Digitization 
has changed so much, this is undeniable. And yet, so little regarding the 
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fundamental phenomenological aspects of what it means to be a human being 
have changed.  
Our embodiment, though never before so linked to the potential of digital 
worlds, is still unchanged human embodiment. Via the devices of digitization, one 
could clearly argue that the body has been opened to virtual worlds, although in 
the same instance, these virtual technologies show themselves to be fully reliant 
upon embodiment as the means of accomplishing anything within a virtual world 
at all. The irony, however, is that never before has one’s own world been so 
enjailed by the technologies that attempt to produce greater freedom. We must 
either sit or stand encapsulated by our devices, which conform themselves to our 
embodiment in order to enter us into another foreign virtual experience. And even 
if one were to reduce embodiment to the brain itself, which Merleau-Ponty so 
clearly displays is an impossibility, the brain too becomes embodiment, stationary 
as though in the film The Matrix. So, virtual reality always depends upon 
embodiment because being embodied is being situational within a world one has 
to experience. And this, the truth within the dissertation desires to display as true, 
is an unavoidable facet of being human, though it is, rather paradoxically, the 
very means by which a will to escape this condition is made possible, and so we 
strive against the provisions embodiment places upon us. 
Likewise, for the-will-to-flatten, space as depth is subconsciously 
apprehended as something to overcome. But has the human condition, our 
fundamental phenomenological experience of space changed whatsoever? I 
argue here that it is has not. The will-to-flatten, as de-severant embedment 
always already finds within the depth of space an access towards being within 
other locations, and those locations being within ourselves. We are absorbed by 
space. Like embodiment, it is the ultimate limitations of space that call on us to 
overcome it, while digitization has realized the material possibilities of physically 
being at work, though daydreaming of being in one’s home, accessing via a 
telepresence, whereby I can still engage with my family one-on-one. This access 
into space, as depth, has always been possible by depth itself. The will to find 
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new potential, as dreams and ideologies, within foreign lands has always been 
an aspect of the human being. The will to discover America, to build the first ship 
that would find it, is the result of being de-servant in worldly space. In order to 
traverse large spans of ocean, one must already have “been there,” de-severed, 
in mind. Space as depth is the very medium that calls on us to be near an idea, 
or a tangible place, or to build that new idea in a different location. And yet, 
space remains depth. Depth always conceals itself. There is always more to 
reveal, the world never fully presents itself to us, which is exactly why we search 
it. This is why we find in our current digitization the potential for even great 
nearness. I cannot yet teleport my embodiment to distant worlds, but in the 
potential of the world’s depth, I discover this longing to be achieved, the-will-to-
flatten only needs discover how within this world. And this is nothing digitization 
itself can overcome -- depth itself -- as potential cannot be overcome because 
potential is precisely why human beings will to act, because of what depth holds 
back within itself as to one day de discovered.  
Here, we come full circle to intersubjectivity. Embodiment and space open 
the will-to-flatten toward potentials; they call on us to act, but intersubjectivity is 
truly where one finds oneself. It is always the most consequential result of a 
technology because intersubjectivity is most “at home.” It is the result of who 
each and every one of us are, and the world we are in, clearly including all the 
consequences of digitization as an aspect of the-will-to-flatten, now influencing 
our intersubjectivity as never before. The results of the world being so near 
exacerbate the human condition, positive or negative, it does not change or 
diminish it. All digital technologies reflect our particular will as being-in-the-world, 
and I’m far more inclined in a Nietzschean sense to believe positive and negative 
is too reductive; there is always the in-between, the muddy territory we actually 
reside within, but wish so dedicatedly to make transparent through ultimately 
harmful oversimplification.  
Digitization brings what is near close, and what is nearest, yet always 
most distant to us, is our own being. In digitization, as it continues to influence 
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intersubjectivity, what we bring near is a reflection of none other than our own 
selves. Never before have we had such potential to bring ugliness or beauty 
near, to bring hate or love, diversity or understanding, into our own world. This is 
morality and ethics, and it is indistinguishable from who each and every one of us 
actively decide to become within a world where the-will-to-flatten has realized 
such nearness through digitization. It may sound like a cliché, but the side we 
choose to inform our lives with, what we bring most near, has never been more 
consequential to the human being.  
In what follows, my future and where I intend to take up the realizations of 
this dissertation, what is most vital to me is none other than in the field of 
digitization and its implications on our moral and ethical future. Nothing, I feel, is 
more important than this area in our current moment, and our trajectory towards 
the future. And whether my analysis finds its life within philosophy or art, or 
perhaps both, this question of digitization and the potential for the good that we 
bring near is my jumping point. As Merleau-Ponty notes at the end of 
Phenomenology of Perception, “It is by being what I am at present, without any 
restrictions and without holding anything back, that I have a chance at 
progressing; it is by living my time that I can understand other times; it is by 
plunging into the present and into the world, by resolutely taking up what I am by 
chance, by willing what I will, and by doing what I do, that I can go farther.” (pp. 
482-483). Where I decide to go further is specifically what matters most to the 
human condition, not to fight our will-to-flatten, but to see within it, through the 
digitization it has emerged, the potential to argue and seek out a better life.  
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